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The Aesthetic Paradox of Tourism 
 
Marta Benenti1 
University of Turin 
Lisa Giombini2 
Roma Tre University 
 
ABSTRACT. Everyday Aesthetics is known to be beset by a dilemma: 
how is it possible to reconcile the detached attitude that typically 
characterizes aesthetic appreciation with the nature of everyday 
routine? In this paper, the dilemma is addressed by considering 
cultural tourism as a paradigmatic case of aesthetic appreciation of 
the ordinary. By examining the aesthetic motivations that animate 
cultural tourism, the study shows that, while seeking authenticity in the 
‘un-touristed’, tourists remain trapped in their own, detached, ‘tourist 
gaze’. The analogy between the dilemma of everyday aesthetics and 
the aesthetic paradox of tourism allows for the application to the latter 
of the strategies that have been put forward to solve the former. What 
emerges is that, whereas approaches that rely on aesthetic 
detachment reproduce the dilemma, those that insist on the aesthetic 
value of the ordinary ‘as such’ offer tourists a way out of the paradox. 
Nonetheless, effective as they seem in mitigating the risk of frustration 
that may derive from touristic activities, these approaches appear to 
reduce the aesthetic to an extremely thin notion, thereby weakening 
their own theoretical strength. 
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1. Introduction 
Millions of Japanese tourists visit Paris every year. On average, 
twenty of them are so disconcerted by the gap between reality and 
their idealized image of the city, that they fall prey to the so-called 
Paris syndrome, a condition characterized by psychiatric symptoms 
including delusional states, derealization, depersonalization and 
anxiety (Viala et al., 2004). Interestingly, subjects suffering from the 
syndrome are mainly travelers concerned with the aesthetic aspect of 
their journey.3 
Psychopathology aside, the gap between expectations and 
reality is a common experience for tourists. Why? And what does this 
imply from the point of view of philosophical aesthetics? While 
disappointment may partly result from tourists’ preemptive 
idealization of the place they are visiting, there seems to be a more 
structural reason at the root of this negative experience, one related 
to the intrinsic logic of tourism as an aesthetic practice. Marrying 
insights from tourism studies with everyday aesthetics, we will focus 
on cultural tourism as a paradigmatic attempt to get to an aesthetic 
appreciation of the ordinary. 
 
2. The Dilemma of Everyday Aesthetics 
In recent years, everyday aesthetics has experienced a blossoming 
                                                             
3 The impact of this disease should not be overestimated. According to Viala et al. (2004) 
most patients affected by the Paris Syndrome had been previously treated for psychiatric 
disorders or at least were psychologically vulnerable. It is nevertheless interesting to notice 
that in the examined cases, crises were triggered by the encounter with a foreign place that 
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in the United States and is currently gaining momentum in many 
European countries (see: Leddy, 1995; Light & Smith, 2005; Levanto 
et al., 2005; Saito, 2007, Melchionne, 2013; Matteucci, 2017; Di 
Stefano, 2017). Most authors agree that one main aim of everyday 
aesthetics is to widen the unduly limited scope of traditional Western 
aesthetics beyond the realms of fine arts and nature so as to include 
phenomena that constitute people’s daily life (Saito, 2019). To this 
extent, the subject matter of everyday aesthetics seem to be those 
objects, events, and activities that are common, ordinary, and 
mundane. 
One major concern for everyday aestheticians is that if 
‘everydayness’ is characterized in terms of, commonplace, familiar 
and routine practices, it is unclear how we can have an aesthetic 
appreciation of it in the first place. This amounts to what has been 
called the fundamental dilemma (Carlson, 2014, p. 48; Saito, 2017, 
p. 44) of everyday aesthetics. The dilemma originates from the fact 
that there seems to be an inherent tension between our common 
understanding of aesthetic appreciation and the experience we make 
of everyday life. While aesthetic appreciation traditionally implies the 
appreciation of an object that is experienced in a detached and 
disinterested way, we experience everyday life objects and activities 
with practical considerations in mind that conceal their aesthetic 
potentials. This creates a conflict, for “the aesthetic pulls in one 
direction, and everyday life in another” (Carlson, 2014, p. 49).  
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to overcome this difficulty, a distinction seems to emerge around two 
main approaches. Either having an aesthetic appreciation of the 
ordinary implies a process of distancing, detachment, or 
estrangement from everyday life; or it requires an attempt to 
aesthetically appreciate the ordinary as such. 
In the former approach, the ordinary can only be aesthetically 
appreciated through a process of ‘defamiliarization’ (Saito, 2007; 
2017; 2019), which makes it appear extra-ordinary and worthy of 
aesthetic interest. According to Allen Carlson (2014), 
defamiliarization may come in three main forms. The first is a version 
of classic formalism, and consists in the process of seizing 
aesthetically appreciable features in the formal aspects of things 
which are considered devoid of aesthetic value, such as everyday 
objects.4 The second involves a sort of “artification”5, that is, a 
mechanism through which everyday objects and situations are 
shaped into something ‘art-like’ (Naukkarinen, 2012). The third 
amounts to a process of “aestheticization” of the everyday, through 
the adoption of an aesthetic attitude that “casts an aura” on the 
object of experience (Leddy, 2012). What is taken to be aesthetically 
uninteresting is ‘manipulated’ so as to acquire an aesthetic appeal. 
                                                             
4 Carlson mutuates this conception from art critics like Clive Bell and Roger Fry who 
defended formalism at the beginning of the 20th century. 
5 Introduced by anthropologist Ellen Dissanayake (2001), and developed by sociologists 
Roberta Shapiro and Nathalie Heinich (2012), the concept of artification has entered the 
aesthetic debate thanks to Ossi Naukkarinen, who defined it as “situations and processes in 
which something that is not regarded as art in the traditional sense of the word is changed 
into something art-like or into something that takes influences from artistic ways of 
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Differences notwithstanding, on all these accounts of 
defamiliarization everyday life is regarded as so familiar and routine-
like that it forms a frameless background. In order for this 
background to count as a proper object for aesthetics, it needs to be 
rendered out-of-the-ordinary, unfamiliar, or strange: it needs to be put 
in a frame. The underlying intuition is that one can discover a 
surprisingly rich aesthetic dimension in the otherwise mundane parts 
of our daily life if one isolates them from their ordinary context and 
sheds a different light on them. In John Dewey’s terms (1934), this 
implies making the anesthetic flow of our everydayness become ‘an 
experience’ endowed with pervasive character and a cohesive 
internal structure, and able to unearth latent aesthetic values in the 
most ordinary and routine. As it has been noticed, however, by over-
emphasizing defamiliarization (be it achieved by means of formalism, 
artification, or aestheticization) this strategy eventually leads to losing 
the very “everyday-ness” of everyday experience (Saito, 2017a; 
2019; Haapala, 2005; Irvin, 2008; Forsey, 2014). 
Out of this concern, the second approach maintains that the 
main aim of everyday aesthetics should be the aesthetic grasping of 
the ordinary ‘as such’. An option in this regard is to start considering 
qualities such as the familiar and the ordinary as aesthetically 
appreciable per se. Arto Haapala (2005, p. 50), for example, has 
argued that familiar places “give us pleasure through a kind of 
comforting stability, through the feeling of being at home and taking 
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Alternatively, one can point out how aesthetic experiences, 
judgments, and values are intertwined with other experiences, 
judgments, and values that are central to people’s daily lives. One 
can focus on the pleasure gained by the appropriate functioning of 
commonplace tools, thereby considering the intersection of aesthetic 
and practical concerns (Forsey 2014), or dwell on the role played by 
the knowledge one has of a familiar object’s function for its aesthetic 
appreciation (Carlson, 2014). In addition to these proposals and 
countering Dewey’s description of everyday routine as anesthetic, 
Yuriko Saito has remarked that an important part of everyday 
aesthetics’ endeavor is to pay mindful attention to all neglected 
features of the ordinary. Assuming a mindful attitude, she claims, can 
make one uncover aesthetic qualities even in those apparently 
humdrum aspects of our daily grind (Saito, 2017; 2019). This 
account, however, is not immune from criticisms either. Difficulties 
arise when trying to explain what is distinctly aesthetic in pleasures 
provided by comfort, stability, and functionality (Dowling, 2010; 
Matteucci, 2017). 
Perhaps expectedly, there is no agreement among scholars as 
to which of these approaches is more effective in solving the 
dilemma. In the remainder of this paper, we will lean on the case of 
tourism to shed some new light on this debate. Despite its 
pervasiveness as a cultural and social practice, tourism has obtained 












Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 12, 2020 
 
in philosophy more generally).6 As we will show in the next section, 
tourism in general and ‘cultural tourism’ in particular may constitute a 
revealing example for assessing the solidity of the field, especially as 
regards the above-mentioned dilemma.7 
 
3. Characterizing Touristic Experience 
A widespread and well-established practice, tourism embraces many 
distinct cultural activities, social relations, and economic interests. 
Based on what tourists gaze upon, it is possible to distinguish various 
categories of tourism (Cohen, 1979; Urry, 2002). For example, 
although most tourists are motivated by an intent to see unique 
artistic or historical objects such as monuments, many also show an 
interest in ordinary aspects of social life being undertaken by people 
in unusual contexts (Urry, 2002, p. 13). The former type of tourism 
corresponds to what has been termed ‘art tourism’ (Franklin, 2018) 
mainly aimed at seeing art somewhere else. The second, which is 
generally referred to as ‘cultural tourism’ (Hughes, 1996, 2002; 
Stylianou-Lambert, 2011), is concerned with experiencing lifestyles, 
habits, and cultural and social mechanisms as they unfold in the daily 
                                                             
6 Relevant exceptions are Tribe (2008, 2009); and Todd (2012). One problem may be that 
tourism has few defenders, constitutes an embarrassment, and seems such an easy target for 
those who attack modern culture. (Culler, 1981, p. 1). 
7 This is surprising, for everyday aestheticians have considered an astonishing variety of 
phenomena. including laundry (Saito, 2017), cooking and commuting (Highmore, 2004); 
weather (Saito, 2005; Diaconu, 2013); fashion and clothing (Schor, 2002; Iannilli, 2017), 
design (Norman, 2004; Shove et al., 2007); vacuum cleaning (Tuan, 1993); scratching an 
itch (Irvin, 2008); gardening (Carlson, 1997; Ross, 1998; Parsons, 2008; Brady et al., 
2018), landscaping, architecture, and design (Stecker, 1999; Carlson, 2000; Forsey, 2013; 
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routine of human environments other than one own’s. Despite being 
a heterogeneous field with different characteristics and needs 
(Stylianou-Lambert, 2011, p. 405), cultural tourism shows a general 
orientation of tourists to appreciating at firsthand the cultural and 
social specificity of their destination.  
How does cultural tourism impact on discussions in everyday 
aesthetics? Answering this question implies clarifying in the first 
place the extent to which cultural tourism can be treated as an 
aesthetic practice and, secondly, how it relates to an aesthetic 
appreciation of the ‘everydayness’ of a certain place. In what follows, 
we will address each of these concerns in turn. 
 
3.1 The Search for Aesthetic Pleasure 
In the tourism literature, it is commonly held that one first motivation 
for cultural tourism is the fulfilment of pleasurable experiences 
(Hughes, 1996; Richards, 2013). Yet, the type of expectations 
animating the practice are not only relaxation, recreation, or 
entertainment. As studies testify, tourism is often and primarily driven 
by aesthetic considerations, giving rise to some forms of aesthetic 
pleasure (Todd, 2009; 2012; Maitland and Smith, 2012; Kirillova et. 
al, 2014).  
A crucial notion in this regard was introduced by sociologist 
John Urry (2002) in his seminal examination of tourism as a social 
practice, which holds together anthropological, economical, and 
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concept of ‘the gaze’, Urry developed the idea of the tourist gaze, the 
attitude adopted by tourists towards the environment, the objects, the 
people and the events that they encounter during their travel. As an 
attitude, the tourist gaze is for Urry neither a ‘natural’ nor a modern 
phenomenon, but one which emerged under specific historical 
circumstances in Western culture. In particular, Urry traces its roots 
back to earlier configurations of travel such as the ‘Grand Tour’— the 
travel through Europe which was considered, from the late 
seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, an essential part of 
upper-class education. The tourist gaze, however, only fully formed 
as a result of the exponential growth of personal travel in the second 
part of the twentieth century (Urry, 2002, pp. 4—5).  
From a theoretical point of view, the tourist gaze can be 
described as a way of perceiving or relating to places which cuts 
them off from the ‘real world’ and emphasizes the exotic aspects of 
the tourist experience (Harrison, 2013, p. 107). Assuming the tourist 
gaze implies for Urry (2002, pp. 1–2) to “look at the environment with 
interest and curiosity [...]” and “engage with a set of stimuli that 
contrast with the everyday and the mundane”. As it has been noticed 
(Howard, 2016, p. 34) this adoption of a peculiar ‘detached’ attitude 
relates Urry’s tourist gaze to the notion of ‘aesthetic gaze’. 
Developed during the late Renaissance, Enlightenment and 
Romantic eras, the aesthetic gaze defines the “disinterested interest” 
that characterizes, in Kant’s terms, aesthetic experience (Scruton, 
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provides the paradigmatic case of aesthetic gaze in that her interest 
in the experienced object satisfies “no bodily appetite or need” nor it 
is aimed at any useful information. “The interest”, he writes (2007, p. 
36), “is disinterested – an interest in the landscape for its own sake, 
for the very thing that it is (or rather, for the very thing that it 
appears)”. 
When it comes to touristic experiences, this aesthetic 
detachment seems to be enhanced by the physical distance of the 
visitor from her own home. Because tourism entails traveling a 
certain distance, the targeted environment is perceived as new or 
less familiar to tourists than the usual environment (Kirillova & Lehto, 
2015, p. 3). The impression of novelty facilitates the modes of 
aesthetic appreciation by enabling a process of estrangement or the 
“casting an aura” (Leddy, 2012, p. 127) on what is experienced; 
which makes having ‘an experience’—in Dewey’s terms—possible.  
Another way of referring to this process is what Haapala (2005) 
calls ‘strangeness’, i.e., the basic experience we undergo when 
finding ourselves in a new environment, for example when we visit a 
foreign city for the first time. Experiencing strangeness, according to 
Haapala, leads to an intensification of sensual perception resulting in 
a better appreciation of the environment’s aesthetic features: “When 
we face something unfamiliar, we pay special attention to it. We 
observe the thing, we try to categorize it, we may think as to what to 
do with the object, whether it is of any use for us or not. We are also 
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44). Strangeness involves the adoption of what Haapala terms the 
“outsider’s gaze”, an attitude that—owing to a lack of practical 
interests—makes us sensitive to details and features we ignore in 
our familiar environment.8 
 
3.2. The Search for Authenticity in the Everyday 
As seen, an important reason why people practice cultural tourism is 
tourists’ attempt to derive aesthetic pleasures from experiencing 
everyday situations in the selected destination. But how should this 
attempt be characterized? Looking more closely at tourists’ habits 
and aims, it seems that not only do tourists want to live pleasant 
experiences. They also expect these experiences to lack those 
qualities explicitly intended for tourist satisfaction. As remarked by 
Cain Todd (2013, p. 72), cultural tourism is motivated by a desire to 
experience people and places “more or less unaffected by the 
various influences that govern the tourist’s everyday reality”. This 
corresponds to what he calls the ‘un-touristed’.9 Thus, on the one 
hand, tourists strive to find themselves immersed in that special 
place they have only seen in movies or in the glossy pages of travel 
magazines. On the other hand, what they perceive as most important 
is that this experience be a firsthand experience. They aim to be 
                                                             
8 The need to crystallize the experience by means of pictures and videos attests the role of 
tourists as aesthetic beholders: “People linger over [the tourist gaze] which is then normally 
visually objectified or captured through photographs, postcards, films, models and so on. 
These enable the gaze to be endlessly reproduced and recaptured” (Urry, 2002, p. 3).  
9 An evidence of this is that part of what it means to be a tourist is to dislike tourists based 
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present in, interact with, feel connected to and grasp the ‘true 
essence’ of the visited place.  
The being real and unspoiled of a place represents indeed a 
crucial value when it comes to assess a touristic experience (Kirillova 
and Lehto, 2015, p. 12). Interestingly for the sake of our study, the 
search for the un-touristed gives rise to a particular fascination with 
the ‘lives of others’. Tourists desire to share in the ‘real life’ of the 
places visited, even to get in with the natives or at least to see how 
life “as it really is lived” (MacCannell, 1999, p. 94) is reflected in the 
appearance of those places. They long for insights in the intimate 
backstage everyday of the locals: “Being ‘one of them’, or at one with 
‘them’ (ibid.). Such an interest is not limited to contemporary people 
and cultures but rather spans time, crosses social classes, and 
embraces the routine of distant eras. Tourists are often fuelled by a 
wish to travel back in time (Taylor, 1994; MacCannell, 2001; Larsen, 
2008) towards idyllic townscapes, where time moves slowly if at all 
(Waitt and Head, 2002). Ordinary life becomes therefore the object of 
an aesthetic endeavor that can be accomplished only as long as 
routines, habits, and daily activities present themselves as genuine 
and indifferent to the curious gaze of the tourist. In short, tourism, as 
a social practice, amounts to a quest for authenticity (Boorstin, 1961; 
Cohen, 1972, 1979; MacCannell, 1973; Rojek, 1995; Ritzer, 1998; 
Wang, 1999; Urry, 2002; Reisinger and Steiner, 2006). 
While it seems relatively easy to understand if an object such as 
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evidence, the meaning of authenticity is much blurrier when cultural 
items such as rituals, festivals, cuisine, housing, traditions and other 
social habits are concerned. However, in Jonathan Culler’s words 
(1981, p. 5) “The distinction between the authentic and the 
inauthentic, the natural and the touristy, is a powerful semiotic 
operator within tourism”. In tourism advertising, for example, not only 
are we confronted with the classical motifs of ‘the typical medieval 
house’, ‘the very place where Napoleon slept’, but also with common 
refrains about locations that are ‘off the beaten track’, ‘off the tourist 
circuit’, ‘unspoiled’, ‘patronized by the locals’. 
Stressing the relevance of the notion of authenticity in the 
tourism discourse, MacCannell (1999, p. 49), for example, has gone 
so far as to define tourism “a modern version of the universal human 
concern with the sacred”. The tourist, he argues, is a kind of 
contemporary pilgrim, seeking authenticity in other ‘times’ and other 
‘places’ (MacCannell 1999, pp. 42–48. See also Turner and Turner, 
1978). Like ancient pilgrims, tourists are led in their quest by the 
search of signs of authenticity, genuineness, and unspoiledness. As 
a place is ‘reified’, the tourist’s gaze searches for a label that makes 
an element stand out and renders it worthy of observation and 
reproduction (Cortese & De Nicolai, 2019, p. 173). Tour organizers 
also use signs and markers of authenticity—souvenirs, postcards, 
statues, pictures—to influence how tourists think and feel with 
respect to the visited places (MacCannell, 1999, p. 110).10 Markers 
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of authenticity provide the frame for what is worth gazing upon, so 
that authenticity ends up consisting in what appears or looks 
authentic (Culler, 1981, p. 5). As happens paradigmatically in the 
case of the aesthetic gaze, the interest is visual, concerned with 
appearances as “signs of themselves” (Scruton, 2007, p. 36).  
This has led some to conclude that tourists’ interest in 
authenticity may in fact be contradictory (Handler and Linnekin, 1984; 
Spooner, 1986; Cohen, 1988; Bruner, 1989, 1994; Wood, 1993; 
Taylor, 2001). Whatever it is that the tourist is going to see, it is no 
longer ‘authentic’ just because the tourists are there (Turner, 1994). 
In Culler’s words:  
 
The paradox, the dilemma of authenticity, is that to be 
experienced as authentic it must be marked as authentic, but 
when it is marked as authentic it is mediated, a sign of itself, 
and hence lacks the authenticity of what is truly unspoiled, 
untouched by mediating cultural codes [...] The authentic sight 
requires markers, but our notion of the authentic is the 
unmarked. (Culler, 1981, p. 8) 
 
Authenticity in tourism is thus ‘staged’ (MacCannell, 1973) or 
‘pretended’, inasmuch as the toured object is designed and set up to 
be recognized and labeled as genuine or real. 
                                                                                                                                                           
pamphlets) that constitutes a touristic attraction by giving information about it, representing 
it, making it recognizable. We can adopt the expression ‘symbolic authenticity’ (Culler, 
1981) to refer to tourists’ willingness to perceive toured objects as being symbols of 
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4. Tourism and Everyday Aesthetics 
There is, however, a further and more structural contradiction 
undermining cultural tourism, one that does not simply call into 
question the way tourism is organized and marketed as a social and 
economic practice, but one that also challenges its value as an 
aesthetic practice. Cultural tourism can indeed be conceived of as a 
paradigm of the aesthetic interest for the ordinary, which is 
spotlighted, framed, and enjoyed for the sake of its specific 
appearances. In this sense, tourism’s internal contradiction may turn 
out to have implications for the broader philosophical debate in 
everyday aesthetics.  
 
4.1 The Aesthetic Paradox of Tourism  
The tension originates from the two distinct yet intertwined drives that 
animate cultural tourism. On the one hand, tourists aim to draw 
aesthetic pleasure from observing how daily life and its routines 
enroll in the selected tourist destination. Importantly, they do so via 
the adoption of what we have called the ‘tourist gaze’, a special kind 
of aesthetic gaze that leads the subject to a process of aesthetic 
detachment, estrangement or defamiliarization from what she 
observes. On the other hand, tourists also show to have an interest 
that what they see be unspoiled, unaltered, untouristised. For this 
purpose, they direct their attention towards visible signs that can 
attest its authenticity.  
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two drives are mutually in conflict. When tourists gaze aesthetically 
upon someone else’s everyday life, they look for contexts and 
practices that are not conceived to be gazed upon but are lived in or 
performed by the locals for functional purposes. What are just 
practicalities for the inhabitants of Paris, are contemplated by tourists 
with an aesthetic eye that heightens the “aesthetic potential” of the 
experience (Haapala, 2005, pp. 43–44). 
Here comes the paradox, though, since it is unclear whether 
one can attain the authentic nature of activities that are not 
intrinsically aesthetic by adopting and keeping an aesthetic attitude. 
Observing the everydayness of a place via the tourist gaze means to 
detach oneself from it, but this precludes the immersive process that 
allows one to grasp the place’s authentic (everyday) nature—which 
again is not aesthetic but rather primarily oriented towards the 
satisfaction of practical and functional needs. This creates a friction, 
for it seems that in the very moment in which everydayness becomes 
the object of the tourist’s appreciation, either the ordinariness of the 
experience gets lost, or its aesthetic potential. Since tourists cannot 
escape their tourist gaze (Todd, 2013, p. 72), they find themselves in 
the paradoxical situation of wanting what by definition they cannot 
have, exactly because they are tourists, i.e., grasping the authentic 
nature of the ordinary while appreciating it aesthetically.  
These considerations allow us to shed light on the Paris 
Syndrome, by which we began our study. Clearly, the syndrome 
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expectations and the reality of the place they are visiting.11 But more 
radically, common occurrence of a sense of dissatisfaction or 
discomfort in tourists can be explained by reference to the tension 
arising between the two opposing and self-defeating demands that 
drive cultural tourism. Like the anthropologist (Malinowski, 1922), the 
tourist is trapped into a paradoxical situation. Either she manages to 
have an aesthetic appreciation of what she experiences—at the 
expense of grasping its authenticity—or, to grasp authenticity, she 
fails in her attempt to have an aesthetic appreciation of it. 
Consequently, unpleasant feelings of deception, betrayal or 
disappointment may follow. 
 
4.2 Implications for Everyday Aesthetics 
The paradox of tourism stems thus from a combination between a 
notion of tourist gaze that entails some form of disinterested 
aesthetic detachment, and the need to appreciate authentic features 
of a place’s ordinary routine. To this extent, it seems to share the 
same premises of what has been called the ‘dilemma of everyday 
aesthetics’. This gives us ground to exploit cultural tourism as a sort 
of test-bench to prove the validity of the strategies that have been 
proposed to solve the dilemma. 
To recall, the first strategy, as proposed by author such as 
                                                             
11 As Urry notes, touristic destinations are chosen “because there is anticipation, especially 
through daydreaming and fantasy, of intense pleasures […]. Such anticipation is 
constructed and sustained through a variety of non-tourist practices, such as film, TV, 
literature, magazines, records and videos, which construct and reinforce that gaze” (Urry, 
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Leddy (2012) and Naukkarinen (2012) resorts to so-called 
defamiliarization as what allows one to have an aesthetic 
appreciation of the ordinary. Processes of distancing and “casting an 
aura”, that are meant to make us appreciate what we overlook as 
humdrum routine, are in place in cultural tourism. As the tourist turns 
sipping a café noisette on a boulevard into an aesthetic 
phenomenon, so the everyday appreciator “manipulates” a quotidian 
activity, e.g., vacuum cleaning, in order to make it the object of 
aesthetic appreciation. These processes of aestheticization, 
however, are at the origin of the paradox. As a matter of fact, 
activities such as having breakfast and vacuum cleaning owe their 
nature to their being functional to the aims of survival, hygiene and, 
more generally, wellbeing. Although pursuing these aims can bring 
about pleasures of various kinds, aesthetic pleasure is not what 
identifies them in the first place. What makes these things what they 
are, is that they are not devised for aesthetic appreciation. This 
explains why their aestheticization leads to a betrayal of their 
authentic nature. Arguably, the potential frustration that the tourist 
thereby faces mirrors the failure of this strategy to overcome the 
dilemma of everyday aesthetics. When the ordinary is gazed through 
an aesthetic filter, it lends itself to aesthetic appreciation only as long 
as its inherent ordinariness fades into the background. 
In contrast with this attempt to make the ordinary extraordinary, 
the alternative strategy requires that one tries and appreciates the 
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second account, all those perceivable qualities of everyday life that 
are part of our experience can count as aesthetic properties. Not only 
beauty and sublimity, but also functionality, comfort, safety, and 
familiarity (Haapala, 2005; Carlson, 2014); not only traditionally 
positive, ‘honorific’ values, but also negative qualities such as 
dreariness, tediousness or monotony may be considered 
aesthetically significant (Saito, 2007, pp. 26—27). All what is needed 
to grasp their aesthetic potential is that one devotes specific attention 
to them. Attentiveness is indeed what discloses the potential 
aesthetic value of things: the prerequisite of any kind of aesthetic 
experience (Saito, 2007, p. 56). Aesthetically appreciating the 
ordinary qua ordinary amounts thus to adopting an attentive, mindful 
attitude towards one’s surroundings—be it perceptual (Saito, 2007), 
affective (Haapala, 2005) or cognitive (Carlson, 2014)—so as to 
seize what is aesthetically valuable in there without distorting their 
everyday nature.  
Applied to the case-study of cultural tourism, this strategy 
implies that the tourist gaze be reconfigured as a mindful relation to 
the toured place or cultural habit, rather than a form of aesthetic 
detachment. Interestingly, this goes in the direction of softening the 
exceptionality of the tourist gaze compared to the look we devote to 
our everyday routine. If the tourist gaze is reduced to a conscious 
attitude towards what one encounters, and if such conscious attitude 
can be directed towards one’s own everyday life, then being a tourist 
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own familiar environment. As Theopisti Stylianou-Lambert (2011, pp. 
407–408) writes: “Multiple layers of ‘gazes’, which can be used both 
at home and away, might be in effect at any time”.12 
Reshaping her own tourist gaze, the visitor is offered an 
opportunity to grasp and enjoy a wide variety of aspects of the visited 
resorts, including those that are often hidden by standard marketing 
advertisement. A more conscious attitude gives tourists a chance to 
appreciate every aspect of the visited place’s quotidian life in a way 
that is ideally as close as possible to that of the locals. Similarly to 
what they may achieve ‘at home’ by disengaging “the autopilot” of the 
everyday (Saito, 2017, p. 24), tourists may therefore become more 
receptive to anything the place and its inhabitants may show them. 
Thus, unlike strategies based on defamiliarization—which keep on 
reproducing the paradox of tourism—this second account can offer 
us a therapeutic prescription to reduce tourism’s disappointing effects 
such as the Paris Syndrome.  
 Promising as it seems to be in increasing people’s wellbeing 
while travelling, however, this approach turns out to be more like a 
loophole than a real solution for the paradox of tourism. Indeed, the 
strategy works because it makes no difference between the various 
                                                             
12 Challenging Urry’s opposition between the ordinariness of everyday life and the 
extraordinariness of tourism, many recent studies have pointed out that this sharp 
dichotomy has been artificially construed for research purposes, but it proves to be 
unfaithful to the reality of contemporary tourism (Uriely, 2005; Bærenholdt et al., 2007; 
Stylianou-Lambert, 2011). An attenuation of the distinction between the way we look at our 
daily lives and the way we explore touristic destinations is also advocated by Alain de 
Botton, who urges the extension of a curious gaze to our everyday, familiar surroundings 
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objects to which one’s attention is directed, on the premise that all 
objects, places, activities, and context can be equally worthy of 
attention. The underpinning idea is that the difference between one’s 
experience as a tourist and one’s experience at home can be 
minimized to a point where it becomes irrelevant to distinguish 
between being an outsider and being a local. In this sense, if 
adopting mindfulness weakens the power of the paradox, it is just 
because it undermines the notion of tourist altogether. 
 This has implications for the dilemma of everyday aesthetics. 
For sure, mindfulness allows us, both as tourists and in our everyday 
life routines, to become more sensitive to previously neglected 
aspects of our everydayness. When home, it may equip us to better 
appreciate our own familiar milieu and to enjoy the practicalities of 
our everyday life. As tourists, it may lead us to immerse ourselves 
into the quotidianity of the visited place, thus satisfying our ‘quest for 
authenticity’. What remains unexplained, though, is why the value of 
these mindful experiences of the ordinary as such— positive as they 
may be for our overall wellbeing—should be regarded as aesthetic in 
a proper sense of the term. Indeed, although adopting a more 
attentive attitude towards quotidian life can be satisfactory in many 
possible ways, it must be specified how these ways should be 
regarded as aesthetic in the first place. To what extent can the 
outcome of our attention count as an aesthetic experience? And what 
ensures that once we have placed the humdrum aspects of everyday 
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will appear significant to us from a specific aesthetic point of view 
and not, as it may be the case, from a different cognitive, 
epistemological, social, biological, perspective? 
While in the case of cultural tourism this second strategy works 
by blurring the difference between the tourist and the inhabitant, the 
outsider and the local, thus undermining the notion of tourism from 
within, when it comes to the issue of everyday aesthetics, it blends 
together different values, interests and pleasures, and reduces them 
all to an undefined notion of aesthetic appreciation. Therefore, 
although it perhaps puts us in a better position to appreciate the 
ordinary as such, it does so at the expense of making the aesthetic a 
fuzzy concept.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we argued that cultural tourism, considered as an 
aesthetic practice, is intrinsically paradoxical. Though motivated by 
the fulfilment of aesthetic expectations through the aesthetic 
detachment that characterizes the ‘tourist gaze’, cultural tourism is 
also driven by a quest for authenticity via the immersion in the 
everyday routines of the visited places. These two desiderata, 
however, prove to be mutually irreconcilable. As the extreme case of 
the Paris Syndrome attests, this tension can generate more or less 
profound forms of disappointment. Treated as a paradigmatic case of 
aesthetic appreciation of the ordinary, cultural tourism provides a 
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dilemma of everyday aesthetics. Whereas strategies that rely on 
defamiliarization fall prey of the dilemma anew, those that stress the 
aesthetic value of the ordinary ‘as such’ manage to reduce the risk of 
disappointment. Nonetheless, by minimizing the distinction between 
the tourist and the local, these latter approaches work round the 
paradox instead of solving it, leaving us with a residual notion of what 
is ‘aesthetic’. Viewed through the lens of cultural tourism, neither the 
first nor the second kind of strategies can resolve the dilemma of 
everyday aesthetics. The aesthetics of the everyday may appear 
therefore like a promise that can hardly be kept: having an aesthetic 
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ABSTRACT. This paper aims to broaden the account of the aesthetic 
experience of design objects proposed by Jane Forsey (2013) by 
leveraging such objects' technological origin. Forsey's theory focuses 
on the conditions by which it is possible to aesthetically evaluate a 
design object as beautiful compared to other objects that perform the 
same function. The present account questions if Forsey's proposal is 
genuinely a theory of beauty particular to design, or if it is a theory of 
beauty of craft that adapts to design. To pose this question is to 
highlight the industrial origin as a valuable factor in design's aesthetic 
experience. This factor is usually considered in negative terms due to 
its immediate connection to mass consumption. Mass production is 
taken to emphasize a flat aestheticization and the standardization of 
consumers due to its depersonalizing effect. This type of explanation 
implies a hierarchy where the aesthetic experience of crafted objects 
is richer than the experience of mechanically produced artifacts. In this 
article, I suggest that the privileged position of the aesthetics of design 




Jane Forsey (2013) proposes the sphere of design objects as a valid 
                                                             












Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 12, 2020 
 
category for an analysis that brings out everyday life's aesthetic 
dimension. Her proposal fits in the developing trend that consists of 
going beyond traditional aesthetics understood as the Philosophy of 
Art, i.e., Everyday Aesthetics (EA), a theoretical paradigm that 
overflows into everyday life. However, it should be specified that 
Forsey places herself among EA scholars who do not deem it 
necessary to venture into new philosophical conceptualization to 
establish what is aesthetic in the everyday. Such an approach holds 
on to the philosophical tradition as a fertile ground that allows us to 
turn to the aesthetic dimension of the daily round of activities and its 
objects (expansive approach).2 For this reason, Forsey finds no 
obstacles in expanding the Kantian theory of beauty to a new 
category of objects: objects of design. 
 
2. Intuitively identifying Design 
In her book The Aesthetics of Design (2013), Forsey examines with 
particular attention what we intuitively understand as "design" against 
the backdrop of definitions of art and craft in circulation. After the 
analysis, Forsey proposes the following working definition: “Design 
[…] is functional, immanent, mass-produced, and mute” (Forsey, 
2013, p.68). This definition suggests that the scope of her aesthetics 
of design is “an object” (Forsey, 2013, p.19) rather than the design 
process behind it. Moreover, this object differs from what we 
commonly understand as art and crafts for the four features listed 
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above. First of all, a design object must fulfill a function; it must be a 
functional object. Secondly, this object must be something we 
encounter in everyday life, such as a pen, a coffee cup, or a 
toothbrush; it is a kind of object that does not encompass “the 
transcendent or the profound” (Forsey, 2013, p.17), so it is 
immanent. So far, these characteristics could also refer to the 
ceramic cup we bought in an artisan workshop; therefore, Forsey 
urges to specify that a design object is also a mass product: “Design 
is an emergent twentieth-century phenomenon that depends on the 
means of mass production in a way that art and craft do not.” 
(Forsey, 2013, p.23) Finally, design objects are not designed to 
convey content that the end-user must interpret as he would do in 
front of a Duchamp. In everyday life, a urinal is a urinal; it is mute.  
Being functional, immanent, mass-produced, and mute, in other 
words, very ordinary, how dare we call design beautiful? Jane Forsey 
does not feel uncomfortable describing the experience of design’s 
beauty with “the somewhat emphatic conceptual language inherited 
from the philosophy of the past.” (Vattimo, 1998, p.67) 
 
3. The Beauty of Design  
Jane Forsey proposes an aesthetics of design based on the 
appraisal of the object because of “the perfection in the way it fulfills 
its purpose” (Forsey, 2013, p.162) in connection to the Kantian notion 
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This notion is the starting point supporting the expansive 
approach in EA and for a general renewal of Kantian aesthetics. In 
fact, in addition to establishing a debate with everyday aestheticians, 
Forsey's proposal enters into dialogue with the long tradition that has 
tried to update the Kantian notion of beauty beyond its limitations 
linked to eighteenth-century taste. The main argument in this 
direction is that the notion of dependent beauty, and the judgment 
related to it, is the most pervasive in everyday life. Still, traditional 
aesthetics has been mainly concerned with the Kantian notion 
of free beauty.3 Free beauty, says Forsey, is an exceptional event on 
which Kant has invested a good part of the Third Critique precisely 
because of its rarity. In contrast, the more common dependent 
beauty represents the norm. Given the ubiquity of design, Forsey can 
say that “design exemplifies the way that anything at all can be 
experienced aesthetically, [and] that these experiences can be more 
common and intimate than those of art.” (Forsey, 2013, p.246) 
I am not going to develop this issue in detail. Still, it is worth 
explaining Kant's distinction between free beauty and dependent 
beauty briefly, as presented in the Critique of Judgement:4 
 
                                                             
3 Famous is the attack by Hans Georg Gadamer, who identified the playful element of art 
"as a self-movement that does not pursue any particular end or purpose," thus excluding 
from the horizon of beauty "the secondary forms of the decorative arts and crafts." (Vitta, 
2011:27; Ref. Gadamer, 1986:23) 
4 All quotations from Kant follow the English translations by Werner S. Pluhar in 1987 
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There are two kinds of beauty, free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) 
and merely accessory beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens). Free 
beauty does not presuppose a concept of what the object is 
[meant] to be. Accessory beauty does presuppose such a 
concept, as well as the object’s perfection in terms of that 
concept. The free kinds of beauty are called (self-subsistent) 
beauties of this or that thing. The other kind of beauty is 
accessory to a concept (i.e., it is conditioned beauty) and as 
such is attributed to objects that fall under the concept of a 
particular purpose. (Kant, 1987:77) 
 
Real flowers, but also decorative wallpapers and music without topic 
are for Kant objects that we judge independently from their purposes 
since they “mean nothing on their own.” (Kant, 1987, p.77) Buildings 
and horses (today we would probably say “cars”) are evaluated 
aesthetically dependent on “the concept of the purpose that 
determines what the thing is [meant] to be” (Kant, 1987, p.77); that is, 
its functionality. Forsey, following Kant, claims that we can 
aesthetically appreciate a specific chair because it performs 
excellently compared to other chairs we have sat on. She claims that 
“its beauty comes to light only through everyday use, and only when 
it succeeds in performing its function to a degree that merits our 
approbation” (Forsey, 2013, p.242) and “this appreciation is the kind 
of aesthetic judgment that is particular to design. Design excellence 
is extraordinary in the sense that some objects are better than the 
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Moreover, dependent beauty presupposes adherence to the 
concept of what the object must be (e.g. “mug,” “chair,” “telephone,” 
“bathtub”), and the perfection of the object concerning this concept. 
Forsey is explicit about the fact that  
 
[d]esigns […] have specific purposes devised by their creators, 
and if we are to judge them dependently beautiful […], we must 
know what these purposes are and whether they fulfill them 
reasonably well, or perfectly. […] if we are presented with an 
object whose function we cannot determine, we can only, at 
best, find it freely beautiful if at all. (Forsey, 2013, p.171)  
 
One doubt arises. Formulated in this way, could not the appraisal be 
equally addressed to an object of craftsmanship? How can Forsey 
declare that this judgment is particular to design objects? 
 
4. Rich experience of craft and deficient experience of 
design 
In the space of this section, it is worth quoting a more extended 
passage from The Aesthetics of Design, where the Canadian 
philosopher distinguishes between an aesthetic judgment of craft 
objects and an aesthetic judgment of designs: 
 
[…] the free play of the faculties when faced with a work of craft 
will consider the contingency of the way that object fulfills its 
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given raw material. With judgements of design, we do not 
attend to this aspect of the object: we feel no individual hand at 
work when we appraise a laptop computer or a car, and we do 
not judge it according to how a single individual has 
manipulated some raw material to produce it. (Forsey, 2013, 
p.180) 
 
Our appreciation of design lacks regard for the craftsman's manual 
skills since a machine produced the object.  
Two issues might be raised here.  
 
(1)  Is our feeling, thus described, justified? If something looks 
handmade, it does not necessarily mean it is. As a matter of fact, 
advanced technologies can replicate a “manual” touch on products. 
Typical is the case of ceramics. The ceramic glazing process, even if 
applied industrially, results as unique and different for each product. 
Moreover, ceramic products that are manually glazed and decorated 
are often the result of industrial molds. I will not elaborate on this 
aspect here, but I hope the next section will render it more explicit. 
 
(2)  The aesthetic judgment thus formulated by Forsey is none 
other than a theory of beauty of craft, which adapts to design by 
removing the acknowledgment of “the individual (hand) behind that 
object's manufacture.” (Forsey, 2013, p.180) In this sense, we have a 
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this consideration would suffice to exclude the possibility of 
considering Forsey's proposal as properly relating to design.  
 
What could be a formulation that indeed does justice to the design 
object? Can this feeling of “no individual hand at work” be seen in 
favorable terms? Does recognizing that an object is mechanically 
produced have a positive effect on its appraisal? Even Forsey herself 
acknowledges that “Design is an emergent twentieth-century 
phenomenon that depends on the means of mass production in a 
way that art and craft do not.” (Forsey, 2013, p.23) Is it possible that 
all her enthusiasm for design pales in the face of the 
impersonal nature of its creation? Isn’t it perhaps the beauty of 
unspoiled nature that teaches us that the display of human skills is 
not always to be appraised?  
 
5. Positivity in industrial production? 
The philosophical tradition that has seen in technological 
development a reason for decreeing a crisis of cultural values, often 
in negative terms, is long. Those philosophers that dealt with the 
industrial revolution—the historical origin of design—have mainly put 
pressure on this crisis's negative aspects for the arts. Educated to 
this approach, even contemporary interpreters appoint industrial 
production value in terms of negative significance, mostly by 
identifying its products by their commodity character, which manifests 
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widespread aestheticization of contemporary society and the 
collapse of high art. The products of the industry—mass-produced 
industrial products, or, more simply, design—from the very 
beginning, emerged as a philistine threat to the noble purpose of the 
arts. 
In the second phase of his thought, Walter Benjamin 
emphasized the implications of the new technological advancements 
that favored the mechanical reproducibility of images in the form of 
photography and cinema. According to the German philosopher, 
these processes have involved a change in the perception and 
attention to art. The well-known essay “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction” from 1935 refers specifically to 
photography and cinematographic images. Still, we can read his 
conclusions bearing in mind also mass-produced everyday objects. 
An essential issue for Benjamin is the loss of art's cultual value—
uniqueness and authenticity, the hic et nunc, which he identified with 
the aura—in favor of an exhibition value, intended for the masses. In 
other words, the visibility of the image (and the object) becomes 
more important than its existence. (Mecacci, 2012, p.115) When the 
image/object is devised to be mechanically produced, i.e., it is 
already re-produced at birth, the idea of its authenticity vanishes. 
Suppose we want to make a parallel similar to what Benjamin 
proposes. In that case, we can say that we have moved from 
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experience of design objects5, which feeds consumption—the shame 
of contemporary society. This is the negative idea that generally 
remains impressed by a superficial reading of Benjamin's text.  
Another question, closely related to mechanical production and 
reproducibility, is the obsolescence of objects related to market laws. 
More specifically, obsolescence addresses the loss of performance 
and economic value that everyday objects suffer due to changes in 
fashion or technological advancements. It is precisely this language 
that Karl Marx uses in his lecture on the obsolescence of goods in 
the early twentieth century. As he mentioned in his early writings, 
especially in “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” this 
obsolescence finds its place in the dialectic between production and 
consumption, which generated, in the philosophical discourse, the 
well-known equivalence between design objects and semiotic 
fetishism. (Baudrillard, 1981) 
Not to mention how Marx made the socio-cultural implications of 
industrial production public and shared in the collective imagination 
with the concept of alienation, which arises precisely from the factory. 
This awareness of the crisis of that era still conditions our approach 
to things produced in factories and elevates a curtain of artistic 
individualism around the craft workshop, with its well-aligned tools 
and the craftsman's hands who carefully shape the rough material.  
                                                             
5 It must be emphasized that Walter Benjamin postulates the distracted perception of the 
mass as the genuine experience of architectural work, and such can also be the genuine 
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This image evokes John Ruskin's criticism of the industry. The 
often-quoted passage from The Seven Lamps of Architecture reads 
as follows: “all cast and machine work is bad, as work. [...] a piece of 
terra cotta or of plaster of Paris, which has been wrought by the 
human hand, is worth all the stone in Carrara, cut by machinery.” 
(Ruskin, 1849, p.81,84) In other words, the elimination of any manual 
intervention by the designer contributed to the utmost impersonality 
of design—an impersonality also reflected in the standardization of 
form and function. All this invests, still today, the general image of 
design with a specific “cynical power,” as a machine that produces 
needs for an anonymous mass.  
Nevertheless, as Rafael Cardoso has noted, there is a habit of 
misinterpreting Ruskin’s thought on design exclusively “as 
constituting an attack on industry and a defense of handicraft.” 
(Cardoso, 2010, p.325). If at the dawn of industrialization, it is true 
that Ruskin saw machines as a threat, later, his criticism was mainly 
aimed at factory work as inhumane and not at mechanical production 
per se. Cardoso stresses that there have been several shifts in 
industrial paradigms throughout history whose implications are rarely 
considered. For example, regarding the industrial developments of 
the early twentieth century, Cardoso points out how public opinion 
towards industrial production has changed, resulting in the 
recognition that “industrial artifacts possess an elegance and integrity 
of their own, quite divorced from any considerations of the nobility of 
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new perfectibility for industrial artifacts; and designers would 
henceforth play the key role in ensuring that machine work was as 
attractive as it was efficient and cheap.” (Cardoso, 2010, p.327) For a 
more recent example, it should suffice considering the quality 
attributed in the second half of the twenty-first century to Japanese 
industrial production: walkman, stereos, kitchen utensils produced 
then still work today. 
This brief listing intends to bring out a specific bias of perception 
towards industrial products that has not changed to date, but it is 
unfounded, or at least simplistic despite everything. Demonizing 
rhetoric has led to creating a “tired dichotomy” between 
craftsmanship and design, which still resonates in a common 
hierarchical perception of the nobility of craftsmanship and the 
machine product's crudeness. (Cardoso, 2010) This hierarchization 
depends on the fact that, as the Italian historian Renato De Fusco 
(1999) has pointed out, design has lacked an apparatus that would 
promote its culture for a long time. The design museum's 
phenomenon is something very recent, and, unfortunately, still 
mimics the exhibition strategies that pertain to art, focusing on 
displays suitable for contemplation rather than addressing what 
properly belongs to design: functionality and its technological 
valence. Thus, design is promoted as an appealing layer to conceal 
objects’ industrial and commercial complexion. Yet, it is not true that 
the way how a design objects look is divorced from the way how they 
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If Everyday Aesthetics, in Forsey’s understanding and in its 
systematic vocation, wants to start from design must be sensitive to 
the technological condition, which allows to acknowledge the plurality 
of taste and to counter the tendency to reduce the aesthetic 
discourse on design to the phenomenon of aestheticization. The 
latter results from approaching design from the point of view of a 
“commodity aesthetics” that is inherently destined to see design in its 
mere capitalist vocation since it does not distinguish between means 
of production and medium of production. The first term, as has been 
intended in the philosophical tradition, accentuates the question of 
mass production and distribution; on the contrary, reformulating the 
issue in terms of the medium requires a specific aesthetic theory to 
define its modes of appreciation. It will then be possible to revalue 
the question of the aesthetic experience of mass-produced everyday 
objects. This does not necessarily mean focusing on medium-
specificity to feed the old debate on the ontology of art forms for 
which design, as an art form, needs to be interpreted as a reflection 
on technology.6 The appeal I propose is only meant to underline that 
we appreciate, and are fascinated by, how design objects are 
produced. 
This approach also has additional benefits. The aesthetics of 
design has an advantage over other aesthetics because it has 
privileged access to the technological question. In other words, an 
                                                             
6 This has already been done by the Futurists in Italy and the Constructivists in Russia in 
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account for the appreciation of the outcome of advanced 
technological mediums might start with design. 
Moreover, thus supplemented aesthetic theory of design allows 
to get closer to the well-established Philosophy of Design, as the 




Jane Forsey succeeds in her task of showing that the everyday must 
not be plundered of its aesthetic dimension. By proposing an 
aesthetic theory of design, justified by the ubiquity of industrially 
mass-produced products—design objects—, the Canadian 
philosopher shifts the focus of aesthetic theory away from the fine 
arts, especially by highlighting how functionality can give rise to a 
sense of aesthetic fulfillment.  
Despite this, I identified in her proposal a certain sense of 
nostalgia for artisan traditions, which renders her philosophical 
project a negative aesthetic theory of design. Instead, it would be 
more fruitful for a positive theory of design, without diminishing the 
role of craftsmanship, to promote the same attention to the industrial 
dimension of design. 
Understandably, Forsey is careful not to fall into the trope of 
aestheticizing technology. Nevertheless, having made it clear that the 
appreciation of art is not the measure for the appreciation of 
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beyond the conventional forms of artistic expression, aesthetics thus 
understood can acknowledge a positive appreciation for industrially 
made products. 
The problem may lay in defining (intuitively) design in terms of 
mass production (Forsey, 2013, p.23), which brings with it a number 
of issues. The adjectival modifier “mass” in “mass production” 
implies, not a distinction between design and craftsmanship,7 or 
between design and art,8 but mass distribution, consumerism, and 
distracted attention. Forsey avoids in her text the first two issues, 
making a compelling argument against the absolutization of 
distracted attention—the fading in the background of everyday 
objects. She claims, against Martin Heidegger’s tool analysis 
(Heidegger, 1996), that “it is not only when they break down that 
[objects] come to our attention: we also notice things when they work 
extremely well.” (Forsey, 2013, p.241) In fact, re-proposing Kant’s 
theory and the theory of adherent beauty shows how there is a 
genuine intellectual pleasure even behind such objects. 
Despite this, it seems more intuitive, particularly if we want to 
keep a distinction between the perception of handicraft objects and 
design objects, to deal with the industrial condition of such objects. 
Understanding design in these terms has two advantages. 
Firstly, it acknowledges a distinction between the consequences 
of mass distribution for aesthetic perception and how the result of an 
                                                             
7 Mass produced objects involving textiles (sofas, shoes, and the like) are often hand-sewn. 
8 See: Carroll, N. (Spring, 1997) “The Ontology of Mass Art” in The Journal of Aesthetics 
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industrial medium is appreciated. The design product is a mass 
product as long as technology allows it. However, since technology 
already allows non-mass production, we cannot reduce the 
understanding of design to the "mass" condition.  
Secondly, it supports a historical account of design, according 
to which the technological development of industrial production 
methods is decisive for granting a certain object the status of design. 
This becomes fundamental, especially if we want to establish a 
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ABSTRACT. Leo Tolstoy, the author of War and Peace and Anna 
Karenina,2 dedicated fifteen years of his life to exploring aesthetical 
theories and the phenomenon of art.3 Starting with critical thoughts 
about modern aesthetics, Tolstoy developed his own conception of art 
and its role in society, some of which are presented in his work What 
is art?, first published in 1897. Unfortunately, in the English-speaking 
world, there was not much attention paid to Tolstoy’s book.4 What 
stands out in the critical literature is Tolstoy’s exclusion of famous 
artworks from the world of art, like those of William Shakespeare and 
Richard Wagner. My objective in this essay will be to show that What 
is art? has much more to offer than the topic of exclusion. Tolstoy not 
only extended the category of things belonging to art. He also 
                                                             
1 Email: Lilli.Isabel@web.de 
2 On how Tolstoy’s fictional writings and his essays are connected see Šilbajoris, 
Rimvydas, Tolstoy’s Aesthetics and his Art, Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 1991. Her 
judgement is: “Tolstoy’s personal quest for moral value invariably extends to the very act 
of writing fiction, of breathing life into people who must then seek answers to the questions 
that plague their own creator. As these answers emerge, they become a kind of 
metalanguage about art itself and can ultimately be articulated also in theoretical terms, as 
Tolstoy finally did in his essay [What is Art?]” Ibid., p. 9.  
3 Dörr, Paul: “Nachwort,” in: Tolstoi, Leo, Was ist Kunst?, München: Eugen Diederichs 
Verlag, transl. in German by Michail Feofanov, 1993, p. 316.  
4 See, Diffely, Terry, Tolstoy’s ‚What is Art?’, London: Croom Helm, 1985, here p. 1f.. 
Tolstoy’s reception in Russia was clearly tainted by his works as a writer. More on this see 
Zurek, Magdalena, Tolstojs Philosophie der Kunst, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. 
Winter, 1996, p. 105. In France, the country from which most of the literature criticized by 












Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 12, 2020 
 
developed a definition of art which must include previously excluded 
titles into the concept. Above all, Leo Tolstoy’s conception was 
directed against the tendencies of autonomy of the art in aesthetic 
theories of his time. Referring to more than 60 modern philosophers of 
art,5 he pointed out significant disadvantages of beauty as 
fundamental in art. In order to follow his arguments comprehensibly, I 
will start with a short abstract about autonomous aesthetics. Then I 
shall move on to Tolstoy’s understanding and its most important terms 
and concepts, including a critical perspective on Tolstoy’s approach. 
 
1. The Modern Aesthetics  
Putting Tolstoy aside for a moment, it is important to recall the 
historical setting: the French Revolution and the Industrialisation 
shaped the 19th century. Especially the industrial revolution brought a 
lot of cheap and commercial art with it from which the high art wants 
to distinguish itself.6 Owning a piece of art did not prove the 
membership to upper classes anymore, so the taste in choosing a 
work of “art” became the distinctive factor. The result was a deep gap 
between high and low art – and between the people who identify 
themselves with them. Since the raising of literacy in the 18th century, 
                                                             
5 Among them: Baumgarten, Schiller, Hegel, Lessing, Goethe, Winkelmann, Hutcheson, 
Burke, Diderot, Humboldt, Fichte, Schelling and Schopenhauer. It is important to point out 
that Tolstoy was not in general against European intellectuals, like those examples might 
suggest. He positioned himself against high art regardless its origin. See, Tolstoy, Leo, 
What is Art?, transl. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky, London: Penguin Books, 1995, pp. 17–
30. 
6 Mounce, H. O., Tolstoy on Aesthetics. What is Art?, Albershot and Sydney: Ashgate, 
2001, p. 14f.. Important to notice, Russia was not as far industrialised as the Western 
Europe in the 19th century. Most people still lived in the countryside without many options 
of media to spread art. Ibid., p. 16. But the Russian aristocracy lived a Western live style, 
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the group of people being able to consume literature expanded, but 
the reaction of many artists and philosophers to these developments, 
for example Hegel and Herder, was to divide the public into ordinary 
people (Volk/Nation) and the mob (Pöbel) – with the second one 
being unable to appreciate art at all.7 
 This phenomenon of social and cultural exclusion was also 
pointed out by Pierre Bourdieu. The upper classes constantly try to 
distinguish themselves from lower classes via taste – only the well-
educated understand what is good art.8 Cultural goods go hand in 
hand with economic distinctions or as Mukařovský states: “It may 
seem that the hierarchy of aesthetic canon is directly related to the 
hierarchy of social strata.”9 The art operating on the basis of social 
exclusion is linked to the autonomy of the art.  
It was Immanuel Kant who transferred the term of autonomy 
from its political and legal origin into philosophy. Autonomy in general 
is an expression of self-legislation of pure reason. In his Critique of 
Judgement Kant states that autonomy in aesthetics is defined by a 
disinterested pleasure. He further maintains that beauty is not defined 
by a priori rules. What is considered beautiful is therefore contingent. 
But Kant also points out that, if we are free from needs and viewing a 
                                                             
7 See Hecken, Thomas, PoP. Geschichte eines Konzepts 1955–2009, Bielefeld: transcript 
Verlag, 2009, p. 17.  
8 More on this see Bourdieu, Pierre, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of 
Taste, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. 
9 Mukařovský, Jan, “Aesthetic Function Among other Functions,” in: John Burbank and 
Peter Steiner (eds.), Structure, Sign and Function. Selected Essays by Jan Mukařovský, 
New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1978, here p. 46. Mukařovský also noticed that 
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thing without interest and then consider it beautiful, we may assume 
that all people refer to that object as beautiful. 10  
 Soon after the concept of thinking art out of itself, not as 
embedded in the society, gives ground for intellectuals and artists to 
produce art for an elite circle only. Creating art pour l’art became the 
desirable goal. The German poet Stefan George, for example, 
handed out his works only to close friends in order to avoid the 
dictate of the taste of the public. Rubén Darío, on his side, 
maintained that the majority of readers is simply lacking the mental 
elevation necessary for his art.11 Oscar Wilde tried to establish a 
sharp line between everyday life and the world of art and states that: 
“[…] Art should never try to be popular.”12 The decadent art is 
another example for art excluding the mass public from its 
consumption. It refers to mostly French artists like Théophile 
Gaultier.13 For him the aim of art is to produce beauty, not paying any 
attention to the audience’s will or even referring to it at all.14  
Tolstoy started reading about some modern points of view of art 
to find an answer to his question what art is and if it is important 
enough to consume so much time and labor in its creation.15 But 
                                                             
10 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgement, (ed.) Nicholas Walker, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008.   
11 Einfalt, Martin and Wolfzettel, Friedrich, “Autonomie,” in: (ed.) Karlheinz Barck, 
Ästhetische Grundbegriffe. Historisches Wörterbuch, Vol. 1, Stuttgart, 2000, pp. 431–479. 
12 Hecken, Thomas, op. cit., p. 24. 
13 See Mounce, H. O., op. cit., pp. 40–48.  
14 Ibid., p. 16. 
15 Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., p. 8. It is important to notice that Tolstoy’s criticism against those 
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despite the fact that their definitions of art failed to answer his 
questions, they opened Tolstoy’s eyes for the major problems 
coming along with art pour l’art.16 Not only does this decadent 
approach to art divide the upper and lower classes with only 1 % of 
humans having access to art or are able producing it. But it also 
pushes the artists of the different styles of the high art fight against 
each other, claiming that their approach to art is the best.17 Oddly 
enough, the upper classes postulate that their art is the best and only 
true art, judging all art from other nations or classes as poorly.18 As 
we shall see, for Tolstoy, one of the main objective of art is the 
opposite: uniting people.  
 
2. Tolstoy’s Conception of Art  
For Tolstoy the reason behind those aesthetics approaches lies not 
in the developments of the 18th and 19th century, but in the upper 
classes losing their connection to religion,19 starting in the 
Renaissance. They failed to fill this lack and focussed on beauty 
                                                             
16 Interesting to mention, Tolstoy himself was at a certain point in his life quite close to the 
art pour l’art, when he planned to publish a magazine for art’s purpose only, without 
paying attention to readers opinion, but with the aim to educate them. See Eismann, 
Wolfgang, Von der Volkskunst zur proletarischen Kunst. Theorien zur Sprache der 
Literatur in Rußland und Sowjetunion, München: Otto Sagner Verlag, 1986, p. 28. 
17 Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., p. 8. 
18 Ibid., p. 55. 
19 Important to notice to understand Tolstoy’s connection to religion better: after finishing 
Anna Karenina, Tolstoy found himself questioning his life and its value. This turned into a 
life crisis including thoughts of suicide. It was the Christian teaching, not the church that 
helped him finding a way to live on. In this process Tolstoy even translated the New 
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instead.20  
Reading through the aesthetic theories of prominent modern 
authors, Tolstoy provides two definitions of beauty: the first one being 
objective, but mysterious, connects beauty with the absolutely 
perfect; the second one, being subjective, defines beauty as 
something pleasurable.21 Both definitions are clearly harmful for art 
development.  
Above all, beauty cannot be the fundament of art,22 because it 
is not a clear, but subjective term and based on conventions.23 
Tolstoy also mentioned that beauty in Russian language (красота) 
refers not to, for example, music, but only to things which can be 
viewed with one’s eyes.24 Calling all sorts of art beautiful (красивый) 
is therefore not quite correct and also indicates the strongest 
argument against beauty as fundamental in arts: the confrontation of 
beauty against the good and the truth. The unity of those three – 
beauty, good and truth – is a mistake, because the more beautiful 
something is, the less good it will be. For Tolstoy, “[t]he good is the 
eternal, the highest aim of our life.”25 In contrast, beautiful is simply 
what one likes, what pleasures. In fact, pleasure is linked with lower 
                                                             
20 Ibid., p. 47f..  
21 Ibid., p. 31.  
22 This topic of beauty as the objective of art was picked up by Arthur Danto in the 1990s 
again. See Danto, Arthur, Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical 
Perspective, Berkley: University of California Press, 1998.  
23 See ibid. pp. 32–35 and Eismann, Wolfgang, op.cit., p. 59. Exactly this lack of a clear 
definition makes beauty as a basis of high art appealing. More on this see Poljakova, 
Ekaterina, Differente Plausibilitäten. Kant, Nietzsche, Tolstoi und Dostojewski über 
Vernunft, Moral und Kunst, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013, p.  297.  
24 Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., 13f..  
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animal instincts26 and the good is the force preventing humans from 
following them.27 Tolstoy concludes that the current aesthetic 
theories, grounding on beauty, are constructed to justify artworks as 
works of beauty, only justifying the already built canon.28 However, 
other thinkers, for example, Platon, Tolstoy is not advising to 
abandon art for the well-being of society, but to renew it.   
In this connection, it is important to clarify Tolstoy’s main terms: 
feelings and religious perception. The Russian word чувство is 
translated with feeling and just as any feeling it is something abstract 
which can be considered directly measured. The term covers 
impressions, intuitions, feelings of all sorts – in short; everything 
arising from a source other than thoughts and objective reasoning.29 
The role of feelings in Tolstoy’s conception of art could not be more 
important: works of art transport feelings and connect people this 
way. He further compares this system of communication with 
language. Language communicates thoughts from one to another 
                                                             
26 Zurek, Magdalena, op. cit., p. 299. 
27 But Tolstoy is not totally banning beauty and pleasure from the arts. The artist may feel 
pleasure while creating an artwork, and beauty can be, but does not have to be, a 
characteristic of an artwork. People of different backgrounds like to surround themselves 
with beautiful things. So, one conclude Tolstoy’s position towards beauty in art: It cannot 
be the scale for judging art, but it can be a characteristic of good art. In this Roger Fly sees 
a major achievement of his theory: “It was Tolstoy’s genius that delivered us from this 
impasse [of  beauty], and I think that one may date from the appearance of What is Art? the 
beginning of fruitful speculation in aesthetic.” Diffely, Terry, op. cit., p. 3. 
28 Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., p. 33.   
29 Jahn, Gary R., “The aesthetic theory of Leo Tolstoy’s what is art?”, in: Journal of 
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just like art does with feelings.30  In other words; works of art express 
something about the soul of human beings that language cannot 
express.31 The two are equally important for humans to feel united 
through space and time.32 The greatest feelings communicated this 
way roots in religious consciousness. Tolstoy also insists that 
understanding the religious consciousness of the time is 
understanding the meaning of life, what he considers the highest 
good. Interestingly enough, authors like Zurek suggest that instead of 
using the critical term “religious consciousness” one should refer to a 
“philosophical” one.33  
For Tolstoy, there is also another kind of feelings, which can be 
communicated through a work of art: particular everyday feelings. On 
the basis of these feelings humans are able to empathise. In short, 
Tolstoy states that everyday feelings like sadness, happiness or 
anger can be shared through a work of art as well. 
When those feelings are transported, they infect the 
audience/the spectators or readers – this is how an artwork is to be 
understood. This understanding is a universal one: Every person, 
regardless of her/his age, her/his intellectual background or her/his 
class attachment should be able to get infected with the transported 
feeling of religious consciousness or everyday emotions.  
                                                             
30 See Milkov, Nikolay, “Aesthetic Gestures: Elements of a Philosophy of Art in Frege and 
Wittgenstein,” in: (eds.) Wuppuluri S., da Costa N., WITTGENSTEINIAN Yadj.. The 
Frontiers Collection. Basel: Springer Cham, 2020, pp. 505–518.  
31 Eismann, Wolfgang, op. cit., p. 61. 
32 Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., p. 40. 
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The term infection is causing problems for understanding 
Tolstoy’s theory. Normally used to refer to diseases, it does not have 
a negative connotation for Tolstoy. Like people get infected with 
laughter, the same works with successful art. Zurek defends 
Tolstoy’s use of the term, underlying its dimension and the 
inevitability of infection via artworks, whereas Diffely reminds the 
reader of the randomness of infections, which stands in contrast to 
the deliberately process in art creation.34 
Taking a closer look at the way people get infected with feelings 
shed light on this discussion. If the audience or spectators are 
consuming a successful work of art, it can get infected with the 
feeling that the artist once experienced herself/himself, or with that 
she/he imagined to experience.35 Specifically, the spectator or 
listener of an artwork is “brought to a similar state of mind.”36 To do 
so, the artist recalls memories or imaginary ones and transforms 
them into a piece of art. She/he willingly reproduces the feelings, 
which creates a distance of art to the real life.37  
In this way, some unconsciously encountered feelings are 
consciously brought into art, allowing in this way to learn something 
about life from art – looking through art at the world.38 But the 
empathy needed to get infected with feelings of others is a skill also 
needed to keep societies together. Getting infected by art is also 
                                                             
34 Ibid., p. 288. 
35 Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., p. 39.  
36 Mounce, H. O., op. cit., p. 24. 
37 Zurek, Magdalena, op. cit., p. 273f.. 
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training social skills of living together. Moreover, it helps to reflect on 
one’s own feelings and life–experiences.39  
An argument often stated against Tolstoy’s conception of 
infecting via artworks, is the passive role of the spectator or listener 
or reader and the risk of becoming a victim of propaganda intentions 
this way. Tolstoy himself was aware that the infection of art is not 
morally unproblematic. The feelings transported via artworks can be 
either good (uniting) or bad (dividing), but they infect the same way. 
Besides, uniting in a feeling can also result in questioning it. Art 
consumers are not passively consuming the artworks. It can also 
reflect on their own feelings that they got infected with. 
But while an artwork can be good or bad, depending on its 
ability to unite or divide, what about its aesthetic value? Importantly 
enough, moral judgement can only be applied to a successful 
(gelungene) piece of art: if it has certain aesthetic value.40 Due to its 
involvement with moral issues, art needs to be involved in every area 
of life and therefore feeds upon life itself. Magdalena Zurek, in this 
context, points out that ethics and aesthetics go often hand in hand.41  
The important role of the connection between life and art was 
underlined in Tolstoy’s conception of art, when he is referring to the 
ordinary people (мужикь), especially children, as natural, unspoiled 
art consumers.42 The people of the lower classes often produce good 
                                                             
39 Ibid., p. 65. 
40 Ibid., p. 29. 
41 Zurek, Magdalena, op. cit., p. 315.  
42 Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., pp. 115f. and 141f.. This focus on the ordinary people is also 
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art, which is directly linked to the feeling of religious consciousness 
or to everyday situations. The artworks they produce differs from the 
high culture, mostly in its form: folklore dances, songs, jokes, puns, 
children’s plays.43 Tolstoy is opening up the field of art this way, 
holding that art can be found everywhere.44 The argument that by 
opening the world of art and making it universal one lowers its 
standards, can easily be shattered: allowing feelings to take new 
forms makes the field of art richer in expressions and also in themes. 
Tolstoy lists only three major indicators for a good piece of art: (i) the 
transported feeling must be well outlined; (ii) it should be 
communicated in a clear manner; (iii) the artist needs to be sincere.45  
Sincerity is the most important trade of the artist. For 
communicating a feeling, the artist also needs to understand 
herself/himself and her/him relations with everything surrounding 
her/him, even gaining this way a standpoint ahead of her/him time.46 
When she/he has the will to communicate this feeling, the artist also 
needs talent – sheer skills are not enough. The only skill required is 
                                                                                                                                                           
they do not question they existence. He came to the conclusion that they simply stand with 
both feet firmly on the ground and live their life. In contrast, people of upper classes get 
themselves lost in self-made paradoxes.  
43 Not only children’s play, but also theater performances and operas can be connected to 
Tolstoy’s conception of art. Especially the acting theory of Stanislavski gives grounds to do 
so. More on this see: Daniel Larlham “Stanislavsky, Tolstoy, and the life of the human 
spirit” in: The Routledge Companion to Stanislavski, (ed.) R. Andrew White, London/New 
York: Routledge, 2013 pp. 179–194 and Hughes, R. I. G., “Tolstoy, Stanislavki, and the 
Art of Acting,” in: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 51(1), 1993, pp. 39–
48, here pp. 40f..  
44 Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., p. 155.  
45 Ibid., pp. 121ff..  
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to transfer the feeling understandable for others.47 In Tolstoy’s art of 
the future, everyone is an artist, owning the basic knowhow from 
school; no further education is needed. There is no real need for the 
profession of an artist, as well as for art schools or art critics. Works 
of art created this way are able to enlarge our experience and 
increase the understanding of life – ours as well as those of others.48 
This understanding includes the most powerful feature of art – 
the ability to unite. Or as Israel Knox points out: “The dearest quality 
of art to Tolstoy is its power of union.”49 Through the transported 
feeling, the artist is connected with the audience and the 
listeners/spectators/readers are also linked to other 
listeners/spectators/readers through the artwork, regardless of their 
position in society, their cultural background and the time they live 
in.50 Through art, we are able to realize the connections we have with 
others, independently from nationality, age, gender, education and 
other distinctive factors. The feeling of this uniting force is also 
producing a feeling of connectedness. Just recall the feeling of sitting 
together in a dark cinema room, getting lost in the good movie and 
being conscious about the others and their emotions surrounding you 
                                                             
47 Eismann, Wolfgang, op. cit., pp. 70f.. 
48 This social utopia underlying Tolstoy’s theory of art is pointed out by Thomas Barran 
this way: Tolstoy’s What is Art? “remains a profoundly political document.” Idem., 
“Rousseau’s Political Vision and Tolstoy’s What is Art?,” in: Tolstoy Studies Journal 5, 
1992, pp. 1–12, here p. 1. For a connection between Tolstoy and Rousseau also see Zurek, 
Magdalena, op. cit., pp. 255ff. and Milkov, Nikolay, “Tolstoi und Wittgenstein. Einfluss 
und Ähnlichkeiten,” in: Prima philosophia, Vol. 49, 2003, pp. 187–206. 
49 Knox, Israel, “Tolstoy’s Esthetic Definition of Art,” in: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
27(3), 1930, pp. 65–70, here p. 68. 
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or remember the last rock concert. Some critics claim that Tolstoy’s 
conception of unity implies that by consuming art humans have to be 
in a sense identical to feeling the same. But the opposite is true: 
successful art is raising out of the differences between people. It 
articulates a feeling which is special and somehow new. Exactly 
because if this this special feeling is of interest to others and needs 
to be shared with them.51  
 
3. Art for All 
Summarizing, for Tolstoy art is a universal medium, which makes it 
possible to be understood by everyone. Art has the ability to 
transport feelings and infect people. Tolstoy conclusion is that “[t]he 
task facing art is enormous: art, genuine art, guided by religion with 
the help of science,52 must make it so that men’s peaceful life 
together […].”53 Based on these arguments, Tolstoy holds that all 
theories pleading for the autonomy of aesthetics are inadequate. Art 
in its true form can only be approached as art for all: for all nations, 
all classes, all people.  
After taking a closer look at Tolstoy’s theory of art, I am going 
to pick up one of the most popular critical remarks held against it. As 
already mentioned in the introduction: Why is Tolstoy excluding 
                                                             
51 Poljakova, Ekaterina, op. cit., pp. 319f.. 
52 Science, just like art, should also not follow a science for science ‘s sake, but is 
underlying social responsibility Tolstoy, Leo, op. cit., pp. 157–167. Or as Eismann states: 
“This art [of the future] has the same aim as science: the well-being of all people.” (transl. 
by the author) Eismann, Wolfgang, op. cit., p. 48.  
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classics of the world of art like those of Richard Wagner54 from the 
world of art? Apparently, because he was strongly convinced that 
artists like Wagner only produce a counterfeit of art that is made for a 
special group of people. For artists with an educated background 
those works of art are part of a canon considered good art, but what 
if those works are viewed from outside of the nation they are created 
in or with the eyes of next generations? Are those works of art 
understandable for people from different cultural backgrounds? The 
problem with a canon of good art is that at some point it is not 
questioned anymore. So, we cannot answer the question: Do we 
really think this is a good piece of art or are we just saying so, 
because we learned it that way? One way of reading Tolstoy today 
can result in questioning the art canon and in this way prevent 
nationalistic, one-sided views on art and artworks.55 Important to 
notice, Tolstoy himself was also very concerned about the way of 
living that supports such a canon of artworks – the Western lifestyle 
of the 19th century.  
Although Tolstoy’s conception of art is rooted in his social and 
ideological criticism of his time, the idea of artworks as uniting force 
of all humans is still present in modern aesthetic theories.56 Terry 
                                                             
54 Tolstoy dedicated a whole chapter to Richard Wagner’s “Nibelungen” in ibid., pp. 101–
112.   
55 Or as W. H. Auden pointed out correctly: “[O]ne can never again ignore the questions 
Tolstoi raises.” Diffely, Terry, op. cit., p. 9.  
56 Another critical point against the autonomy of art is made by marxistic theories. They 
attack the growing dependence of artists on the market and its consumers. This market is 
enabling the autonomy, while at the same time it is also restricting it. See Einfalt, Martin 
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Eagleton, for example, states, referring to a stronger getting 
tendency of viewing art as autonomous, that art should not be viewed 
as an isolated field. In doing so, the ruling powers of society can build 
up a space for protecting their values of exploitation, owning property 
and completion.57  
Finally, a short digression on what can be said about Tolstoy’s 
vision of the art of the future when looking at today’s society? Thanks 
to modern technology the project of art for all is not accomplished, 
but we are getting closer: music can be produced from laptops at 
home, movies shot with mobile phones and virtual museums allowing 
excess for everyone.58  
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ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to consider if and how music can 
satisfy the demands of Nietzsche’s conception of successful art in 
Human, All Too Human and its two supplements. The two main 
criteria of his artistic ideal, I argue, are the artist’s successful 
demonstration of a “dance in chains” and a certain realism in the 
work’s subject matter. I intend to show that music’s satisfaction of this 
ideal as a whole hinges on its expressive capacities, which Nietzsche 
progressively reconsiders in these texts, as well as on how the 
composers manage them. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper2, I would like to examine Nietzsche’s well-known 
                                                             
1 Email : charles.lebeau-henry@uclouvain.be. The author would like to thank Wallonie-
Bruxelles International for the financial support that made the realization of this research 
possible. 
2 In what follows, I will refer to Nietzsche’s aphorisms directly in the text, by indicating 
the abbreviated title of the book it comes from and the number of the relevant paragraph in 
parentheses. The abbreviation used are as follows: HH = Human, All Too Human (the first 
volume of the 1886 edition), MOM = Mixed Opinions and Maxims, WS = The Wanderer 
and His Shadow. Unless otherwise specified, I used Hollingdale’s translation for the texts 
from Human, All Too Human I and II. See the bibliography for the other translations used. I 
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illustration of artistic creation as a “dance in chains” in its application 
to music. This model is presented with varying levels of emphasis in 
all three books that together constitute the second edition of Human, 
All Too Human3, but it is only in the last one, The Wanderer and His 
Shadow, that it is explicitly put in relation with music.4 Very briefly 
put, Nietzsche’s idea is that successful art is a demonstration of 
artistic mastery in (more or less) arbitrary constraints,5 so that “both 
the constraint and its conquest are noticed and admired” (WS140). 
The kind of artwork thus produced, by exciting “emulation and envy” 
(MOM99), could have a transformative effect on its public and teach 
it in turn how to overcome its own feelings of limitations through a 
similar self-fashioning (MOM172). 
Nietzsche initially had some reservations about the possible 
realization of this goal by music. Before The Wanderer, he had 
limited this possibility to poetry. According to him, for the work of art 
to serve as a model, it had to depict something determined; but 
Nietzsche now rejected the idea that music could symbolize anything 
but affective states. Without a clear, conceptually mediated referent, 
music, it seems, could not attain the “monumentality” essential to the 
                                                                                                                                                           
written (for more clarity in the chronology), their number in the Kritische Studienausgabe 
(KSA), as well as the volume and page number in this same edition. 
3 For reasons of space and ease of reading, I will shorten the titles of Nietzsche’s books 
after their first mention for the rest of this paper. 
4 Compare HH221, MOM99, WS140 & WS159. 
5 See HH221 (modified translation): “To fetter oneself in this way can seem absurd; 
nonetheless there is no way of getting free of naturalization than that of first limiting 
oneself to what is most severe (perhaps also most arbitrary).” The constraints can obviously 
hardly be entirely arbitrary, but it is important to distinguish the instrumental character of 
artistic limitations (which are intentionally imposed to be overcome) and the various 
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creation of models of human life made harmonious.6 Nevertheless, in 
§159 of The Wanderer, Nietzsche applies it to Chopin without any 
apparent reservations, and implies that music, too, could satisfy this 
ideal to some extent. But how much, really, could music satisfy the 
broader formative ideal that Nietzsche links to this notion in Mixed 
Opinions and Maxims? I will try to provide an answer to this question 
by taking a brief look at the development of his ideas on musical 
expression, his use of the metaphor of “dancing in chains” and his 
characterization of Chopin in The Wanderer. 
 
2. Expression and Expressivity Before the Second Part 
of Human, All Too Human 
In the Birth of Tragedy, art’s highest task, as paradigmatically 
exemplified by Attic Tragedy, is to allow the integration of a 
pessimistic sensibility into a Weltanschauung that nevertheless 
allows for life and action. This is achieved through the interplay of  
the Dionysian and the Apollonian artistic drives in a tragic 
Gesamtkunstwerk that is both expressive (Dionysus) and beautiful 
(Apollo). Through its analogy with the deepest structure of the world, 
Dionysian music allows its auditor a glimpse both into the 
fundamental contradictions of existence and into its underlying unity. 
Such an insight, as important as it may be for Nietzsche, is a rather 
dangerous thing: this knowledge of the contradictions of the world, 
even if coupled with joy at the perspective of a newfound freedom 
                                                             












Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 12, 2020 
 
from the world of individuation, is incompatible with the conditions of 
active life, and leads to depressive states. As said by Byron’s 
Manfred, whom Nietzsche liked to quote to make this recurring point 
(Byron, 2000, p. 275): 
 
Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most 
Must mourn the deepest o’er the fatal truth, 
The Tree of Knowledge is not that of Life.  
 
Despite and because of the importance of this Dionysian insight, 
illusion must remain essential to life. The constant struggle of these 
two drives determines art history, beyond ancient history and into the 
present. Thus, in The Birth, Nietzsche understood good art as an 
artistic transfiguration of unique knowledge of a special and unique 
value. 
By the time he wrote Human, Nietzsche had renounced this 
view of art. In this book, he took his departure from a certain 
unquestioned Heraclitus-inspired metaphysical stance,7 but he did 
not consider the truth to be available in the musical works of genius 
anymore: it had to be searched for. Moreover, it seems that his 
approach somewhat agreed with the Socratic optimism he had so 
thoroughly condemned in The Birth, since he could now assert that 
religion could be overcome through refutation (HH135).8 He now 
reflected on the arts separately rather than as an artistic “pentathlon” 
                                                             
7 See Heller (1972), p. 4 sq. 
8 For the idea that this was not an idea he wished to advance, but a sort of mise-en-scène of 
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(Nietzsche, 2013, p. 20) modelled on attic tragedy, and though he 
still thought of music as an expressive affair, he no longer defended 
the idea that it could express something in any strong, symbolic 
sense. Without a privileged analogical relationship to the world of the 
“primal unity” (Ur-Einen) music could not symbolize simply in virtue of 
its nature: it could no longer be a “copy” (Abbild) of the “Will” through 
a metaphysical affinity. Instead, Nietzsche now admitted for all music 
what he had said to be a limitation of pre-Wagnerian opera,9 namely, 
that music’s expressive qualities had been carried over from its long 
association with rhetoric. This meant, first, that they concerned not 
the expressed thing, but rather the pathos associated with its 
expression; and second, that this expressivity had been made 
possible by learned, conventional associations (HH215-216). 
This expressivity is, in HH, at the center of Nietzsche’s rejection 
of the arts.10 The main thrust of this critique, in line with the broader 
goal of Human, is primarily directed at art’s (and especially music’s) 
pretensions as a source of profound knowledge, such as that to 
which Wagner’s Schopenhauer-inspired aesthetics purported. 
                                                             
9 Wagner was never entirely free of these limitations: he possessed both Dionysian wisdom 
and an authentically operatic tendency. But that is precisely why he could push the operatic 
logic to its limit and thus force it to “overcome” itself (1871, 9[48]; KSA 7, p. 293; see also 
1871, 9[90, 127 & 135]; KSA 7, p. 306-307, 321 & 323-324]). The experience of the first 
Bayreuth festival in 1876, to Nietzsche, showed that Wagner could and would in fact do no 
such thing (see 1878, 30[1]; KSA 8, p. 522) and the letter to Mathilde Maier of early 
August 1878 [in Nietzsche, 1986, Bd 5, p. 337-338, #734]). 
10 Young astutely remarks that, in HH, Nietzsche’s attacks are always directed at the art of 
“the beyond,” that is, sublime art (p. 71). I believe this is because he did not believe at that 
point in the possibility of a renewed art of the beautiful (compare his remarks on Goethe in 
HH221 with the subsequent MOM99). Thus, I would interpret his focus on sublime art as a 
focus on what he then took to be the most advanced and the most potent form of art, rather 
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Despite its lack of epistemic import, rhetorical expressivity could 
serve as a caution for such claims to knowledge. By triggering 
learned and automatically occurring affective responses, they could 
be the cause of an impression of depth and importance in the 
listener, which could in turn be transferred onto the supposed 
knowledge and convince the listener of its depth or value (HH161). 
The object of Nietzsche’s critique was not artistic expressivity in 
itself, but the fact that it is most often used with dishonesty: it 
masquerades as a primordial language brought to expression 
through the mystical power of genius, while it is in fact a conventional 
language the artist uses to consolidate her privileged social position. 
In addition to this “symbolic” pretension of music made possible by 
expressivity, Nietzsche had qualms about the effect expressive 
music had on its public, or rather the use it made of it. Intensely 
expressive art has, according to him, a tendency to lead its public to 
destructive or counterproductive ways of engaging with it. Whether 
they listen to it to forget and use it as a narcotic of sorts (MOM159); 
or rather than purged of them, become used and prone to fear and 
pity (HH212); or perhaps, even, insufficiently trained in the subtleties 
of music’s expressive language and taken by its roughness and 
brutality, they are made themselves into rough brutes (HH217): in all 
these cases, the risks, clearly, dwarf the potential rewards. 
This expressive character could not, though, be wrested away 
from music. The affective states we associate with certain perceptual 
properties of the music, carried over from rhetoric through prolonged 
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well as in practice.11 Furthermore, as time goes by, music must 
become more and more expressive as its associations multiply and 
as the human sensibility grows deeper.12 The pretensions of the 
musician to the expression of a valuable knowledge, at this point, 
could then be seen as no more than a trick, relying on 
representations regarding the status of the artist and on his 
capacities, as well as finding confirmation in the expressivity of the 
music itself. Regardless, this did not necessarily imply that musical 
expressivity was in itself reprehensible; yet there did not seem, at 
that point, to remain an open path ahead for the musicians, or indeed 
for the artists in general.13 
 
3. Chains and Fetters 
Mixed Opinions, the first supplement to Human, saw Nietzsche 
reconsider his judgment on Goethe’s limitations as an artist. No 
longer marred by the decidedly sentimental posture in which he “lived 
in art as in recollection of true art” (HH221), Goethe’s poetry, 
Nietzsche now affirmed, was one that could serve as a “signpost to 
the future” (MOM99) and be the source of a renewed artistic practice, 
                                                             
11 Hanslick himself, the herald of musical formalism and avowed opponent of Wagner, 
recognized that music did (vaguely) evoke affects through the analogy of its processes with 
those of affective events. In fact, he sometimes relied on subjective impressions such as 
those he criticized in Vom musikalischen Schönen in his musical criticism (See p. 17 in 
Kivy, 1990). See also the developments on the persistence of expressivity in Schönberg’s 
twelve-tone music in the first part of Adorno’s Philosophy of New Music. 
12 See the variant of HH219 from the fair copy, KSA 14, p. 137: ”If the thought of a rebirth 
of the ancient world now surfaces once again, we will long for a more inspired ancient 
world (einem beseelteren Alterthum) than did the fifteenth century” (G. Handwerk’s 
translation in Nietzsche [1997], p. 336). We find echoes of this idea MOM126. 
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in conformity with that of the Ancients. Regarding music, on the other 
hand, Nietzsche was more openly critical, naming Wagner (whose 
name had been entirely absent from Human) as the culprit for the 
transition of music into a baroque period. In the second supplement 
to Human, The Wanderer (of which, again, Wagner’s name is entirely 
absent), Nietzsche suggests that music could perhaps do the same 
as poetry when he implies that Chopin could serve as a similar 
“signpost” since he, too, could “danc[e] in fetters” (WS159). 
This image of a “dancing in chains” (in Ketten Tanzen) or in 
“fetters” (Fesseln) as a metaphor for artistic creation came from 
Voltaire, to whom, incidentally, Human All Too Human was dedicated 
in its first edition. In a letter dated January 24, 1761, Voltaire writes to 
Deodati de Tovazzi, who had sent him a copy of his book on The 
Excellence of the Italian Language, to contest his hasty declaration of 
the superiority of Italian over French. After defending the sonorities of 
the French language and its lexical abundance, he turns to a 
comparison of the rules imposed on the poet of both languages 
(Voltaire, 1876, pp. 425–426): 
 
You have, sir, many more actual advantages [sc. than that of 
creating diminutives], that of inversions, that of making a 
hundred good verses in Italian more easily than we can make 
ten in French. The reason for this facility is that you allow 
yourselves these hiatuses, these gaps in syllables that we 
proscribe; all your words ending in a, e, i, o, provide you with 
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of that, you can still do without rhymes. You are less enslaved 
than we are to the hemistich and the caesura; you dance in 
freedom, and we dance with our chains.14 
 
Voltaire introduces the image to establish the added difficulty of 
composing verses in French, not as an ideal, but as a descriptive 
account of poetical practice. Indeed, he writes a few lines later that, 
“[i]f the people have formed languages, great men perfect them with 
good books; and the first of all languages is the one with the most 
excellent books” (Voltaire, 1876, p. 426).15 The result, and not the 
quantity of limitations opposed to creation, determine the quality of 
the work; the constraints are historically inherited and have to be 
mastered. In addition, the chains are meant here not to signal just 
any constraint, but an excess of them: the Italian poet is “free” 
inasmuch as she is not as constrained as the French, but she is only 
comparatively free. The dancer and the poet are always limited by 
rules and other resistances, by the unforgiving regularity of the 
rhythm, by the inertia of the body or the mind, and so forth. Thus 
Voltaire, with this image of “dancing in chains,” highlights the simple 
fact that linguistic and artistic conventions oppose much more 
resistance to the ease of poetical creation to the French than to the 
Italians. 
Nietzsche uses this same formulation (in the infinitive) in the 
                                                             
14 The translations from French are my own. In Nietzsche’s personal exemplar of this book 
(conserved at the Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek Weimar), he draws two vertical lines in 
the margin next to the last sentence, and underlines the last word, “chains” (chaînes). 
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title of §140 of The Wanderer, but he avoids it everywhere else in the 
three books which together make up the second edition of Human, 
except for a mention in quotation marks in the same aphorism—and 
this although he discusses the idea a number of times. Everywhere 
else, Nietzsche speaks of “dancing in fetters” (Fesseln) rather than in 
chains (Ketten). This is particularly remarkable in §221 of Human, on 
“The Revolution in Poetry,” in which there is not a single mention of 
chains. This may seem like a minor lexical difference, but Nietzsche 
was not one to approximate with metaphors.16 By this change in 
terminology, he signals a shift in metaphorical regime for the idea 
and a consequent redefinition of its parameters. The chains evoke 
continuity as well as constraint; the image is linked with ideas such 
as necessity and history’s weight, much like the shadow of The 
Wanderer’s title and of its framing dialogue. The fetters, on the other 
hand, are an image of immediate constraints, without additional 
temporal significance. Nietzsche’s modification of the terms of the 
comparison, then, evacuates the reference to history and traditional 
practice, and focuses instead on the attainment of artistic mastery 
despite constraints that were added to the ones that already belong 
to the process of creation.17 
This was, according to him, how the Greeks made their art, as 
well as the practice towards which Goethe strived and could serve as 
                                                             
16 For a classic treatment of Nietzsche’s use of “overdetermined metaphors,” see chapter 2 
in Blondel (1991). 
17 This does not mean that all such fetters are ahistorical, but rather that they must not 
necessarily be historical. As such, I believe that Ponton’s (2004) very interesting treatment 
of the idea is nevertheless unduly restricted to some such historical “fetters,” namely, 
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a guide. But this condition, to Nietzsche, is still not entirely sufficient. 
He also demands of art a certain realism in the choice of materials,18 
best realized through a process of linguistic reference. The mastery 
in arbitrary constraints alone cannot imbue art with an effective 
formative character: a representation of contemporary reality is also 
essential if the work is to contribute to its public’s (self-)cultivation. 
This does not mean a mere reproduction of the effective world, nor a 
sustained depiction of its worst aspects. Rather, realism is essential 
for the production of a “functional” ideal, one that the public could 
actively benefit from. The best way to teach harmony to her public is 
for the artist to take the contemporary conditions of life and provide a 
model of how to attain liberty and grace within them (MOM 99).  
This, for now, kept Nietzsche’s broader artistic ideal 
inaccessible to music. If art has not to merely present a ready-made 
ideal life, but to exemplify its fashioning out of available materials, 
then how could music, if it were impossible for it to refer to anything 
outside of itself but to a conventional affective language, provide 
such content? Its abstraction appeared to disqualify it from this 
function, and thus it mostly remained stuck in a dead end in Mixed 
Opinions, as poetry had found a way out. 
 
4. Chopin’s Barcarolle 
This leads us, finally, to Nietzsche’s application of the image to 
music, in spite of the difficulties he had previously often insisted on. 
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In The Wanderer §159, titled “Freedom in fetters (Fesseln)—a 
princely freedom,” he praises Chopin after having pointed out the 
shortfalls of the composers of the German tradition, and writes: 
 
[…] Chopin had the same princely elegance of convention that 
Raphael displays in his use of the simplest traditional colours—
not with regard to colours, however, but with regard to the 
traditions of melody and rhythm. He accepted them as he was 
born in etiquette, but playing and dancing in these fetters 
(Fesseln) like the freest and most graceful spirit—and, of 
course, without mocking them.19 
 
Chopin’s music, he now argues, succeeds in attaining the 
appearance of freedom in added constraints that is characteristic of 
the “dance in chains.” Moreover, a preliminary draft of the passage 
provides us with an even stronger characterization of his success: 
 
He accepted them [sc. the fetters] as he was born in etiquette, 
except that Chopin knew how to dance within the old forms of 
melody and rhythmical conventions, as no musician ever 
succeeded in dancing outside of them.20 
 
Despite the fetters he takes on, “Chopin, the inimitable” (id.), dances 
with more freedom and grace than all musicians, with or without 
                                                             
19 Hollingdale’s translation. 
20 Emphasis at the end mine. The translation of this earlier draft is G. Handwerk’s, in 
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them. Nietzsche insists a number of times on the proverbial idea that 
necessity, and not freedom, is the mother of invention; in the case of 
art, invention of new solutions to artistic problems old or new. Against 
romantic accounts of free and intuitive creation, Nietzsche now 
argues that added restraints could foster greater mastery.21   
This text, though it may indicate that Nietzsche has now found a 
musician he believes could achieve this part of his ideal artistic 
creation, does not tell us whether he could fit the bill entirely and fulfill 
the formative function of art with its condition of realism (MOM172). 
Chopin manages to pull the listener’s attention away from the subject 
matter of his music and towards his artistic mastery, but whether he 
could, like the poet Goethe, provide models of harmonious life in the 
contemporary world remains to be seen. The following paragraph 
(WS160), I believe, provides us with the needed indications:  
 
Chopin’s Barcarole. —Almost all conditions and ways of life 
have a blissful moment, and good artists know how to fish it out. 
Such is possessed even by a life spent beside the beach, a life 
that unwinds tediously, insalubriously, unhealthily in the 
proximity of the noisiest and greediest rabble—this blissful 
moment Chopin has, in his Barcarole, expressed in sounds in 
such a way that the gods themselves could on hearing it desire 
to spend long summer evenings lying in a boat. 
 
Chopin’s music does not paint the ideal figure of “the great and 
                                                             












Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 12, 2020 
 
beautiful soul” that “embod[ies] itself in the harmonious and well-
proportioned and thus acquire[s] visibility” (MOM99), like poetry 
could. Instead, he “expresse[s] in sounds” a “blissful moment” of the 
gondolier’s “unhealthy” existence.22 Since music can evoke no more 
than vague emotional states in the listener, the harmony that it 
represents must be of a passing kind. It cannot, then, be 
“monumental” in character like poetry and serve as a model: it can at 
most evoke a fleeting feeling corresponding to this state of realized 
harmony, but never to its fashioning in the world. 
This does not mean that music is devoid of any formative 
virtues: the dancing in chains of the musician provides, at what we 
may call a more “abstract” level, a model of mastery in limitations. It 
is, in a way, an arbitrary reproduction of the limitations one faces in 
life. Nevertheless, it cannot provide a concrete model of the same, 
one that would take into account much of the materials that have to 
be modelled as well as the modelling itself. What music made by 
“good artists” communicates is an invitation to this work of self-
fashioning through the demonstration of the feeling of bliss that can 
result from it and which it seems to exemplify. Yet even music can, to 
an extent, be realistic in Nietzsche’s sense, since it inherits the 
affective complexion of the modern individual: with the passing of 
time, it becomes more and more expressive, as affective sensibilities 
deepen and as it comes to be coupled with more affective content 
through habit. Despite its limited capacity to express conceptual or 
                                                             
22 The musical form of the barcarolle is meant to mimic the songs of the Venetian 
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objectual content, music can point in the direction if not of the 
contemporary conditions of life, at least to one’s affective relationship 
to them.  
In Chopin, this is recognizable, for instance, in the extension of 
traditional harmony. Nietzsche was likely well aware of this, as made 
clear by his insistence on Chopin’s obedience to rhythmic and 
melodic tradition23—that is, most notably, to the regular bar structure 
of Viennese classicism and to the expressive melodies of bel canto—
with no mention of harmony. Chopin anticipated some of Wagner’s 
harmonic innovation, but as opposed to him, he did not seek to 
reinforce the effects of expressivity at the expense of form: on the 
contrary, he maintained a rigorous logic in his compositions that 
prevented this.24 In particular, he used ambiguity in a way that 
allowed him both to maximize expression and to draw attention to the 
process of harmonic interpretation rather than to the music’s 
expressive effect. Instead of resolving it almost immediately, as the 
Viennese classics, or to have it persist insistently like Wagner, he 
integrated tonal ambiguity in the rigorously organized fabric of his 
works. He often presents, in the words of the musicologist Eduard 
Cone (1995, p. 144), “a contrast, however brief, between possible 
interpretations, or between one interpretation and a subsequent 
reinterpretation.” In this coexistence of multiple perspectives, none of 
which appears to have a privileged role over the others, the listener 
is presented with a parallel to the process of a fashioning of the self, 
                                                             
23 In WS159, quoted at the beginning of this section. 
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of trying different configurations to accommodate in an harmonious 




To conclude, two complementary aspects mark Nietzsche’s demands 
on artistic creation at the time of Human, All Too Human and its two 
supplements: one of mastery, which the expression “dance in chains” 
illustrates; and one of realism, of a relating to some of the actual 
content of human existence. This echoes the dual “artist’s 
metaphysics” of Birth of Tragedy in a number of ways, but the aim 
differs: the expression of content is no longer the purpose of the work 
of art, but rather the fashioning of the given. As such, musical 
expressivity is placed in a difficult position: it is both, as the means by 
which music is provided with a certain affective content, an 
advantage and a risk: it can elevate music by allowing it to attain a 
certain realism, but it can also drive its public away from reality by 
reinforcing false representations on music’s powers, or by 
encouraging its public’s escapism. Ever the music enthusiast, 
Nietzsche continued to reflect on music’s possibilities, but he 
eventually had to come to the conclusion that it could only imperfectly 
satisfy what he saw as art’s highest goals. Despite these 
shortcomings, he found in Chopin a musician that did the most that 
was possible for music, who could combine the greatest expressivity 
with a solid sense of form, and who demonstrated great artistic 
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Moral Aspects’ Aesthetic Relevance: on Dickie’s 
Stolnitz, Stolnitz, and aesthetic attention 
 
João Lemos1 
NOVA University of Lisbon 
 
ABSTRACT: Let us put aside for a while the question of whether there is 
such thing as an aesthetic attitude. Attitude theories are often 
criticized for assuming that adopting an aesthetic attitude, or 
exercising aesthetic attention, excludes consideration of the moral 
aspects of art. Indeed, George Dickie criticized Jerome Stolnitz for 
such an assumption. I claim that Dickie missed the target – Stolnitz’s 
conception of disinterested attention does not commit him to excluding 
any attention to the moral aspects of art. First, I will succinctly point 
out Dickie’s criticisms against Stolnitz’s conception of the aesthetic 
attitude, namely with respect to the relation of morality to aesthetic 
value. I will then show that, according to Stolnitz, the limits of aesthetic 
relevance have primacy over the relation of morality to aesthetic 
value, and that the ultimate criterion of aesthetic relevance is 
experience’s quality enrichment. If the consideration of a work’s moral 
vision may enrich the quality of one’s (aesthetic) experience of such 
work, then the consideration of that property is aesthetically relevant. 
Finally, I will mention a couple of recent versions of aesthetic attention 
which stress the inclusive nature of such kind of attention, therefore 
contributing to overcome Dickie’s criticisms. 
                                                             
1 Email: joaolemos@fcsh.unl.pt.  
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1. Introduction: Dickie’s criticisms 
The most influential critic of aesthetic attitude theories is George 
Dickie. In his widely read paper ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude’ 
(Dickie, 1964) Dickie holds that the notion of aesthetic attitude has 
“little or no connection with the ordinary notion of an attitude” (Dickie, 
1964, p. 56), that it has “no theoretical value for aesthetics” (ibid., p. 
65), and that “the aesthetic attitude is a myth” (ibid., p. 56). 
To argue against such statements is not my purpose here.2 
What concerns me is a secondary but influential thesis of Dickie’s 
paper, namely his endorsing the view that, according to attitude 
theorists, adopting an aesthetic attitude, or exercising aesthetic 
attention, excludes taking account of the moral aspects of art. 
Although ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude’ is known more for its 
main claim than for this thesis, the influence of the latter in the 
approach taken by many aestheticians as well as philosophers of art 
is also wide enough for it to be important that it be considered. 
As the explicit target of Dickie’s criticisms is Stolnitz’s view, I will 
focus my comments on his notion of ‘disinterested attention’. I will 
consider whether Dickie’s reading is right; whether Stolnitz’s notion of 
‘disinterested attention’ commits him to excluding any attention to the 
moral aspects of art.3 
                                                             
2 Effective responses against Dickie’s criticisms have come from Saxena, 1978; Zangwill, 
1992; Fenner, 1996; Kemp, 1999 and, more recently, Nanay, 2016. 
3 This is rather a paper on the history of contemporary aesthetics and philosophy of art than 
an exercise of aesthetics or philosophy of art. What is at stake is whether the highly 
influential criticism performed by Dickie, in particular the one addressed to the purported 
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According to Dickie, Stolnitz’s conception of the aesthetic 
attitude has mislead aesthetic theory with respect to “the relation of 
morality to aesthetic value” (Dickie, 1964, p. 61).4 Dickie appeals to 
David Pole’s thesis according to which the moral vision which a work 
of art may embody is aesthetically significant (Pole, 1962).5 Dickie 
asserts that Stolnitz’s “conception of the aesthetic attitude functions 
to hold the moral aspects and the aesthetic aspects of the work of art 
firmly apart”, that it suggests “the moral aspects of a work of art 
cannot be an object of aesthetic attention because aesthetic attention 
is by definition disinterested and the moral aspects are somehow 
practical (interested)”, and that it assumes an “incompatibility of 
aesthetic attention and the moral aspects of art” (Dickie, 1964, p. 63). 
In summary, according to Dickie, Stolnitz’s view has mislead 
aesthetic theory insofar as it assumes that adopting an aesthetic 
attitude excludes consideration of the moral aspects of art. 
I claim that Dickie missed the target – at least he seems to have 
misunderstood Stolnitz in respect to what falls under ‘disinterested 
attention’. 
 
2. Stolnitz: experience’s quality enrichment 
To begin with, the excerpt chosen by Dickie does not support his 
                                                             
4 The relation of morality to aesthetic value is, in Dickie’s view, one of three aspects of 
Stolnitz’s conception of the aesthetic attitude which is incorrect. The other two are “the way 
in which he wishes to set the limits of aesthetic relevance” and “the relation of the critic to 
a work of art” (ibid., p. 61). 
5 Not only does Dickie generally share Pole’s view; he adds that “a work’s moral vision is 
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view that Stolnitz holds the moral and the aesthetic aspects of the 
work of art firmly apart. Here is the Stolnitz quotation in full: 
 
any of us might reject a novel because it seems to conflict with 
our moral beliefs or our ‘way of thinking.’ (…) We have not read 
the book aesthetically, for we have interposed moral or other 
responses of our own which are alien to it. This disrupts the 
aesthetic attitude. We cannot then say that the novel is 
aesthetically bad, for we have not permitted ourselves to 
consider it aesthetically. To maintain the aesthetic attitude, we 
must follow the lead of the object and respond in concert with it. 
(Stolnitz, 1960, p. 36) 
 
What is at stake in Stolnitz’s description of the rejection of a novel on 
moral grounds is a conflict between (the moral aspects or the moral 
vision of) the novel and the moral beliefs of the reader. In the story 
told by Stolnitz, such a conflict has precluded the reader from 
accepting the novel and, what is more, from reading it aesthetically. 
Now, everyone would acknowledge that a conflict between one’s 
moral beliefs and a novel’s moral aspects or vision may be such to 
preclude one from even reading the novel.6 However, according to 
Stolnitz, it does not have to be the case. 
It is not with respect to what a work may embody, to what is a 
part of the work – to use Dickie’s words – that Stolnitz brings up the 
                                                             
6 Many have not permitted themselves to read – let alone to read it aesthetically – D. H. 
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer, or J. D. Salinger’s 
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problem of what is, and what is not, aesthetically relevant. He does 
so with respect to items that “are not embodied in the aesthetic 
object itself, but arise from the percipient’s previous experience” 
(ibid., p. 53 [emphasis mine]). Those items are connected with the 
percipient’s past history, with what she has experienced in the past, 
with her memory. Among them are the beliefs, values, emotional 
predispositions, recollections, personal memories, thoughts, images, 
and the bits of knowledge which she brings to the experience of the 
work. Let me stress that they “are not present within the object itself” 
(ibid., p. 53 [emphasis mine]). Nevertheless, Stolnitz holds that they 
(too) may be relevant to its aesthetic appreciation. 
They may be so if or when they reinforce attention to the object, 
they get absorbed into aesthetic perception and suffuse it with new 
significance, they fuse with the object and thereby give it added life, 
they illuminate it, rendering the percipient’s aesthetic perception 
more acute and subsequently enriching the quality of her experience 
and thus making it more intense and discriminating. These phrases 
are scattered across Stolnitz’s text (see ibid., pp. 55-60). However, 
there is a place where he both mentions the possibility and sets the 
conditions for considering the role of the above-mentioned items in 
aesthetic appreciation. Immediately after asserting that “we need not 
(…) condemn all ‘knowledge about’ as aesthetically irrelevant” 
Stolnitz states that such knowledge is aesthetically relevant “when it 
does not weaken or destroy aesthetic attention to the object, when it 
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it enhances the quality and significance of one’s immediate aesthetic 
response to the object” (ibid., p. 58). 
Now, if this is the case concerning that which is not embodied in 
the object, then there is no way Stolnitz could hold that a work’s 
moral vision is not aesthetically relevant and, therefore, that it cannot 
be taken into account within the adoption of an aesthetic attitude or 
the exercise of aesthetic attention. 
I shall note that Dickie keeps his discussion of the way Stolnitz 
approaches the relation of morality to aesthetic value, and the way in 
which he wishes to set the limits of aesthetic relevance, separate. 
However, there is a link between them: the way in which Stolnitz 
approaches the relation of morality to aesthetic value should be read 
in the light of the way in which he wishes to set the limits of aesthetic 
relevance – in short, the latter has primacy over the former. If, as 
Dickie holds, a work’s moral vision is a part of that work, and if, as 
Stolnitz would never argue against, anything that is a part of a work 
may be relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of it, then, a work’s 
moral vision is always at least potentially relevant to its aesthetic 
appreciation. 
The reason why I mention ‘potential relevance’ and not 
‘relevance simpliciter’, by the way, has nothing to do with being 
uncertain as to whether Stolnitz accepts that a work’s moral vision 
can be relevant to its aesthetic appreciation. It is just that he never 
asserts explicitly, in the way in which does Dickie, that a work’s moral 
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that the moral responses of a reader of a book, being moral 
responses of her own, are alien to it. Although it does not entail that a 
book’s moral vision – not its potential reader’s moral responses – is 
alien to it, it does not state explicitly that the moral vision is part of the 
book.7 
There is nothing in Stolnitz’s view that entails that the moral 
aspects of art cannot be taken into account within the aesthetic 
attitude. Attending to the moral vision of a work of art, to its interests, 
does not prevent the aesthetic appreciation of such work of art from 
taking place; one may consider those interests – even if they conflict 
with one’s own – and still appreciate it aesthetically, attend to it 
disinterestedly. Indeed, there may be a conflict between the moral 
aspects or visions of a book and the moral beliefs of its reader; and 
yet, she may read that book aesthetically taking its moral aspects or 
visions into account. She may attend to the moral content of the book 
and yet without letting the conflict that may occur between such 
content and her moral beliefs preclude her from reading the book in a 
disinterested way.8 
                                                             
7 Surprisingly, I could find only one commentator who has noticed it, Sushil Kumar 
Saxena: “it is only this externalistic moral checking – this interposition of ‘moral (…) 
responses of our own which are alien to it’ – to which Stolnitz (in his words cited) objects” 
(Saxena, 1978, p. 87). As Saxena adds, after all Stolnitz “does not deny that a moral vision 
may be a part of a work’s inner content” (ibid., p. 87). And if it may be a part of a work’s 
inner content, it may in principle be considered. 
8 David E. W. Fenner claims that “what Stolnitz advocates is inattention to anything that 
will harm the aesthetic appreciation of the object. If the moral point of view of the critical 
point of view helps to create a better experience, then these aspects ought to be included in 
the attention of the spectator” (Fenner, 1996, p. 104). What Fenner takes a better experience 
to be is one by the occasion of which the spectator takes more of a second-order, 
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If this is so, there is no need to say that the spectator may do 
something, namely, take a work’s moral point of view into account, 
and still appreciate it aesthetically, that is, despite appreciating it 
aesthetically. One may appreciate a work of art aesthetically while 
taking its moral point of view into account, among anything else that 
may enrich the quality of her experience. That is, one has a better 
experience because one takes the work’s moral point of view into 
account, among anything else that may help to create a better 
experience. 
 
3. Other versions of aesthetic attention 
If there is something Stolnitz might be accused of, it is that his way of 
conceiving the aesthetic attitude is too inclusive, rather than too 
exclusive. This is because, according to him, the very adoption of 
such an attitude not only admits but often requires a manifold of 
                                                                                                                                                           
into the object expecting a return of second-order pleasure, but when this pleasure is either 
not forthcoming or of a minimal degree” (ibid., p. 117). Indeed, within Fenner’s proposal, 
this dual-character pleasure – or at least the expectation of such – plays a crucial role in 
aesthetic appreciation, although the pleasure is not taken in the object itself, but rather in 
the experience of attending to the object – and this is why he describes it as a ‘metafeeling’ 
or ‘second-order occurrence’ (ibid., p. 119). However, contra Fenner, it must be remarked 
that experience’s quality enrichment does not amount to pleasure enhancement, that is, to a 
more pleasurable experience. Consideration of the moral aspects of art may render the 
experience richer and less pleasurable. Among the accounts focused on aesthetic attention, 
the one advanced by Bence Nanay presupposes such difference. Accordingly, Nanay has 
recently defined ‘an aesthetically relevant property’ – not ‘an aesthetic property’, I shall 
note – in the following terms: “if attending to a property of a particular makes me 
appreciate my experience of that particular more (or less), and not as a result of making me 
appreciate the particular itself more (or less), it is an aesthetically relevant property” 
(Nanay, 2016, p. 73). Meanwhile, as Nanay adds, “it is not aesthetic appreciation that [is] 
used for defining aesthetically relevant properties, but the appreciation of one’s 
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items that are not embodied in the aesthetic object itself, that are not 
present within the object itself. This may include “repeated 
experience of the work, and even, sometimes, technical training in 
the art-form” (Stolnitz, 1960, p. 38), it demands that one is “persistent 
in returning to [the works] again and again” and enters a “process of 
familiarization [that] never ends” (ibid., p. 77). 
What is crucial here is that the adoption of the aesthetic attitude 
“is not always easily come by” (ibid., p. 38) and that it “is not 
something which is over and done with it, once and for all” (ibid., p. 
77). On the contrary, it often requires some contribution, some 
activity on the part of the percipient. The adoption of the aesthetic 
attitude is itself an activity – the percipient is an agent: 
 
as a former teacher of mine used to say, aesthetic perception is 
frequently thought to be a ‘blank, cow-like stare.’ It is easy to fall 
into this mistake when we find aesthetic perception described 
as ‘just looking,’ without any activity or practical interest. From 
this it is inferred that we simply expose ourselves to the work of 
art and permit it to inundate us in waves of sound or color. 
But this is surely a distortion of the facts of experience. 
(…) To be ‘sitting on the edge of the chair’ is anything but 
passive. (ibid., p. 37) 
 
As for other conceptions of the aesthetic attitude criticized by Dickie, 
I readily admit that the thesis according to which the adoption of the 
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manifold of items, which may be either present or not present within 
the object itself, embodied or not embodied in the aesthetic object 
itself, including its moral view, would never be shared by a theorist 
such as Edward Bullough. According to Bullough, distance “renders 
questions of origin, of influences, or of purposes almost as 
meaningless as those of marketable value, of pleasure, even of 
moral importance, since it lifts the work of Art out of the realm of 
practical systems and ends” (Bullough, 1912, p. 117). One could also 
hardly say that Vincent Tomas would accept Stolnitz’s view. Although 
he asserts that “contrary to what Ortega [y Gassett] wrote (…) it is 
false that ‘preoccupation with the human content of the work is in 
principle incompatible with aesthetic enjoyment proper’” (Tomas, 
1959, p. 67), he rejects the claim that effort is involved in the 
adoption of the aesthetic attitude: “there seem to be people (poor 
souls!) for whom it involves effort, an ‘act of will,’ to adopt the 
aesthetic attitude” (ibid., p. 60). 
Things change when one reaches Eliseo Vivas’s ‘intransitive 
attention’: not only does he mention “the activity, which is a 
necessary preparation to come into full possession of the poem”; he 
asserts that “the organic whole which is a poem of quality does not 
come forward on its own; the reader must make the effort to discover 
it” and that “to grasp the unity and the central effects of a poem the 
reader must work and work hard” (Vivas, 1959, p. 231). This hard 
work may include some ‘excursions’, but only ones that can be taken 
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indispensable as means to lead the reader as close as he can come 
to (…) intransitive or contextual experience with the poem”, are to be 
accepted as “of the right kind” (ibid., p. 230).9 
 To be sure, among the authors whose conceptions of the 
aesthetic attitude are criticized in Dickie’s paper, not only Stolnitz, 
but, to some extent, also Vivas, would reject the thesis according to 
which the moral aspects of art cannot be taken into account within 
the adoption of an aesthetic attitude. 
What is more, the same might be said about recent versions of 
aesthetic attention, such as Fenner’s or Nanay’s. 
It shall be remarked that in bringing these versions up, I do not 
mean, by no means, that they are equally inspired – or even that the 
latter is inspired – by Stolnitz’s view or by the theories of the 
aesthetic attitude. It would be uncontroversial to include Fenner 
among the attitude theorists, although he argues that adopting an 
aesthetic attitude is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for one 
to have an aesthetic experience.10 Nanay goes further and holds that 
aesthetic attention is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
                                                             
9 Also involved in Vivas’ version of the aesthetic attitude is a kind of ‘reflection’ that is 
addressed “to the grasping of the meanings and values that the artist informed” or, more 
generally, to grasping “the objective intention of the poem” (ibid., pp. 230-231). 
10 In Fenner’s own words, “it is argued that while the aesthetic attitude is not necessary for 
the creation, sustaining, or flourishing of aesthetic experiences, it may well be sufficient, at 
least in some form. That is, while one need not be in an aesthetic attitude in order to 
experience aesthetically, it may well be that if she is in an or the aesthetic attitude, her 
experience will be aesthetic. It is at this point that my own attitude candidate is introduced” 
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aesthetic experiences.11 Nevertheless, he also claims that this kind 
of attention is required for paradigmatic cases of aesthetic 
experience,12 and that such cases have the status of paradigmatic 
because they “align nicely with the experiences some influential 
novelists, artists, and critics have tried to capture” (ibid., p. 33). If this 
is the case, it is advisable to bring Nanay’s account up as a recent 
version of aesthetic attention.13 
Now, nothing in what one may call an attitude of expectant 
attention – Fenner’s version of the aesthetic attitude – precludes the 
moral aspects of art from being considered within the adoption of it. 
On the contrary, as Fenner himself states, 
 
in viewing an artwork that was explicitly designed to convey 
some political message, one’s aesthetic appreciation of the 
object may be heightened by realizing the effectiveness of the 
piece in conveying its message. One’s appreciation of Picasso’s 
Guernica is enriched by realizing the powerful statement it 
makes about war and innocents. (Fenner, 1996, pp. 11-12) 
 
                                                             
11 Nanay notes that “attending in a certain way is not something we can always force 
ourselves to do” (Nanay, 2016, p. 32), that is, “we do not have full control over the way we 
exercise our attention” (ibid., p. 33). 
12 In his own words, “some experiences that may be called aesthetic may not require 
aesthetic attention. All I claimed was that those paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experience I 
zeroed in on (…) do)” (ibid., p. 28). 
13 As Robert Hopkins writes, “[i]n emphasizing the role of attention in aesthetics, Nanay 
revitalizes a tradition that ran aground in the hail of criticism directed at the theory of the 
‘aesthetic attitude’. Repositioning attention centre stage in aesthetics is welcome, offering a 
refreshing alternative to attempts to characterize the aesthetic by a more direct appeal to a 
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As for Nanay, it must be remembered that, according to his 
philosophy of perception-based approach, any property, at least any 
property one can attend to, including properties that are not 
perceptually represented, can be aesthetically relevant. The conditio 
sine qua non is that it is connected to the object’s observable formal 
properties, i.e., that it is made a semi-formal property.14 Inasmuch as 
Guernica’s moral vision is connected with Guernica’s observable 
formal properties, that is, as long as it is made a semi-formal property 
of Picasso’s painting, it can count as an aesthetically relevant 
property. Therefore, it can be considered within the exercise of 
distributed attention, Nanay’s special kind of aesthetic attention. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Although there are a number of reasons why interest in aesthetic 
attitude theories has waned in the past few decades, Dickie’s 
criticisms have played a central role in this historical phenomenon. 
However, the historical significance of Dickie’s criticisms does not lie 
solely in his view that there is no such a thing as an aesthetic 
attitude. Dickie also argued that, according to attitude theorists, 
adopting an aesthetic attitude excludes consideration of the moral 
                                                             
14 “Semi-formal properties are properties that depend constitutively on the artwork’s 
formal properties” (Nanay, 2016, p. 113). Among them are the ones that “partly [depend] 
on our background information and partly on formal properties” (ibid., p. 107). As Nanay 
holds, “knowledge of non-observable facts about the artwork can indeed enrich attribution 
of some semi-formal properties to the artwork, thus, it can also enrich our aesthetic 
evaluation of it. But these non-observable facts are relevant to our aesthetic evaluation of 
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aspects of art. This have contributed to take attitude theories as of no 
use when it comes to appreciate such significant and trendy topics as 
the relation of art to morality.15 
Unfortunately, authors who have followed the tradition of 
aesthetic attention – including Fenner and Nanay – have not given 
any specific account on the topic. 
I have shown that there is nothing in Stolnitz’s conception of the 
aesthetic attitude that entails that the moral aspects of art cannot be 
taken into account within such an attitude. The adoption of the 
aesthetic attitude is an activity that welcomes the consideration of a 
manifold of items, which may be either present or not present within 
the object itself, embodied or not embodied in the artwork itself, 
including its moral view. According to Stolnitz, consideration of a 
work’s moral vision may enrich the quality of one’s aesthetic 
experience of such work. 
Although showing this alone has been my purpose here, I 
have also given some hints on how a sophisticated account of 
aesthetic attention can include consideration of the moral aspects of 
art. Presumably, it would have to embrace some of the tenets of both 
Fenner’s conception of expectant attention and Nanay’s conception 
of distributed attention – namely Nanay’s definition of an aesthetically 
relevant property. 
                                                             
15 Many have just moved to proposals such as Noël Carroll’s moderate moralism (Carroll, 
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But before moving to that it is important to stress an historical 
fact: according to Stolnitz, adopting an aesthetic attitude does not 
exclude taking into account of the moral aspects of art.  
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ABSTRACT. The main focus of this paper is the aesthetic significance of 
the concept of repertoire and its relevance to research in empirical 
aesthetics which addresses the question of beholding, understood as 
engagement in appreciative behavior when confronted with stimuli of 
potential aesthetic interest. Despite the meta-disciplinary appeal of the 
concept of repertoire, which is a heuristic device used both in 
reception aesthetics (Iser, 1976; Moles, 1958) and psychologically 
informed analytic aesthetics (Wollheim, 1990; Hopkins, 2001), there is 
no articulate view of the repertoire as aesthetic category. I hold that 
the innovation in the study of aesthetics that the repertoire might be 
introducing is establishing a conceptual basis for a cognitive 
aesthetics of reception and providing a naturalistic alternative to 
aesthetic categories that are given a transcendental essence. 
 
1. Introduction 
Questioning the cognitive foundations of aesthetic appreciation is a 
topic enjoying a resurgence in the theoretical landscape of recent 
developments in cognitive science after having been already present 
in the early layers of traditional philosophical aesthetics and art 
theory, with their “once prized mental heritage” (Berenson, 1953, 
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270). Concepts of cognition went from playing a central role in 
philosophical aesthetic thinking (Schaeffer, 2000; Iseminger, 2005; 
Nanay, 2019) to informing discussions of hierarchical models of 
information processing in the psychology of art (Bartel, 2014; Seeley, 
2018). A consequence of this ongoing development might be 
articulated in terms of a shift in emphasis from distinctive aesthetic 
states of mind (Levinson, 2016; Iseminger, 2006) toward more 
general information-processing states of mind that shape an 
aesthetic encounter. Comparably, work in anthropology and art 
theory situate the question of art appreciation within the framework of 
universal human dispositions – biological and psychological 
anthropological constants, operating below or above the threshold of 
consciousness (Berenson, 1953, 20; Morphy and Perkins, 2006). 
Moreover, the anthropological basis of art appreciation is becoming 
foregrounded with the expansion of the aesthetic field, which seeks 
to integrate modes of responsiveness to art forms and creative 
practices from outside the established canon of fine arts (e.g. 
indigenous cultural practices, Miner, 2014; Townsend-Gault, 2014) 
and to account for global artistic circulations of art forms (Espagne, 
2015). 
The heterogenous sources mentioned above call for a 
refinement of mental categories relating to appreciative behavior, 
which are to be kept within nature’s bounds (Berenson, 1953, 41). 
These categories could and do indeed start to make the object of a 
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which is yet to receive thorough analysis. 
In this paper I aim to clarify the concept of repertoire in relation 
to two seemingly divergent theoretical traditions, namely, literary 
studies in the German tradition, more specifically, reception 
aesthetics, and philosophical aesthetics in the Anglo-American 
analytic tradition. My focus will be on the theoretical assumptions of 
Wolfgang Iser and Richard Wollheim about the repertoire in 
connection with textual and pictorial artifacts. Both Iser and Wollheim 
argue to a greater or lesser extent against the irrelevance of 
psychological considerations in the aesthetic context and, as I 
suggest, work towards a cognitive aesthetics of reception, given their 
interests in mental acts underlying episodes of aesthetic 
appreciation. I hold that the innovation in the study of aesthetics that 
the repertoire might be introducing is establishing a conceptual basis 
for a cognitive aesthetics of reception. In what way does the concept 
of an aesthetic-centered repertoire challenge the problem of 
beholding, that is, the relationship between the beholder and creative 
practices? Does it allow for differentiated notions of appreciative 
response, unique to each form or genre of creative practice, in 
keeping with their specificity, or does it hold a more generalist 
appeal? Moreover, what kind of experience does a repertoire 
foreground (active, contemplative, self-reflexive etc.)? 
In addressing these questions, I first settle a technical point by 
elaborating on the status of the repertoire as second-order aesthetic 
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aesthetics and psychological aesthetics in order to provide some 
framing and trace back the notion of repertoire to already established 
discourses. I then unpack the elements of the literary and pictorial 
repertoires, as they appear in Iser and Wollheim’s writings. My 
general claim is that by bringing to the fore the complexity of the 
beholder’s cognitive repertoire, one opens the prospect for 
overcoming the shortcomings of existing models of aesthetics that 
characterize aesthetic appreciation exclusively in terms of privileged 
mental states (e.g. attention, pleasure, disinterestedness etc.), and 
take steps towards reassessing its “compound nature” (Levinson, 
2016, 35). 
 
2. The Repertoire as Second-Order Aesthetic Category 
The repertoire is a heuristic category for the study of reception which 
restores the relevance of the beholding subject in discussing 
aesthetic appreciation. As opposed to first-order aesthetic concepts, 
understood in Sibley’s sense (Sibley, 1959), as terms that we use in 
making a judgment with respect to features intrinsic to particular 
works such as unified, balanced or delicate, the repertoire works as 
an organizing system, capturing links between such first-order 
concept ascriptions and shedding light on how states and processes 
that govern aesthetic appreciation connect to each other. Given that 
it is a category relating to the very nature and conditions of 
appreciation itself and to the ways in which first-order concepts are 
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perceptiveness, or sensitivity, of aesthetic discrimination or 
appreciation”, as Sibley (ibid., 421) has it, I take the repertoire to be a 
second-order category. Generally absent from the art critics’ talk, 
who focus rather on first-order concepts, the repertoire appears in 
rather theoretical aesthetic discussions, to which I will now turn. 
 
3. Two Frames of Reference: Reception Aesthetics and 
Psychological Aesthetics  
One can trace back the notion of repertoire to two theoretical 
traditions in which is manifested a concern with the beholding 
subject, namely, reception aesthetics, developed since the late 
1960s in the German literary tradition and psychologically informed 
aesthetics in the Anglo-American analytic tradition. Wolfgang Iser 
and Richard Wollheim are in this respect two important reference 
points for understanding the processing of both textual and pictorial 
meaning. This section will give an overview of their main theses. 
 
3.1. Reception Aesthetics 
Reception aesthetics brings to the forefront an explicit 
acknowledgement of the beholder and his role in producing an 
aesthetic object. Building on philosophical discourse – and more 
particularly phenomenology – rather than empirical evidence (Iser, 
1989, 43; Holub, 1984, 84-85), reception aesthetics is not concerned 
with a historically documented reception of art practices across time, 
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reception of implied beholders, and, more specifically, as regards 
Iser’s original model, with the aesthetic response that implied readers 
experience in the act of reading. The proposed model is an idealized, 
heuristic one, aiming at disclosing the operations which lie at the 
basis of processing a literary text (Iser, 1989, 49). Literary processing 
operations are made manifest through textual “response-inviting 
structures” (i.e. structures that play with the bounds of indeterminacy 
in a text, between the reader’s own experience and the meaning 
conveyed by the text or between text and reality), understood as 
inherent structures liable to trigger an aesthetic response and to 
secure a communicative efficacy (ibid., vii, 5-6, 12). 
A question that arises is related to the aesthetic and 
experiential statements that permeate the aesthetics of reception 
(Kemp, 1998, 183). If the main object of reception aesthetics is the 
aesthetic effect felt at the level of the beholder’s perceiving 
consciousness (Iser, 1976, 49), it is questionable whether the 
primary aesthetic experience of real or empirical subjects is given full 
due. One of the pitfalls in the method of reception aesthetics is 
precisely that it “prestructures a certain role for the reader”, who is 
more acted upon than properly activating for himself the aesthetic 
object, being thus possibly subject to a form of literary determinism, 
and reduced to a textual condition (Holland, as cited in Iser, 1989, 
43, 45). It is hard to tell in what respect or to what extent the 
idealized aspects of beholding brought into focus by reception 
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Here is Iser’s understanding of reception: “what I call reception is a 
product that is initiated in the reader by the text but is modeled by the 
norms and values that govern the reader’s outlook. Reception is 
therefore an indication of preferences and predilections that reveal 
the reader’s disposition as well as the social conditions that have 
shaped his attitudes. If I wish to access such a product, I must 
examine the response-inviting structures of the text, so that I can see 
how much the actual reader has selected from the potential inherent 
in the text.” (Iser, 1989, 50). While it focuses on commonalities in 
response to an ideated meaning inherent in the text rather than in 
differences in expectations and response, the model seems to assign 
no constitutive role to the individual reader’s stock of experience in 
constructing an aesthetic object. Quite the contrary, the 
individualized store of experience of the reader is assumed to be 
molded by the very act of engaging in literary reading, which should 
ideally be resulting in cognitive learning and in an extension of the 
self or of ones horizons of consciousness, as one can read in the 
following passage: “Divergent responses would be an interesting 
basis for investigation into the proliferative effect resulting whenever 
a literary text is to be incorporated into the individual reader’s store of 
experience. A new idea of research would open up, relating to the 
degree  in which 1) fictionality activates human faculties in a way not 
called upon during our everyday lives, and 2) why we are able to 
understand a literary experience that an actual experience has never 
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mentions here is reframed in terms of literary anthropology (ibid., vii, 
6, 7, 261, 264), a discipline that would investigate ways in which 
literature reveals the workings of the human mind and its creative 
responsiveness. This would lead to a reappraisal of faculty 
psychology whose original partitions may no longer be meaningful 
and intelligible (ibid., 274-275, 280). 
 
3.2. Psychological aesthetics 
The repertoire comes equally under the purview of psychological 
aesthetics in the analytic tradition, whose main representative is 
Richard Wollheim. Building on psychological discourse, Wollheim 
addresses the constitution of pictorial meaning and aesthetic 
appreciation, which can be comprehended by appealing to the 
cognitive capacities of beholders or appreciators. As a complement 
to textual understanding, what Wollheim brings anew in considering 
pictorial understanding is a conceptual construct that he calls “an 
internal spectator” (Wollheim, 1990, 102), whose mental activity is 
determinant for the conception and perception of art. Introducing this 
pictorial strategy is meant to induce an appropriate mental condition 
in the mind of the empirical, external spectator, more specifically one 
that parallels the mental condition of the artist, comprising required 
sensitivity and required information (ibid., 357). One can see that 
Wollheim shares with Iser the epistemic assumptions of an 
appropriate response to works of art, that could not be resumed to 
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of the performance of transmitting artistic meaning is tested against 
the survival of art: the enduring intelligibility of paintings for an 
appropriate spectatorship would thus be due to a common human 
nature manifested in human societies (Matravers, 2007, 143) that 
enables it.  
If Iser is not concerned with the individual psyche in his 
reception aesthetics (Iser, 1976, 50, 58), Wollheim marks a change 
in the scope of addressing aesthetic response or the effect a works 
has on us in that he puts emphasis on the constitutive role of 
psychological traits for appreciation and the active completion of the 
beholder. He also marks a change with respect to theories prevalent 
in the analytic aesthetic tradition to which he belongs such as attitude 
theories, reputed to describe aesthetic appreciation almost 
exclusively in terms of distinctive or paradigm aesthetic states of 
mind (such as aesthetic contemplation, aesthetic pleasure, 
disinterested, distanced or detached aesthetic attitude etc.); 
Wollheim thus avoids reductive or all-encompassing categories. One 
of the ambitions of the repertoire is, as we shall see, to demarcate 
the processes that enable aesthetic experience from the capacities 
that preclude it, while avoiding segregating aesthetic behavior from 
other human concerns and general forms of response that define our 
relation to the world (Schaeffer, 2003, 147; Levinson, 2016, 30). 
What is needed is an account that would allow to go from simpler, 
natural responses to more complex ones.  
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And what are the capacities that occupy the mental space in an 
aesthetic episode about which psychological theses are supposed to 
be making a point? In trying to answer these questions, in the 
following sections I highlight the polarities of the literary and pictorial 
aspects of the repertoire flowing from the two seemingly opposing 
traditions of reception aesthetics and psychological aesthetics briefly 
sketched above. 
 
4. The Literary Repertoire 
The repertoire of a literary text is made, according to Iser of 
“conventions necessary for the establishment of a situational frame”, 
that is, of a common ground between the work and the reader (Iser, 
1978, 66-67; 1976, 127). The situational frame within which the act of 
reading is set is to be distinguished from a pragmatic or situational 
context of action, wherein meaning is stabilized. Here is Iser’s 
definition of the literary repertoire:  
 
The repertoire consists of all the familiar territory within the text. 
This may be in the form of references to earlier works, or to 
social and historical norms, or to the whole culture from which 
the text has emerged— in brief, to what the Prague 
structuralists have called the "extratextual" reality. The fact that 
this reality is referred to has a two-fold implication: (1) that the 
reality evoked is not confined to the printed page, (2) that those 
elements selected for reference are not intended to be a mere 
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means that they undergo some kind of transformation, and, 
indeed, this is an integral feature of the whole process of 
communication. The manner in which conventions, norms, and 
traditions take their place in the literary repertoire varies 
considerably, but they are always in some way reduced or 
modified, as they have been removed from their original context 
and function. (Iser, 1978, 69; 1976, 128-129). 
 
Thus, conventions serve as a determinate normative background 
against which one comprehends a work. As mentioned in the 
passage above, conventions can relate to traditions of past literature 
alluded to in a text (e.g. Homeric and Shakespearian allusions in 
Joyce’s Ulysses; Iser, 1978, 79), to a cultural and social prevailing 
system, or, to some extent, to the subjective norms and dispositions 
of the reader (Iser, 1989, 8). Conventions introduce another kind of 
dependence, different from perceptual determination (i.e. properties 
that appeal to perceptual senses), in that they appeal to the 
experience and knowledge of prospective readers and provide a 
minimal structure for expectations that arise in the reading process. 
At the same time, literary conventions, which remain to be 
discovered in the reading process, deviate from, call into question or 
at least throw in a new light conventions and old norms by 
reshuffling, depragmatizing and reorganizing them in unexpected 
combinations while dismissing their regulative function and disrupting 
the projected expectations of readers (Iser, 1978, 60-61).  
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which lead to indeterminacy in a literary text, which needs to be 
resolved by appeal to the reader’s imagination (Iser, 1989, 36, 40-41; 
1978, 85; 1976, 304). Through this emphasis on unfamiliar territory, 
the reader’s participation is made manifest (Iser, 1978, 73-74). 
Indeterminacies take the form of blanks or abstract idealized 
structures acting as triggering signals for a response. It is this very 
reorganization of the repertoire of both familiar and unfamiliar 
elements that is deemed to have an effect on the reader. 
Furthermore, the effect on the reader will be determinant for 
establishing the aesthetic value of a work, which is not formulated 
explicitly in the repertoire but emerges out of the suspension of 
validity and recodification of familiar norms: “aesthetic value 
constitutes the structural ‘drive’ necessary for the process of 
communication. By invalidating correspondences between the 
elements put together in the repertoire, it prevents the text from 
corresponding to the repertoires already inherent in all its possible 
readers; in this respect, the aesthetic value initiates the process 
whereby the reader assembles the meaning of the text” (Iser, 1978, 
81-82). Conveying aesthetic value is, in Iser’s reception aesthetics, 
tied to the proper functioning of any communication system entailing 
the repertoires of producers and recipients. Thus the repertoire of the 
sender (mainly, the author) is deemed to be continuous, although not 
identical or equivalent with the repertoire of the receiver (the 
spectator, the audience etc.), since some minimal overlapping is 
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same time, while familiar elements need to be recognizable in order 
to make the work understandable, the ultimate goal is to change the 
recipient’s repertoire, bringing him or her to revise and reshape his or 
her background beliefs and familiar schemata. The balance between 
the representation and alteration of the familiar is captured by the 
notion of “coherent deformation”, a notion Iser draws from Merleau-
Ponty which broadly amounts to placing familiar elements in an 
unfamiliar context, thus disturbing the illusion of an intrinsic 
orderliness of the world (Iser, 1978, 82-83; 1976, 150). It is a textual 
strategy that appeals to the reader’s experience and individual 
memory store in order to draw him or her in the literary 
communication process while seeking to transform this very 
individualized store of experience. 
Iser’s deviationist approach appears as a counterbalance to a 
well-known model of representation and reception in pictorial art, 
namely Gombrich’s model of schema and correction (Iser, 1978, 90-
91), whereby correction of schemata takes place through close 
perception and a continuous matching process of one’s familiar 
classifications against what the world has to offer. Gombrich’s model 
is not operative for literary purposes (nor for pictorial arts that do not 
aim primarily at naturalism) since it relies exclusively on perceptual 
normative principles. Iser retains nonetheless from this model the 
idea of going against norms of expectation, which is common both to 
pictures and literary texts, even though the norms brought into 
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An objection raised against Iser is that, by giving so much 
weight to deviation or deformation, he promotes an aesthetics of 
negativity which, rather than bringing into play and broadening the 
reader’s store of experience, it goes against it, negates it – along with  
conventions of the represented world – rather than transforms it 
(Holub, 1984, 87; Iser, 1978, 73-74).  
The literary repertoire is consistent with Iser’s project of literary 
anthropology which is deemed to capture human nature within a 
frame. A literary repertoire may be picturing thought systems 
operative at specific historical moments (e.g. the prevailing norms of 
eighteenth-century thought systems and social systems, represented 
as governing the conduct of the most important characters of 
Fielding’s Tom Jones such as “norms of latitudinarian morality, 
orthodox theology, deistic philosophy, eighteenth-century 
anthropology, and eighteenth-century aristocracy”; human conducts 
such as “benevolence, corruption of human nature, ruling passion, 
natural superiority of the nobility” etc.; Iser, 1989, 37-38). The 
aesthetic object thus becomes “the whole spectrum of human nature” 
arising from negated possibilities and what the representation of 
norms occlude, giving access to the diversity of human experience: 
“the repertoire of the novel … combines and levels out norms of 
differed systems which in real life were kept quite separate from one 
another. By this selective combination of norms, the repertoire offers 
information about the systems through which the picture of human 
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reassessed to the extent that human nature cannot be reduced to a 
single hard-and-fast principle, but must be discovered, in all its 
potential, through the multifarious possibilities that have been 
excluded by those norms” (Iser, 1978, 76). The repertoire would thus 
give a picture of variations on possibilities regarding human 
experience. The question remains open as to how an aesthetic-
oriented repertoire may be contributing to anthropology and adding to 
a study of man. 
 
5. The Pictorial Repertoire 
If we were to arrange in contrasting patterns the literary and the 
pictorial repertoire, one would say that the elements of the latter 
repertoire are here to be tracked in the work (and, more specifically, 
for Wollheim’s purposes, in a special category of representational 
painting; Wollheim, 1990, 102), not in conventions and extrapictorial 
norms. 
Furthermore, Wollheim, as opposed to Iser, gives more weight 
to cognitive interaction, to the inner life of the beholder, only that the 
beholder – here, the spectator – is no longer external or implied, as 
we have seen with Iser, but internal to the picture, to its virtual space. 
In other words, there are differences in what the beholder is 
supposed to be when comparing the two traditions of reception 
aesthetics and analytic aesthetics. Wollheim’s move is to say that the 
real, empirical spectator of the picture is drawn into the composition 
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having to accrue the picture’s content (ibid., 185).   
In order to explain pictures that contain an internal spectator, 
Wollheim appeals to an analogy with perspectival visual imagination 
(ibid., 103-104), of which we have a more intuitive grasp. Just as one 
can imagine an event from the inside, from a first-person point of 
view in which I (or someone else) am protagonist, or from the 
outside, from a third-person point of view, so one’s engagement with 
pictures may require a perspectival approach, and more specifically, 
adopting the perspective of an internal spectator. Importantly, 
protagonists or internal spectators, which remain unrepresented as 
such although they are given along with the content of the picture 
(ibid., 101-102), are endowed with an assigned repertoire, by which 
is meant dispositions to act, see, think, remember and feel (ibid., 
104), and this repertoire is to be retrieved by external spectators 
when engaging with pictures. Here is how Wollheim introduces the 
pictorial repertoire: 
First, the artist determines the identity of the spectator in the 
picture. In doing so, he has the same options open to him as I have 
when I engage in centrally imagining. He can choose between a 
spectator who is a particular person and a spectator who is merely a 
person of a particular kind, the kind itself varying in specificity. 
Secondly, the artist, having fixed the identity of the spectator in 
the picture, will go on to assign him a repertoire. He will assign him 
dispositions that will generate and constrain his outer life and his 
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which controls the inner life” (ibid., 104-105).  
 In addition to being a fully-embodied “perceiving, thinking, 
feeling, acting, creature” (ibid., 130), the internal spectator, in order to 
give the external spectator a distinctive access to the content of a 
particular picture (ibid., 129-130; Hopkins, 2001, 217-218) must be a 
total spectator with an extended repertoire comprising an all-
encompassing visual field and acute sensibility, a particular form of 
enhanced attention to the represented content, as well as expressive 
elements that match this rich inner life (Wollheim, 1983, 96). 
Moreover, as stressed in the passage above, it is the artist who 
constructs the repertoire of the inner life of the internal spectator and 
inscribes it in the painting during the depictive process (Wollheim, 
1990, 164-166, 286-287). In other words, constructing a repertoire is 
a matter of artistic skill and the retrieval of the elements of the 
repertoire is conditioned by pictorial devices. With respect to knowing 
how one accesses the repertoire of the internal spectator, the 
solution proposed is through an imaginative engagement licensed by 
pictorial devices which enables an experience corresponding with 
what the internal spectator experiences inwardly and leaves us in a 
condition similar to his: “Though imagining from the inside someone’s 
inward responses doesn’t require me actually to have these 
responses myself, the upshot of the imaginative project, or the 
condition in which it leaves me, is that it is for me as if I had 
responded in these ways. Imagination, without inducing the 
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is as if the external spectator were delegating his or her mental 
processing in order to have an appropriate, enhanced understanding 
of the pictorial content, the effect of this understanding being free 
from real consequences or sanctions, an idea that we can also find in 
Iser. Pictorial experience becomes thus primarily a matter of 
experience through imagination since the assumption is that the 
elements of the repertoire enter the content of occurrent experiential 
states of the external spectator. 
One of the main objections to Wollheim’s proposal regards the 
dismissal of the external spectator’s psychology (or at least part of it), 
whose sensory, motor or affective behavior patterns are counted out 
from the proper understanding of the pictorial content (Wollheim, 
1990, 181-182, 237). An undesired consequence flowing from this 
approach would be to postulate “a distinctive positive psychological 
repertoire different from ours” (Hopkins, 2001, 229-230) comprising 
alternative sensibilities, affections and cognitions, only inscribed in a 
specific category of pictures. It is not clear what resources would be 
needed in order to comprehend such a distinctive repertoire.  
Another problem with the repertoire (both literary and pictorial), 
is that it may not be too comprehensive enough and may not reflect 
the intrinsic divisions and ramifications of capacities and functions in 
the mental realm. Given that both the literary and pictorial repertoires 
aim to give a picture of variations of inner states (Iser, 1978, 76; 
Wollheim, 1983, 94-95), further inquiry regarding the possibility of an 
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contextualized is needed.2  
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Aesthetic Values, Engaging Perspectives, and 
Possibilities in Literature 
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University of Murcia 
 
ABSTRACT: This is a paper on the aesthetics of literature, but also on 
the phenomenology and axiology of art. I will try to defend: 1) that an 
approach to the engagement of the reader in literary fiction based on 
the concept of “perspective” (Donnelly) is compatible with 
interactionism and moderate autonomism concerning values in art; 2) 
that such an approach needs to pay attention to the complexity of the 
aesthetic qualities which contribute to the aesthetic value of the work 
in order to explain the quality of a “perspective” developed within the 
work (and thus basing the engagement of the competent reader), and 
must also determine (in some cases) the aesthetic properties playing 
a significant role as reasons for the presence of other non-aesthetic 
properties in the work; 3) that the “adventure” of the engaged reader 
can be explained in terms of “possibilities” and “aspects” in order to 
avoid some dangers of epistemic and ontological views; and 4) that 
some examples from Henry James’s novels (The Golden Bowl, 
mainly) may be particularly useful in order to exemplify my ideas. 
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Nussbaum (1990) and Diamond (1996) have proposed that the 
experience of the reader of artistic literature creates an “adventure” 
because through our attentive reading of novels, the emotions, the 
stirred intelligence, the moral consciousness of her heroes and 
heroines become our very own adventure2. I will take Nussbaum’s 
concept of “adventure” as a conceptual tool in order to take account 
of the imaginative responses of both characters and readers in 
literature. Nevertheless, in literary writing there is an asymmetric 
relationship between author and reader insomuch as literature “does 
not purport to describe the world either from a common objective 
perspective (as we find with scientific, historical, or philosophical 
texts) or from a shared cultural perspective (as in the case of works 
of genre fiction)”. Instead, “literature invites the reader to reach out 
from his or her own subjective perspective to engage with an 
unfamiliar perspective” (Donnelly 2019, p. 11). 
Some scholars (such as Walsh, 1969; Burri, 2007; or Donnelly, 
2019) have defended that such an asymmetric relationship can be 
solved because, as Donnelly's solution proposes in particular, 
“excellent literature impels the engaged reader to imaginatively 
transfer perspectival properties from things as they are characterized 
in his or her own experience to the fictional entities of the literary 
work” (Donnelly, 2019, p. 11), Donnelly’s “perspective” is “like a grid 
                                                             
2 Nussbaum and Diamond have in mind James's quotation of the preface to The Princess 
Casamassima (James, 1937, p. 70) referring to George Eliot’s characters: “Their emotions, 
their stirred intelligence, their moral consciousness, become thus, by sufficient charmed 
perusal, our own very adventure.” Diamond’s and Nussbaum’s ideas about “adventure” 
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through which my experience is structured” (Donnelly, 2019, p. 14). 
Thus, for example, imaginatively engaging in the perspective(s) 
developed in a literary work such as Zola’s “The Flood” implies that 
“Imagining that an event is unfolding and horrific only requires that I 
imagine that it is characterized by the perspectival properties events 
have when they are unfolding and horrific from my own perspective” 
(Donnelly, 2019, p. 15). Referring to Louis, the main character of 
“The Flood”, “I have no problem understanding this character’s 
perspective and respecting the motivations behind his decision to 
remain on his farm” (Donnelly, 2019, p. 18), even though engaging 
with the perspective of the text does not imply at all having (or having 
had) an experience similar to the experience of, or endorsing the 
perspective of, the character; often “we must to learn to temporally 
set important aspects of our own perspectives on hold” (Donnelly, 
2019, p. 19). 
The goal of Donnelly’s argument is a defense of the “utility” of 
literary fiction which is not conceived as providing cognitive or moral 
direct gains, but rather as a means in order to develop tools and 
skills enabling us to identify, to compare, and to understand other 
perspectives and experiences. Even so, her argument becomes 
evaluative when she states that the imaginative engagement 
enabling that “utility” (which is an indirect or mediated one) 
constitutes at the same time an evaluative element of the artwork, 
insofar as “to make sense of characters’ actions, at least in a minimal 
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their values, goals, knowledge, and so on have the right sort of 
structure to support their actions” (Donnelly, 2019, p. 19). 
The axiological implications of her theory appear more clearly when 
Donnelly says that 
 
part of the aesthetic value of a literary work may lie in the 
sensory appeal of its combinations of words”, but “it seems that 
an important part of the aesthetic value of a literary work must 
lie in the quality of the perspective developed within it” and “this 
requires, at a minimum, that the literary work unfolds through a 
perspective that is internally coherent and embodies compelling 
ways of looking at the world (Donnelly, 2019, 21). 
 
What is included in Donnelly’s “the right sort of structure to support 
their actions”? Is it not aesthetically determined by the author’s 
particular work with language (beyond any “sensory appeal”)? Is that 
“internal coherence” a matter of mere logical congruence (the 
reasons of the “what” of the story), independently of the “how” of the 
writing? 
  Recently, M.J. Alcaraz (2018) has defended a version of 
interactionism concerning values in aesthetics which is compatible 
with a moderate autonomism and with a certain particularism. In the 
light of that view (to which I am sympathetic), “grasping aesthetic 
properties can be a condition for grasping other non-aesthetic 
properties” and “aesthetic properties can play a significant role as 
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2018, 29). 
Donnelly’s approach leaves the door open to the possible 
crucial relevance that aesthetic properties have, in some artworks at 
least (as Alcaraz punctuates), in order to explain the presence of 
moral and cognitive values, even if Donnelly insists (often 
confusedly) on the “structural” nature of the basis ensuring the 
engagement of the reader, and thus the artistic value of the text. 
My hypothesis is that recent approaches to this topic (such as 
Donnelly’s example) have not considered well enough the intimate 
relationship between the quality of a perspective (“internally 
coherent”) developed within the work (and thus basing the 
engagement of the competent reader), and the complexity of the 
aesthetic qualities which contribute to the aesthetic value of the work, 
and also sometimes (in some works), to moral values or other non-
aesthetic values.  
Furthermore, I am convinced that a theory of aspects may offer 
a clearer view in terms of possibilities, supporting the idea that: 
 
1) aesthetic-literary qualities are crucial in order to take into 
account the reader’s engagement, endorsing the concept of 
perspective, at the same time, through the concepts of “aspect”, 
“dawning of an aspect” and “possibilities” (in both the author’s and 
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2) some non-aesthetic values (moral or cognitive values) that the 
work has, even if their “utility” is an indirect or mediated one, are 
often based on aesthetic properties, which can be explained in terms 
of aspects in order to endorse a realism about properties that avoids 
a narrow ontological and epistemic viewpoint. 
 
Henry James’s novels (particularly The Golden Bowl) are 
privileged examples because they demand their readers carry out a 
task which moves in parallel with the “adventure” of the development 
of the characters and the plot. That task, in terms of “possibilities”, is 
a necessary condition in order to be able to appreciate the 
adventures of the novels as adventures. In fact, the structure of the 
story of The Golden Bowl may be compared with the tensions which 
allows toothpicks to remain stable in a square-shaped arrangement, 













Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 12, 2020 
 
Roughly summarized, the story of The Golden Bowl is also built on 
the basis of a square structure of main characters: Adam Verver, a 
widowed American millionaire, his daughter Maggie, Charlotte Stant 
(Maggies’s close friend) and Prince Americo, a young Italian 
nobleman living in England. Even Maggie’s marriage to Prince 
Americo does not notably change the pattern of her and her father’s 
stable lives, a pattern that she believes to be complete when Mr. 
Verver marries Charlotte Stant. What Maggie does not know is that 
before her marriage, the Prince and Charlotte, both short of funds 
and therefore unable to marry, had been lovers, and now they 
resume, in a way, their former intimacy. Once Maggie becomes 
aware of this, being deeply in love with her husband and devoted to 
her father, she decides to remain silent. Finally, Mr. Verver and 
Charlotte leave for America and Maggie regains her husband’s 
attention. 
Obviously, the interesting thing about that novel (and James’s 
novels in general) is not the events per se,  but rather the moral 
adventure of the characters, that is, the interplay of tensions where 
the characters’ agencies are working, or even more, the interplay of 
reflections from indirect views (“oblique” 3 views, James says) where 
the few actions inhabiting James’s novels are cooked up, and on a 
metalinguistic level,  how that indirect way of taking everything into 
account is built up by means of literary skills. I will offer some 
example of that further on by quoting some fragments of the novel. 
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It is perfectly possible to track in Martha Nussbaum’s work 
some view very close to the theory of aspects with Wittgensteinian 
roots that I am defending here, and it is possible to do this by 
appealing to Nussbaum’s own words which she devotes to 
interpreting The Golden Bowl in her well-known essay Love’s 
Knowledge. Even though Nussbaum’s frequent philosophical fulcrum 
is not Wittgenstein, but Aristotle, I find it highly significant, and an 
endorsement of my position, the fact that Nussbaum appeals directly 
to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in a passage in Love’s 
Knowledge, chapter 5. The context of that passage is, not by chance, 
a comment about one of the crucial elements of James "oblique" 
strategy. The adventure of the main characters of The Golden Bowl 
is mediated (especially for the reader) by a secondary character 
(more exactly, by a couple of characters): Fanny and Bob 
Assingham’s, a retired married couple. Fanny Assingham is a 
common friend of all the four main characters, and she is an enabler 
(not at all just a witness) of the events concerning both younger 
couples. Fanny symbolizes (for Nussbaum) the perception and the 
complexity of particulars, while Bob (an old Army-officer) symbolizes 
the attachment to the rules and to the general conceptions.  
James shows us how a shared moral “basis”, a responsible 
vision, can be constructed through the dialogue of perception and 
rule. (Nussbaum, 1990, 158)  
A crucial moment in the story is the discussion between Fanny 
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sentimental intrigue because of their blindness for the actual 
relationship between the Prince and Charlotte. 
At the climactic moment, Fanny feels (as the result of his effort) 
a sharp pain of realized guilt; and Bob, responding with tenderness to 
her pain, opens himself fully to her moral adventure, to the concrete 
perception of their shared situation. She cries, and he embraces her 
“all with a patience that presently stilled her” [James, 1908, p. 378]. 
(Nussbaum, 1990, p. 159)  
One of the clues of that encounter is Bob's tenderness, 
abandoning rules and descending until he is in a "sort of vision of the 
concrete", submerging in himself, and learning  
 
her [Fanny's] abilities; and he was able to learn them only 
because there was already something in him that went beyond 
the universal, namely, a loving, and therefore particular, vision 
of her.” (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 160)  
 
That allows Nussbaum to claim here, in Aristotle's way, for the 
previous character of perception, insofar as  
 
if as members of moral communities, we are to achieve shared 
perceptions of the actual, we have better love one another first, 
in all our disagreements and our qualitative differences. Like 
Aristotle, he seems to say that civic love comes before, and 
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Nevertheless, there is another clue of that finding of a "common 
basis" (the "mystic lake", in James words, where both members of 
the Assingham couple are, finally, rowing together): it lies on "getting 
the tip" (or catching the insinuation, or the warning). The narrator's 
voice of The Golden Bowl, this time close to Bob's mind, says:  
 
He conveyed to her now, at all events, by refusing her no 
gentleness, that he had sufficiently got the tip, and that the tip 
was all he had wanted. (James 1908, p. 379) 
 
Nussbaum is quickly ready to interpret the words of James's narrator 
in those terms: 
 
Finally, James's talk (or Bob’s talk) of “getting the tip” shows us 
what moral exchange and moral learning can be, inside a 
morality based on perception.  Progress comes not from the 
teaching of an abstract law but by leading the friend, or child, or 
loved one by a word, by a story, by an image to see some 
new aspect of the concrete case at hand, to see it as this or 
that. Giving a “tip” is to give a gentle hint about how one might 
see. The “tip”, here, is given not in words at all but in a sudden 
show of feeling. It is concrete, and it prompts the recognition of 
the concrete. (Nussbaum 1990, p. 160) 
 
And just here, at this point, Martha Nussbaum places Wittgenstein's 
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Compare Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York, 1968) Part II, Sect. 11, 
227e:  
Correcter prognosis will generally issue from the judgments of 
those with better knowledge of mankind. 
Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, 
by taking a course in it, but through “experience.” Can 
someone else be a man’s teacher in this? Certainly. From time 
to time he gives him the right tip [in German original: Wink]4.  
This is what “learning” and “teaching” are like here. What one 
acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. 
There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only 
experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-
rules.  
What is most difficult here is to put this indefiniteness, correctly 
and unfalsified, into words. (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 160, footnote 
10) 
 
Let us come back, for a moment, to the initial point of all that process 
of Bob’s change of attitude. In chapter XXIII we found the Assingham 
couple face to face, in silence, before the starting of their “divergent 
conversation” about the possible delay of Charlotte and the Prince 
returning together to their respective homes from their visit to 
Matcham. James’s subtleness reaches the narrator’s view (and, 
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consequently, the reader’s view) concerning the expressive “tip” of 
Fanny Assingham: 
 
There might, for that matter, even have been in Mrs. 
Assingham's face a mild perception of some finer sense a 
sense for his wife’s situation, and the very situation she was, 
oddly enough, about to repudiate--that she had fairly caused to 
grow in him. (James, 1908, 365) 
 
That “There might, for that matter, even have been...” involves 
ultimately an incitement to the reader to participate in the play of 
possibilities which constitute the dimensional structure of aspects in 
the novel. The characters are playing the same play also. Let us pay 
attention to the fact that James's narrator avoids directly describing 
the expression in Fanny’s face when she perceives a sign of 
sensibility in her husband’s attitude, but rather the narrator throws 
that tip to the reader (“There might, for that matter, even have been 
in Mrs. Assingham’s face a mild perception of some finer sense”). 
Thereby he anticipates something which, in terms of the “water 
metaphor”, implies leaving the shore and plunging into the water 
where she was swimming alone until now. James exploits the “water 
metaphor” and “the mystic lake” in very crucial moments of the novel. 
We will see the structural matter of that fact in further passages. 
Summing up, Fanny has managed to make Bob see the thing 
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rules”), and that thing is her concern about the sentimental tension 
that has been created between both younger couples. And the tip 
(Wink) has consisted in experiencing the tenderness that his love for 
her inspires in him.  
 
If we are to assess the claim that correct judgment is the 
outcome of a dialogue between antecedent principle and new 
vision, we need to see the view imbodied in prose that does not 
take away the very complexity and indeterminacy of choice that 
gives substance to the view. The moral work involved in giving 
and getting “the tip” could hardly be shown us in a work of 
formal decision theory; it could not be shown in any abstract 
philosophical prose, since it is so much a matter of learning the 
right sort of vision of the concrete. It could not be shown even in 
a philosopher’s example, inasmuch as an example would lack 
the full specificity, and also the indeterminacy, of the literary 
case, its rich metaphors and pictures, its ways of telling us how 
characters come to see one another as this or that and come to 
attend to new aspects of their situation. (Nussbaum, 1990, pp. 
160-161) 
 
Those kinds of "tips" are what we can call, in Wittgensteinian 
vocabulary, further descriptions or invitations to see as (whether 
successful or failed) and, if it is successful, to see. Further 
descriptions, proposed in Wittgenstein's courses of the 1930-1933 
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associations, analogies, examples, metaphors, connections, 
juxtapositions, repetitions, transitions, redundancies, gestures, 
contextualizations, invitations to emphasize this or that element, the 
invention of new contexts for interpretation, etc. They are the sort of 
reasons that we utilize frequently in everyday aesthetic situations and 
they play an essential role in actual artistic and aesthetic practices. 
We cannot pass over the fact that Wittgenstein is just using here the 
term “descriptions” regarding  further descriptions: indeed, there are 
descriptions that have one foot in some objective feature of the work 
(or the thing), for instance “listen to this transition...”, and the other 
foot out of the work (for instance “...as a protest against x”) in order to 
endorse an aesthetic judgment (“You will now see that the work is 
ironic”, for example) and set out to excite a reactive seeing, but 
without making its truth dependent on the success of this reaction. 
We cannot ignore either the fact that Wittgenstein explains how 
we manage to catch the expressed thing (in an artwork or in a 
person) in terms of the concept of “imponderable evidence”5. I know 
(I see) that a musical piece is ironic because a certain transition 
works as a protest against this other passage of the piece. But I 
know (I see) also that someone loves actually by means of certain 
“imponderable evidences” such as “subtleties of glance, of gesture, 
of tones” (Wittgenstein, 1986, p. 228). Let me quote briefly 
Philosophical Investigations part II, because I think that quotation 
                                                             
5 Even if, as Wittgenstein points out, we can also use documentary evidences in order to 
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allows a direct Jamesian reading. Wittgenstein says: 
 
Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of 
gesture, of tone. 
I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a 
pretended one (and here there can, of course, be a 
‘ponderable’ confirmation of my judgment). But I may be quite 
incapable of describing the difference. And this not because the 
languages I know have no words for it. For why not introduce 
new words? If I were a very talented painter I might 
conceivably represent the genuine and the simulated glance in 
pictures." (Wittgenstein, 1986, p. 228) 
 
Nobody as much as Henry James has reflected the “imponderability” 
of the “imponderable evidences” (no paraphrase replaces completely 
what the subtle glance or the subtle gesture expresses), but at the 
same time, nobody as much as Henry James possesses the 
extraordinary literary skill of using words in order to evoke 
“imponderable evidences” in the reader’s mind by means of an 
almost-pictorial literature (even though, obviously, James is not a 
painter, but a writer). Nussbaum says:  
 
In the preface to this novel, James speaks of the "duty" of 
"responsible prose" to be, "while placed before us, good 
enough, interesting enough and, if the question be of picture, 
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(Nussbaum 1990, 161) 
 
Chapter XLI starts with the Prince and Maggie at home when they 
reveive a telegram from Charlotte announcing that she and Adam 
Verver will go there for a tea at five o'clock. That tea means in fact 
the farewell of both before their departure to America. And the 
chapter finishes with an involuntary contact of hands between the 
Prince and Maggie, with the sound accompaniment of a “Wait.Wait.” 
where all Maggie's (and now also the Prince’s) hopes of giving in to 
each other are condensed.  
 
“‘Wait!’ It was the word of his own distress and entreaty, the 
word for both of them, all they had left, their plank now on the 
great sea”, [...] “She has saved herself [...]” (James, 1908, pp. 
352-353) 
 
The echo in terms of the water metaphor from the Assinghams's 
conversation gains here a structural role to play. But there is still a 
new echo of it in the last paragraphs of the novel, when the Prince 
and Maggie find themselves alone again after the departure of Adam 
and Charlotte. 
 
“Isn’t she [Charlotte] too splendid?” she [Maggie] simply said, 
offering it to explain and to finish. 
“Oh splendid!” With which he came over to her. 
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moral. 
It kept him before her therefore, taking in —or trying to— what 
she so wonderfully gave. He tried, too clearly, to please her —to 
meet her in her own way; but with the result only that, close to 
her, her face kept before him, his hands holding her shoulders, 
his whole act enclosing her, he presently echoed: “‘See’? I see 
nothing but YOU.” And the truth of it had with this force after a 
moment so strangely lighted his eyes that as for pity and dread 
of them she buried her own in his breast.” (James, 1908, pp. 
368-369) 
 
The subtleness of James’s style allows us to glimpse that this in not 
at all the case of a happy ending; but rather like toothpicks in tension 
in the square structure (the moral tension, the balance of feelings) 
remains standing in its complexity and in its irreducible partiality 
(“complexity and indeterminacy” said Nussbaum in his pp. 160-161 
quotation). The Prince is “trying to” take in (not simply “taking in”) 
what Maggie so wonderfully gave. The scene culminates with a half-
embrace (or almost-embrace) of the Prince and Maggie: “she buried 
her own in his breast”. But, is this actually an embrace? Is it the 
Prince embracing Maggie? It seems not so at all. Is it rather a half-
embrace made by Maggie’s gesture to the Prince? But, most of all, 
there is the echo of the (complete) embrace of the Assinghams, the 
elderly couple, and the contrast that we have remarked on 
previously. And there is also the contrast between the two words 
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Nussbaum, 1990, p. 132 footnote 11) and the two words which 
dominate that almost-embrace (“pity and dread”). The reader has, no 
doubts, an active role in order to answer all of those questions. 
James puts everything on the line when he describes the 
gestures in the very final scene of the novel, accompanying “she 
buried her own [eyes] in his breast”. Maggie ends up covering her 
eyes. If my hypothesis endorsing the central role of “seeing” is right, 
that detail is highly significant because it confirms that the whole of 
the final passage pivots on the “seeing”: “ ‘See’? I see nothing but 
YOU.” And there is a contrast between the two ways of "seeing” (the 
second one having been denied by the gesture of the almost-
embrace in itself), insofar as the truth of the Prince's words (“the truth 
of it”) leads into his eyes (“strangely lighted”) which inspire Maggie's 
“pity and dread”. Nussbaum has remarked on this when she says: 
 
It is instructive to examine the many places in the novel where a 
person is praised with the aesthetically linked word “splendid”. It 
usually emerges that to call a human being that is to refuse that 
person a properly human tenderness and care. (Nussbaum, 
1990, p. 132 footnote 11) 
 
Finally, we cannot overlook the associations of the expression “to 
bury her eyes in his breast” (I italicize bury). There is a strange “truth” 
that has to be evaluated by the reader in the overall context of the 
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gestures, words, and feelings, which participate in a slippery and 
complex chemistry of writing.  
Nussbaum interprets Maggie's final gesture and the words “pity 
and dread” in a decidedly Aristotelian tone:  
 
Aristotle argued that tragedy brings illumination concerning 
values: through the "pity and dread" inspired by tragic events, 
we learn about what matters to us, and we are clarified. Maggie, 
in the last sentence of the novel, recognizes that the keen 
vision and acknowledgment of the good tragic spectator are 
themselves values which can, in the world of nature, collide with 
others values. To see all, to be present to all, requires of the 
spectator a narrowness of love; to surrender to love requires an 
infidelity of the soul's eyes. (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 137) 
 
Even though, later on Nussbaum makes Maggie's blindness and the 
reader’s blindness the same when the reader, focusing his attention 
on Maggie (with the narrator’s guide), no longer focusses on the 
“passion” of Charlotte. My emphasis on the comparison with the 
Assingham’s embrace intends to suggest a less optimist 
interpretation than Nussbaum’s one. Anyway, the issue of the final 
interpretation of the novel is not the actual goal of my paper. 
 Let us now retake the schedule of hypothesis promised at the 
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1) aesthetic-literary qualities are crucial in order to take into 
account the reader’s engagement, endorsing the concept of 
perspective at the same time, through the concepts of “aspect”, 
“dawning of an aspect” and “possibilities” (in both the author’s and 
reader’s tasks). It goes beyond Donnelly’s “sensory appeal”.  
 
Donnelly’s approach has the undoubtable advantage of avoiding the 
radical epistemic argument, insofar as it does not base the utility and 
the value of the novel on a knowledge directly derived from the 
characters’ descriptions or actions, but rather on the development of 
tools and skills when we share, as readers, the “adventure” of the 
characters, to the extent that it allows us to compare and understand 
the other's perspectives and experiences.  Properly sharing the 
adventure of the characters involves, for Donnelly, “to grasp enough 
of their perspectives to see that their values, goals, knowledge, and 
so on have the right sort of structure to support their actions” 
(Donnelly, 2019, p. 19).  
 I am not aiming to exploit here all the descriptions in terms of 
a theory of aspects that James’s novel, Nussbaum’s interpretation of 
it, and Donnelly’s perspectivist approach offer us, but I think that 
James, particularly in The Golden Bowl, makes it possible for us to to 
see three characteristics under a very special light which are central 
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a) its simultaneously perceptive (experiencing) and cognitive 
(interpreting, thinking, reasoning or reflecting) constitution; the seeing 
(experience) involves something more than a mere interpreting, even 
though it starts very often with an invitation to see as... (possibilities 
or hypothesis) 
 
b) the intimate relationship between the understanding side and 
the evaluative side concerning the “downing of an aspect” (there are 
no “epiphanic guaranties”) 
 
c) the role of trigger played by the “tip”, which is conveyed 
through the words in literature, even if it is open-ended, by means of 
the words, to a huge ut pictura poesis in the reader's mind. 
 
I do not think that a and b need much more explanation: when I see 
an aspect, I am not simply asserting to a hypothesis, but rather I 
have to be able to see the object in accordance with the way 
proposed by the hypothesis (or possibility). At the same time, the 
evidence that my seeing is the proper one (or the correct one) is not 
something guaranteed by the properties of the object (even if my 
seeing has to be in accordance with them), and the criteria by which 
someone (me or another person) is able to test that you have come 
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either6. 
The third characteristic c allows us to see specially well that 
Donnelly's perspectives have to work necessarily on the basis of the 
double articulation previously mentioned (perceiving/ knowing, 
understanding/ evaluating, stating/ imagining), and they do it in a way 
that is never standardized or guaranteed for the reader, rather they 
lie on the square-shaped structure of toothpicks which is ultimately 
the literary warp, the text of the novel itself. The efficacy of the “water 
metaphor”7, of the deployment of “tips” (glances, tears, embraces, 
contacts, words, tones of voice, etc.)8 when expressing what they are 
not merely representing, but rather what is behind those 
representations (that is, an aspect, a seeing), all those issues acquire 
an undoubtable tone in terms of a theory of aspects. And Henry 
James is every time being careful about never closing the 
interpretation of his “tips”, about leaving them ever open while we are 
tempted by him to find our guide with the help of them. What has 
Maggie really come to see in the Prince’s gesture? And what has the 
Prince really come to see in Maggie’s gesture? How do those 
examples of “seeing” compare with the Assingham's “seeing”? What 
is the reader’s “seeing”? And what is the “seeing” of James’s narrator 
                                                             
6 I have developed those characteristics of aspects in previous works as for example 
Comprender en arte, Valencia: Cimal, 1995, or “Aspectos, razones y juicios en la 
comprensión estética: una aproximación    wittgensteiniana”, in Julián MARRADES (ed.).: 
Wittgenstein: Arte y Filosofía, Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2013, cap. 6, pp. 155-178. 
7 Is this an unnatural metaphor or not? 
8 The deployment of “tips” works between the characters, for the reader, or for the author 
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who organizes all the plot9? 
For, if we follow Nussbaum’s thesis, James thinks that moral 
knowledge is a perception (the proper way of seeing something): 
 
Moral knowledge, James suggests, is not simply intellectual 
grasp of particular facts; it is perception. It is seeing a complex, 
concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is 
taking in what is there, with imagination and feeling. To know 
Maggie is to see and feel her separateness, her felicity; to 
recognize all this is to miss least of all. If he had grasped the 
same general facts without these responses and these images, 
in all their specificity, he would not really have known her. 
(Nussbaum, 1990, p. 152)  
 
On the one hand, Adam’s moral learning consists of being able to 
come to see Maggie as a “water creature” (that means his daughter’s 
sexuality and free maturity) by paying attention to the words that she 
employs in order to describe her passion for Americo (Nussbaum, 
1990, pp. 279-280). On the other hand, Maggie’s learning takes 
place when “her imagination, like his [Adam], achieves its moral goal 
in the finding of the right way of seeing”, [...] “to imagine him not as 
father and law and world but as a finite human” (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 
152).  
Ultimately, the structure of aspects regarding the conferring of 
                                                             
9 Here lies above all the complexity of the Jamesian poetics which is shown, for example, 
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meaning and value to the artwork is explicitly present at the heart of 
The Golden Bowl in the object of the golden bowl itself. Now let us 
remember again that, for Donnelly, “part of the aesthetic value of a 
literary work may lie in the sensory appeal of its combinations of 
words” (Donnelly, 2019, p. 21). That “sensory appeal” needs to be 
extended to the expressive power of the combination of words which, 
after all, constitutes every literary text. The “sensory appeal” can 
work on a microstructural level (for example, the use of the word 
“wait”10, or the use of the conditional formula when interpreting the 
expression of the gesture in the perceived face); but it also works on 
a macrostructural level (the contrast between Assingham’s embrace 
and the final embrace between Americo and Maggie, or the water 
metaphor). Understood this way, it is no just a “part”, but all of the 
aesthetic value of the literary artwork that is grounded on the 
“sensory appeal of its combinations of words”. Furthermore, the 
connection between aesthetic value and moral value is very intimate, 
as the proper object of the golden bowl shows. And once again, this 
is true regarding the different layers of the literary communication: 
the way the characters interpret the actions of each other, the way 
the narrator leads us to interpret the novel, and the way every reader 
finally interprets all those data, even in the frame of the complete 
work of James considered as a whole. And that issue leads us to the 
                                                             
10 No by chance, the world “wait” is the crucial word also in the final passage of The 
Portrait of a Lady. Vid. my “Imagination, Possibilities and Aspects in Literary Fiction”, in 
Vaughan, C. (eds.) & Vidmar, I. Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 
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second hypothesis proposed at the beginning of this article: 
 
2) some non-aesthetic values (moral or cognitive ones) that the 
work has, even if their “utility” is an indirect or mediated one, are 
often based on aesthetic properties, which can be explained in terms 
of aspects in order to endorse a realism about properties that avoids 
a narrow ontological and epistemic viewpoint. 
 
Alcaraz (2018) has defended a version of the interactionism 
concerning the values in aesthetics which is compatible with a 
moderate autonomism and with a certain particularism. The 
interaction between aesthetic values and moral values is implicit in 
the efficacy of the “adventure” shared by the characters and the 
reader, following Nussbaum's proposal to which I am sympathetic. In 
fact, Donnelly’s “perspective” may be understood as a condition of 
the possibility of such an efficacy. Aligning with moderate 
autonomism, we may assume that “grasping aesthetic properties can 
be a condition for grasping other non-aesthetic properties” and 
“aesthetic properties can play a significant role as reasons for the 
presence of other non-aesthetic properties” (Alcaraz, 2018, p. 29). I 
think it has been clearly shown that a deficient understanding of the 
aesthetic properties (and values) of the novel, or, in Donnelly's terms, 
a deficient assumption (or judgement) of “perspective” may 
frequently involve other non-aesthetic (mainly moral) properties and 
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terms (through the development of moral skills or tools) as proposed 
by Donnelly and Alcaraz. And the last “may” has to be decided 
concretely for every particular work; we can think, for example, that 
the oblique literary strategy used by James is more or less 
successful or efficient in this or that chapter of James’s novel and 
thus what kind of moral consequences result from it. 
Furthermore, a theory of aspects according to which we 
understand an artwork when we are able to catch its correct aspect, 
that is, when we come to see it (the complete artwork or some of its 
elements) properly, is perfectly compatible with stating that the 
aesthetic properties are in the artwork. At the same time, it is 
perfectly compatible with an axiological position according to which 
both the aesthetic and the moral values of the artwork are 
substantially dependent on the reader's ability to base these two 
such kinds of values on the aesthetic qualities (literary qualities, in 
that case) of the work. The immanent character of those properties 
does not deny the role of the author, or the role of the reader, in the 
process of determining those values. 
Nussbaum's view is aligned with that idea when she says: 
 
In the preface to this novel, James speaks of the “duty” of 
“responsible prose” to be, “while placed before us, good 
enough, interesting enough and, if the question be of picture, 
pictorial enough, above all in itself” (James, 1908, pp. ix-x) 
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I have to underline “responsible” here. Certainly, it is a duty of the 
author to provide his prose whith the assumption of a proper 
“perspective” (in Connelly terms). The efficacy and the value of his 
work depend on that. It is subject to a normative (evaluative) regime 
insofar as the reader comes to see, or not, independently of the fact 
that he has experienced (or not) a situation similar to that described 
in the novel (for example, a suspicion of infidelity11), thanks to the 
skill of the writer in order to create the proper literary conditions for 
the engagement (an aesthetic and moral engagement) of the reader. 
The adventure of reading The Golden Bowl implies that the 
reader has to take sides for in that adventure, an aesthetic, moral 
(and philosophical, Nussbaum would add) adventure which consists 
mostly of conferring the proper expression and meaning to the 
gestures and words of the characters, while assuming the high 
degree of indetermination which is the signature of Henry James’s 
writing style and a key component of his particular and timeless 
value. And this also implies that the conferral of meaning entails the 
acknowledgement of the intimate link between gesture and 
expression as possibilities which have to be seen (by the characters, 
but also by the reader, if the representation is “pictorial enough, 
above all in itself”). Those possibilities (for example, the attention to 
the fact that the Prince is unable to embrace as Bob Assingham 
                                                             
11 Or rather, we could say the experience of managing an evidence of infidelity in the 
frame of a stable relationship (a “loving” relationship, maybe?). I think that those answers 
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does) allow the readers to assume a perspective from which they are 
able to see the moral value of a certain character's actions that the 
reader has never experienced in his proper life. That is the deep 
sense of Nussbaum’s idea (after James’s words) when she says that 
the experience of the reader of artistic literature creates an 
“adventure” because through our attentive reading of novels, the 
emotions, the stirred intelligence, the moral consciousness of her 
heroes and heroines become our very own adventure12. 
The main goal of Martha Nussbaum is to prove that literature is 
genuine moral philosophy, even though she bases that goal on a 
statement that Cora Diamond ignores (or rather she places 
secondarily): that this is made “through” (or “by means of”) the 
aesthetic properties of the literary text itself. My intention has been to 
underline that idea, while to coming to a less “moralistic” view than 
Nussbaum's view and coming to one closer to Donnelly’s or Alcaraz’s 
view which would conclude that novels (like art in general) do not 
make us morally better necessarily. In other words, that novels do 
not provide us with the acquisition of knowledge (moral knowledge, in 
particular) directly, but they contribute (most often) to the 
development of tools and skills which may come to enrich our moral 
knowledge.  
Obviously, people do not read novels with the main goal of 
enriching their moral knowledge. And we can even remove the word 
“moral” from the previous sentence: people’s main reason for reading 
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novels is not in order to acquire knowledge, while they may do so in 
order to enrich their lives (and here “enrich” involves typical aesthetic 
ends such as, for example, to enjoy the reading). Usually, it is 
“through” that enjoyment (an involved or engaged one) that novels 
find a way to place us in proper perspectives from which we are able 
to better understand others (characters) or we can take in some 
situations never experienced actually in our lives, by living the 
adventure of the novel as readers. And, ultimately, (maybe) to come 
to develop skills and tools for our moral actual life. 
My thesis has been that the “learning” (if we can use that word 
here) from novels (artistic novels at least) has to be something 
conveyed through an aesthetic (literary) elaboration which may be 
clearly emphasized from the approach of a certain theory of aspects. 
In the case of Henry James’s novels (and particularly of The Golden 
Bowl), that elaboration is most especially sophisticated, subtle and 
complex. 
And probably (I leave it for moral philosophers to consider) this 
works as a metaphor of the actual character of moral life13, where 
“moral exchange and moral learning” are “inside a morality based on 
perception” and where the concrete thing (a word, a story, an image, 
a gesture as a sudden show of feeling (and never the teaching of an 
abstract law) are the “tip”, the guide, in our moral learning, “by 
leading the friend, or child, or loved one [...] to see some new aspect 
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of the concrete case at hand, to see it as14 this or that.” (Nussbaum, 
1990, p. 295) 
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Beyond ‘Visual’ Art: Non-Sighted Modes of 
Beholding Contemporary Art 
 
Ken Wilder1 
University of the Arts London 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper investigates new engagements afforded people 
with visual impairments by hybrid or intermedial forms of art, such as – 
pre-eminently – installation art. Against ocularcentric models of 
‘spectatorship’ championed by someone like Clement Greenberg, it 
argues the centrality of non-sighted modes of beholding to a number 
of paradigmatic examples of installation art. In so doing, the paper 
proposes the importance of such modes in bringing the beholder’s 
orientation into play, and in negotiating the unstable relation between 
the virtuality of the artwork and the ‘real’ site context. Thus 
considered, visual impairment might be reconceived not an 
impediment to an aesthetic encounter (a lacking or deficiency), but 
rather a ‘gap’ to be creatively negotiated as part of a fully embodied 
experience. This takes on a particular importance in installations that 
explicitly seek to activate the space of reception using senses other 
than sight, and the paper concludes by examining concrete examples 
of such art practice.  
 
1. 
If aesthetics is to have continuing relevance to the experience of 
contemporary art practice, then it is important that it reflects not only 
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the reality of new aesthetic modes of encountering art, but the needs 
of diverse audiences. These two issues are, I believe, closely linked; 
that they are rarely discussed together reflects, on the one hand, a 
disconnect between the philosophy of art and the reality of much 
contemporary practice, and on the other a ‘default’ beholder often 
conceived (putting to one side intersectional issues of race, sex, 
gender, sexuality and class) as an able-bodied ‘viewer’ or ‘spectator’. 
My particular concern in this paper is the theoretical consequences of 
such ocularcentric norms when considering contemporary art 
practice, integral to the very characterisation of what is still referred 
to as the ‘visual’ arts. In so doing, the paper will address an area of 
research that has received little critical attention outside of the writing 
of blind artists and/or theorists.2 In particular, it will consider the 
significance of new engagements afforded people with visual 
impairments by hybrid or intermedial forms of art, such as – pre-
eminently – installation art.  
 
2. 
For many years, the experience of ‘visual’ art afforded those people 
with more severe sight-impairment was limited to rare opportunities 
to touch objects in a museum’s collection (often while required to 
                                                             
2 See, for instance, Fayen d’Evie (2017), Georgina Kleege (2018). This paper has emerged 
out of an ongoing research connected to a joint funding bid with the visually impaired artist 
Aaron McPeake, and I am immensely grateful for his invaluable contribution to my 
thinking about the subject matter. McPeake and I have previously collaborated on artworks, 
including our 2017 work Circumstantes, an installation within Sigurd Lewerentz’s Sankt 
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wear gloves) or, more problematically, mediated access through 
tactile facsimiles of objects or paintings. This situation has somewhat 
improved, at least in part in response to disability discrimination 
legislation. Most major museums now offer guided tours and audio-
descriptions aimed specifically at a blind and partially-sighted 
audience; and some museums, galleries and heritage sites 
commission exhibitions or works of art that offer a multi-sensory 
experience. However, there is still a tendency to treat blind people as 
a unitary group, defined by their ‘disability’ and undifferentiated in 
terms of their degree of sight impairment and levels of art knowledge. 
Writing in 2003, Fiona Candlin notes:  
 
However diverse individual blind people might be, as museum 
visitors they are primarily defined in relation to a lack of sight. 
The continuing lack of basic provision means blind people can 
only visit in a disabled capacity; tactile flooring is still virtually 
non-existent, good lighting is often sacrificed for ambience and 
large print labelling generally comes in a distant second to the 
designer’s overarching exhibition concept. Museums and 
galleries may flaunt their access credentials (especially in 
funding applications) but access is often tokenistic and tends to 
remain low on the list of institutional priorities. Blind people are 
constituted as a marginal group not because their blindness 
makes them so, but because the ocularcentricity of museums 
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artefacts remains virtually inconceivable in all but the most 
innovative of institutions. (2003, p. 101) 
 
This situation has not significantly changed in the intervening years, 
and institutional priorities continue to prohibit touch. When the 
second of the five casts of Henry Moore’s King and Queen (1952-3) 
was first installed in 1954 on remote moorland at Glenkiln, in 
Dumfries and Galloway, everyone (including livestock) could rub-up 
against, or climb over, the bronze work; by contrast, when a cast of 
the same work (owned by the Tate) was installed at the Ashmolean 
Museum, Oxford, in 2013, alongside paintings by Francis Bacon, no 
touching was allowed. Such a situation is exacerbated by the 
increasing use of laser-beam alarm systems in galleries, which make 
the close viewing of paintings almost impossible for anyone with 
visual impairment.   
Sometimes the lack of awareness of how blind people 
encounter art can be almost comical; a blind acquaintance was 
stopped (for health and safety reasons) from entering, alone, 
Anthony Gormley’s immersive installation Blind Light (2007), an 
illuminated glass room filled with mist, installed at the Hayward 
Gallery in London. Yet this was a work where everyone’s experience 
was to blunder into unseen strangers in the dense fog. On a more 
serious note, those charged with improving accessibility are rarely 
given the kind of voice afforded curators within their organisations. 
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reinforcing an institutional fear of ‘touching’ the artworks while 
presenting particular difficulties for visually-impaired people in terms 
of negotiating virtual tours.  
Such concerns with access are not, however, the primary focus 
of this paper. Rather, I intend to focus on how this marginalisation is 
mirrored by a gap in philosophical thinking as to how engagements 
beyond the optical might potentially expand the experience of art: not 
only for the partially-sighted and blind community, but for all 
beholders. This challenges what David Bolt refers to as 
‘ocularnormative’ epistemological approaches that equate seeing 
with knowing, prioritising visual perception over other forms of 
knowledge (2014, p. 18). In confronting this issue, I propose the 
centrality of non-sighted modes of beholding art to a number of 
paradigmatic examples of installation art.3 Indeed, I will argue that 
such fully embodied, multi-sensory modes are essential to the 
experience of ‘situated’ installations that we have to physically enter, 
or (in some circumstances) to which we are pointedly excluded. 
 
3. 
Let me return to my opening claim. Elsewhere, I have sought to 
counter suggestions that postconceptual art is non- or even anti-
                                                             
3 Of course, in so doing we might make a convincing case for galleries/museums to rethink 
the kinds of spaces they make available for the commissioning of installation works 
(beyond the generic white-cube), and the kind of intrinsic haptic and auditory locational 
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aesthetic – a position held by someone like Peter Osborne (2013). 
This requires confronting misconceptions about the nature of the 
‘autonomous’ art object as necessarily self-contained (Wilder, 
2020b). In so doing, I share Juliane Rebentisch’s contention that 
installation art transgresses not so much the ‘idea of autonomous art’ 
but rather ‘an objectivist misunderstanding of it’ (2012, p. 14). If, by 
‘bracketing’ a world from the spheres of practical and theoretical 
reason, installation art offers an experience that demands the 
performative role of the subject (in bringing forth something that is 
not, in and of itself, given by the work), then as Rebentisch argues 
the aesthetic experience “does not transcend the concrete empirical 
subjectivity of the subject of experience but rather reflects on it in a 
specific way” (2012, p. 271). This demands reflection not only upon 
the beholder’s productive role (what we might call the beholder’s 
share), but on the need to confront ‘silent’ social and cultural 
assumptions by disrupting or invalidating norms and conventions 
(such as the ubiquitous ‘do not touch’). The resulting 
dehabitualisation – a characteristic feature of much installation art – 
necessitates (i) shifts in spatial and ideological orientation towards 
the work in question, and (ii) (and this is where my position differs 
from Rebentisch’s) a central role for the imagination. In particular, I 
have argued that the latter is critical to negotiating the intrinsically 
unstable relation between our perception of the ‘real’ situation and 
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My argument is therefore that non-sighted modes of beholding 
are integral to both bringing our bodily orientation into play and 
binding the resulting imaginative processes, whereby we experience 
the work as both a virtual space (i.e. a semblance) and a spatially-
situated reality. Thus considered, visual impairment might be 
reconceived not an impediment to an aesthetic encounter (a lacking 
or deficiency), but rather a ‘gap’ to be creatively negotiated as part of 
a fully embodied experience. And while this bodily orientation might 
be considered as a factor in all situated art, it arguably takes on a 
particular importance in installations that explicitly seek to activate 
the space of reception using senses other than sight.  
 
4. 
This paper therefore maintains that the engagement afforded blind 
and partially-sighted people – marginalised not by their blindness, but 
societal attitudes – should not be solely thought of in terms of 
‘disability access’ or ‘social inclusion’ (though these are important), 
but one that expands our understanding of the distinctive ontology of 
postconceptual art. This encompasses – but is certainly not restricted 
to – works appreciated through senses other than sight. Moreover, 
such a position intersects with the problem of defining a distinctive 
phenomenological experience for installation art (distinct from, for 
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environment is organised by the kinetic potential of the sculpture 
itself rather than the situation we occupy).4  
However, if such ‘expanded’ experiences are to constitute more 
than tokenistic gestures towards widening participation, there is a 
need to identify where the criticality lies in such an engagement: an 
encounter that should, of course, be as challenging for a blind 
audience as it is for a sighted one.5 The issue is pressing given that 
intermedial works often seek to problematise the beholder’s 
orientation towards the work, dehabitualising the beholder-position by 
disrupting or negating norms and conventions. Crucially, such a 
theoretical process should be distinguished from the very real 
practical problems of access for people with disabilities that some 
installations present (as the recent controversy over wheelchair 
access to the 2002 work Your Spiral View at Olafur Eliasson’s 
retrospective at Tate Modern demonstrates).6 
This discussion takes place against a backdrop where the 
1960s and 70s witnessed a fundamental challenge to the kind of 
medium-specific modes of art championed by the likes of Clement 
                                                             
4 See Susanne Langer (1953). This is a position I share with Elisa Caldarola (2020), who 
has argued something very similar. 
5 As Candlin (2003) notes, there can sometimes be a tendency to ‘dumb down’ on touch 
tours, though this is certainly not always the case as more blind and visually impaired 
artists are increasingly involved in organising and leading them. In the UK, organisations 
such as VocalEyes, founded in 1998, have been pivotal in transforming the quality of touch 
tours and audio-description. 
6 See the media response to Irish journalist Ciara O’Connor’s Instagram then Twitter thread 
about her experience of being excluded as a wheelchair user by Eliasson’s installation. 
O’Connor’s objection was not just that she was excluded, but Eliasson’s rhetoric around the 
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Greenberg and Michael Fried, dominated (at least in Greenberg’s 
case) by reductive notions of the ‘optic’ that negate the beholder’s 
bodily engagement, even in the case of sculpture. Thus, Greenberg 
claims: “The human body is no longer postulated as the agent of 
space in either painting or sculptural art; now it is eyesight alone, and 
eyesight has more freedom of movement and invention within three 
dimensions than two” (1993, p. 59). The supposed self-sufficiency of 
modernist painting and sculpture was criticised by a new generation 
of critics and practitioners: not only for its demarcation of the virtual 
space of the artwork as distinct from the space of the beholder, but 
also for its explicit ocularcentrism and disavowal of haptic modes of 
engaging art. By contrast, new forms of intermedial art explicitly 
sought to activate the space of reception, in what constituted an 
ideological rejection of the very notion of context-independent art.7 
Here, not only was the context of a work’s reception considered 
constitutive of a work’s meaning, but intermedial art potentially 
offered a more complex physical engagement, inviting multi-sensory 
perception including sound, touch, smell, proprioception and even 
(on rare occasions) taste. Early examples might include Michael 
Asher’s air flow works of 1969, where industrial fans created tangible 
columns of air, or Lygia Clark’s 1967-8 Máscaras 
Sensoriais [Sensory Masks], which enveloped the face of the wearer, 
integrating sachets that were both aromatic and textural.  
                                                             
7 See, for instance, Alex Potts (2001). Of course, this should not hide the fact that many of 
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5.  
A number of questions arise here. If, as noted above, a stated 
intention of much intermedial art involves an intentional 
problematising of the beholder-position, prompting acts of ideation, 
how might such perspective-shifting (to use Wolfgang Iser’s term)8 
be achieved through non-sighted modes of beholding art? How might 
non-sighted modes of beholding likewise dehabitualise perception 
and impede ideation (i.e. our attempt to grasp different levels of 
meaning)? And how might such an expanded notion of such 
processes feed into the wider question of defining a distinctive mode 
of virtual space (in Susanne Langer’s sense) for intermedial forms of 
contemporary art such as installation art? 
My suggestion is that the above questions are, in fact, 
necessarily linked; that in bringing our full bodily orientation into play, 
non-sighted modes of beholding art are integral not only in terms of 
our orientation towards the work, but to processes of 
dehabitualisation. They constitute a distinctive (if not defining) feature 
of the phenomenological experience of installation art (a space into 
which we physically enter), playing a particular role in terms of 
destabilising the conventions of a work’s reception. Of course, I am 
not the only one to make such a claim. Claire Bishop, for instance, 
notes in the introduction to her 2005 book Installation Art: A Critical 
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History that installation art “loosely refers to the type of art into which 
the viewer physically enters”, such that: 
 
Rather than imagining the viewer as a pair of disembodied eyes 
that survey the work from a distance, installation art 
presupposes an embodied viewer whose senses of touch, smell 
and sound are as heightened as their sense of vision. This 
insistence on the literal presence of the viewer is arguably the 
key characteristic of installation art. (2005, p. 6) 
 
Bishop’s position, with its emphasis on touch, smell and sound, 
clearly intersects with my own concern with non-sighted modes of 
beholding art. And while the importance of an embodied beholder 
might be said to characterise many ‘situated’ historical works (prior to 
the Greenbergian fallacy of the self-contained art object),9 it is 
undoubtedly true that the intermedial work emerging out of the 1960s 
marked a paradigmatic shift in practice away from a modernist 
emphasis on the optic. However, Bishop’s two claims need to be 
prised apart. To reduce the beholder (as Fried notoriously does)10 to 
a ‘literal presence’ denies her role in negotiating the unstable 
boundary between real and virtual, something which Bishop’s own 
writing emphasises throughout the rest of her book. 
                                                             
9 See Wilder (2020a). 
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This has certain consequences. If our engagement with 
installation art is one which brings our situated perception into play (a 
perception already enmeshed within the world, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
sense), then non-visual modes of orientation are also constitutive of 
the critical reflection that installation art prompts. They are vital in 
activating our imaginative and ideational orientation towards the 
work, facilitated not only by the ease with which we move between 
frames of reference (coordinated between different sense 
modalities), but in their use of demonstrative frames of reference 
shared between perception and mental imagery. This conceives non-
sighted modes of beholding art as integral to what I hold to be the 
locative, or indexical, functioning of situated art (Wilder, 2020a) – 
exemplified by (though by no means limited to) certain forms of 
installation art – and to the subsequent destabilising effect of the 
work in question when our perception and/or wider orientation 
(including ideological) is then challenged. Bishop (2005) similarly 
refers to this as the ‘decentring’ of the subject, though I prefer to 
describe it as a problematising of our orientation towards the work in 
question, in that any displacement is dependent upon what I am 
calling the work’s locative function. And, to repeat, non-sighted 
modes of beholding art are integral to the very processes of 
dehabitualisation 
The artist Fayen d’Evie, for instance, has likewise written about 
the radical potential of blindness, employing the metaphor of 
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movement with lurching shifts in perceptual perspective, or an 
unanticipated discovery’ which ‘allows for uncertainty, tenuous 
threads, and peripheral distractions, while also affirming wayfinding 
through blindness’ (2017, p. 43). For d’Evie, “blindness may activate 
attentiveness in audiences” and “destabilise performer-spectator 
conventions” (p. 43); she reminds us that “blindness and visuality 
need not be mutually exclusive”, but rather “introduces a complexity 
and diversity of embodiments and relationships to perception, 
imagination, and consciousness” (p. 44). Drawing upon her own 
“unstable” functional vision, she writes: “To retrieve the agency of 
blindness, the definition I carry instead as we blunder onwards is 
blindness as a mode of perceiving that, to a radical extent, makes 
tangible the limits of normative constructs of vision, impairs 
ocularcentrism, and destabilses 20/20 cultural paradigms” (p. 44). 
And as she notes, blindness is a mode of perceiving that connects us 
more explicitly to the ground as a point of reference for navigation, 
whether through the use of a mobility cane or echolocation; we might 
add, it also connects us to the reality of a work’s context. 
Indeed, installation art constitutes a space that while virtualised 
– removed from functional imperatives – compels acts of 
imagination/ideation that, at least in the most critically pertinent forms 
of practice, do not take place in isolation from the work’s situated 
context. Indeed, it is the tension (or slippage) between these two 
superimposed but miscalibrated realms that arguably destabilises the 
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the wider conditions of access enter into the work’s semantic content 
varies widely. At one end of the spectrum are works that make little 
connection to their site and can be relocated without fundamentally 
changing the work’s meaning; at the other are site-specific works that 
are entirely dependent upon their site context and make little sense 
(or at least suffer a considerable loss) when removed from that 
situation.11 Thus conceived, we might set out a series of 
interconnected ways installations orientate us within their virtual 
worlds, which overlap with (while distinguished from) the real space 
                                                             
11 Of course, the same artist can make both types of work, which highlights definitional 
problems based on the imposition of necessary conditions. An example might be Mike 
Nelson’s narrative-driven work. Claire Bishop uses Nelson’s work as paradigmatic of what 
she calls the “dream space” type of installation: “Such work is characterised both by 
psychological absorption and by physical immersion – the viewer does not identify with a 
character depicted in a scene but is placed in the position of the protagonist” (2005, p. 47). 
However, different works by Nelson construct very different relations to site. Coral Reef, 
for instance, is a completely immersive installation entered through an unassuming door 
into a completely internal world of fifteen rooms with interconnecting corridors. Originally 
constructed in late 1999, and opened in 2000 at Matt’s Gallery in London, the whole 
complex installation was then reconstructed in 2010 at Tate Britain, with little impact upon 
the work’s meaning. Here we navigate our way through a confusing set of intersecting, and 
seemingly abandoned rooms using the same orientation skills we employ when faced with 
any real sequence of rooms for the first time; nonetheless, we are not only lost within this 
labyrinthal space but confused as to ‘where’ we are, such is the reality of the replicated 
spaces that do not belong to the space of the gallery – a confusion intensified when we 
encounter the doubled-up space of the mini-cab office for a second time, throwing any 
residual sense of orientation into disarray in an even more destabilising moment of déjà-vu. 
It is as if we have entered a parallel world, both familiar and strange. By contrast, Mirror 
Infill (2006), a site-specific work installed at the Frieze Art Fair and commissioned by 
Frieze Projects, constructs its labyrinth of interconnected spaces in a parallel realm that 
relies for its impact directly upon its juxtaposition of disconnected worlds. The work, 
entirely invisible on the outside apart from its entrance door (concealed by the warren of 
commercial gallery stands), seemed to defy reality, opening up an impossible space 
dominated by the red photography lights in a fictional darkroom and printed images of the 
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that we occupy as beholders. Here, Langer’s notion (alluded to 
earlier) of sculpture making virtual ‘kinetic volume’ out of real, three-
dimensional space might be contrasted with works where the 
organising role is enacted not by the sculpted object, nor, indeed, the 
sculpture itself (in the case of non-gestural abstract sculpture), but 
the entire spatial situation and the potential of our movements 
within.12 Proprioception plays a particular role here; indeed, I would 
suggest that this organising of the kinetic potential of the spatial 
situation takes on its full potential (in Merleau-Ponty’s terms) when it 
comprises a kind of bodily-readiness to the virtual involving all the 
senses: in other words, it utilises locational cues that engage multiple 
senses, and in so doing also involves our imaginative orientation 
towards the virtual realm of the artwork. 
 
6. 
How is this manifest by particular examples of art practice? In the 
final section I will offer some paradigmatic examples; but first, I 
believe it is worth briefly digressing in order to discuss the problem of 
defining the elusive categorisation ‘installation art’. 
If intermedial art (which by definition occupies a territory 
between media) gives rise to new ‘genres’ under umbrella terms 
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such as ‘video art’, ‘sound art’, ‘performance art’ or ‘installation art’,13 
then we need to distinguish between the former terms – 
distinguished by a particular type of content – and the latter term, 
which describes not so much a content as a distinctive format in 
which individual objects (in the analytical sense of calling forth a 
reciprocal subject) are unified into a single work. These categories 
overlap, in that we can coherently talk of ‘video installations’ or 
‘sound installations’ or ‘performance installations’ as subgenres of 
‘video art’, ‘sound art’, and ‘performance art’, distinct from, say, 
single-channel video works, monophonic/stereophonic sound works, 
or performances that happen in conventional theatrical settings 
(rather than a gallery situation). This has led to a certain confusion, in 
that the term installation art has been taken to encompass both 
specific manifestations of these other genres and a genre in and of 
itself, while many artists work across all these genres (such as, pre-
eminently, Bruce Nauman). This is further complicated by other 
overlapping categories such as expanded cinema, land art, 
environments, happenings or expanded painting. 
In trying to define the latter’s multiple manifestations one might 
benefit, as Anne Ring Petersen suggests, from Wittgenstein’s 
concept of family resemblance, which he famously applies to the 
problem of categorising various kinds of games (Petersen, 2015, pp. 
                                                             
13 See, for instance, Juliane Rebentisch (2012). Other terms such as ‘haptic art’ or 
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35-6).14 Such an approach conceives of resemblances not as 
unchanging and fixed, but as relational and shifting, with malleable 
boundaries between categories that are subject to challenge. This 
creates ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-
crossing’ (Wittgenstein, [1953] 2001, p. 27).  
However, as both Wittgenstein and Petersen suggest, at least 
some resemblances might be conceived of as exemplary or 
paradigmatic. Petersen usefully identifies three recurrent tendencies 
that have dominated discourse about installation art: (i) the 
phenomenological approach, with its broad emphasis on spatial and 
temporal experience; (ii) the contextual approach, which identifies 
connections with external circumstances, both institutional and 
historical, social, cultural, economic, political and technological; (iii) 
the performative approach, which emphasises the experience of the 
work as constitutive of a situation and process (2015, pp. 75-89).15 
These are not, however, mutually exclusive, and the most interesting 
installations might be said to address all three discourses. 
Might we likewise conceive ‘situated’ works perceived through 
different non-sighted modes of beholding (such as sound, smell or 
                                                             
14 See Wittgenstein ([1953] 2001). Petersen, however, compromises her position by then 
blurring the distinction between an art form, medium, or genre. 
15 These tendencies, reflected in particular works of installation art, have much in common 
with Claire Bishop’s historical genealogies of installation art, which she divides into: (i) the 
dream scene (‘organised around a model of the subject as psychological, or more 
accurately, psychoanalytical’); (ii) a heightened perception (‘a phenomenological model of 
the viewing subject’); mimetic engulfment (encompassing ‘different returns to late Freud 
and his idea of libidinal withdrawal and subjective disintegration’); (iv)  an activated 
spectatorship (with a poststructuralist informed critique of ‘the activated viewer of 
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touch) as constituting an overlapping and criss-crossing set of 
resemblances within the wider category (or genre, if we want to use 
that term) of installation art?16 And might this also acknowledge 
differences in experiences (which in itself might be thought of as 
constituting a case of overlapping resemblances) of differently abled 
beholders? This shifts the emphasis on ‘resemblance’ from a 
likeness in appearance to the sharing of certain characteristics or 
properties beyond the mere visual. In Wittgenstein’s terms, this might 
be thought of as a shift from considering the enduring physical 
properties of games to characteristics of the rules of engagement 
and the consequent experiences intrinsic to the playing of different 
games. This, to use the language of Wittgenstein, is a drawing of 
boundaries for a ‘special purpose’. 
This shift of emphasis is not, therefore, to submit to a 
subjectivism where the experience is removed from the constraints of 
the work (which would posit the subject’s aesthetic experience as its 
own object), but rather to acknowledge that the art ‘object’ (for want 
of a better word) is aesthetic not by virtue of qualities that precede 
the experience, but in its enactment.17 This is not an escape from the 
particularities of the work and its context, but rather reflects upon the 
                                                             
16 This usefully conceives of what Krauss terms artistic ‘invention’ (countering the so-
called post-medium condition of contemporary art) not in terms of artists inventing their 
own new medium, but (as Dairmuid Costello has suggested) in terms of novel juxtapositions 
of existing media (often using extra-aesthetic technologies, or technical supports, co-opted 
by artists) (Costello 2012). 
17 Again, my position here echoes Rebentisch’s defence of the philosophical turn to 
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experience occasioned by the work (and its instructions) in a specific 
way, such that the beholders role is genuinely performative. I 
conclude with a series of key examples, demonstrating the 
importance (if not centrality) of senses other than sight. To quote 
Wittgenstein:  
 
Here giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining – in 
default of a better. For any general definition may be 
misunderstood too. The point is that this is how we play the 
game. (I mean the language-game with the word “game”)’ 
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Figure 2. Michael Asher, installation at Pomona College (1970) 
Asher’s site-specific 1970 installation was originally conceived as an 
amplification of his earlier air flow works (Asher, 1983, p. 38), which 
had sought to deal with ‘air as an elementary material of unlimited 
presence and availability, as opposed to visually determined 
elements’ (p. 8); but at Pomona he eschewed mechanical devices in 
favour of natural ventilation by opening up the lobby to the gallery by 
removing the doors, such the work’s two interlinked triangular spaces 
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consequences, abstracting the surrounding ambience such that 
‘exterior light, sound, and air became a permanent part of the 
exhibition’ (p. 34). Of particular concern here, the sound of people 
moving through the installation became key, such that ‘exterior and 
interior sounds were collected and amplified in the smaller triangular 
space and transmitted through the corridor’ into the larger, and 
darker, triangular space (which had no lighting other than that which 
passed through the interconnecting space). The installation offered 
an experience that while visual, would amplify the sounds of 
someone moving within the space, especially using a white mobility 
cane, providing audible clues as to the work’s formal configuration. 
The work thus heightened perception, visually, acoustically, and 
haptically. Nonetheless, as with Asher’s wider work, this intersects 
with a critique of the political and economic role of the exhibition, and 
an expectation as to the beholder’s familiarity with such an 
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Figure 3. Lis Rhodes, Light Music (1975), as installed at The Tanks, Tate 
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Figure 4. Lis Rhodes, Light Music (1975), as installed at The Tanks, Tate 
Modern, London, in 2012 
Rhodes’s Light Music is a two-screen 16mm black and white film 
installation, conceived within the remit of what if often referred to as 
expanded cinema. First installed at the Serpentine Gallery, London, 
in the Festival of Independent Video (1975), it was re-installed at the 
Tanks at Tate Modern in 2012. The two screens face each other at 
opposite ends of the haze filled room, such that the two beams 
traverse each other, and the apparatus of projection are incorporated 
into the work. The work addresses the relation of sound and image in 
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series of different horizontal and vertical black and white stripes 
made without a camera) over the audial tracks, thus generating a 
synchronised sound and visual experience through optical means. 
The image thus constitutes a visual score of what one is 
simultaneously hearing, such the experience is akin to an aural 
equivalent to the flickering patters on the two screens. These 
patterns are also apparent in the beams themselves, such that one 
can enter into the cones of striated light. The spatial arrangement 
creates a dynamic, immersive environment that invites the 
participation of the beholder, who disrupts the beams as she passes 
through the space. This is an experience that engages beholders 
with even minimal residual vision, while the audio tracks (and the not 
inconsiderable sounds of the projectors themselves) create dynamic 
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Figure 5. Wolfgang Laib, The Passageway (1988), MoMA, New York 
Since 1988, when he built the demountable The Passageway at 
MoMA, Laib has been creating a series of aromatic wax rooms lined 
with golden beeswax, the most ambitious example being the 40 
metre long underground passage entitled From the Known to the 
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La Ribaute, Barjac, France (fig. 6), in what was the former studio of 
Anselm Kiefer. The earlier works were made from slabs, whereas the 
later works, such as the one at La Ribaute, involved applying the wax 
directly to the supporting walls in one, irremovable piece. Beeswax is 
a natural material secreted from the abdominal glands of honey 
bees, and which is used to form cells for honey storage or larval and 
pupal protection. It has long association with candle-making, for 
sealing/casting, but also in burial rituals; it is thus rich in associations, 
which Laib exploits while refusing to close down the work’s meaning. 
Beeswax is one of a limited number of intrinsic materials found in 
nature that Laib employs extensively in his work, a list which also 
includes pollen, stone, rice and milk. These enclosed, confined 
spaces (lit only by bare lightbulbs), intensify the sense of smell, yet 
they are not so much claustrophobic as meditative, the smell 
unlocking memories to transport us to someplace ‘elsewhere’. The 
inspiration was Laib’s own extraordinary experience of making his 
smaller beeswax works, which involved having his head inside the 
work. The translucent walls reflect the light in such a way as to 
seemingly emit a soft glow. Here, the beholder is given a very 
concentrated experience: a heightened perception rich in historical 
associations. And not surprisingly, Laib is critical of categorising 
himself as a ‘visual’ artist, stating that if it was only the visual 
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Figure 6. Wolfgang Laib, From the Known to the Unknown – To Where is 
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Figure 7. Mona Hatoum, The Light at the End (1989), Showroom Gallery, 
London 
 
Originally installed in a triangular-shaped space at the rear of the 
Showroom Gallery in London, the Palestinian artist’s work has been 
re-staged at various venues. The work is constructed out of iron, 
steel, brass, glass, aluminium and electrical elements. The tunnel-
like space is darkened, other than a single light which reveals the 
blood-red colour of the painted bricks, and the sculptural installation 
itself, which emits a soft and enticing glow. But the work’s most 
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walks towards the glowing lines of light. Lizzie Wright describes the 
work thus: “As progress into the tunnel is made, the temperature 
rises until the heat becomes oppressive: it becomes clear that the 
grill glows with a dangerous heat that would burn the skin if touched.” 
The title of this work suggests optimism – a pathway through the 
tunnel of despair – yet the installation cruelly shuts of this possibility 
and instead leads the viewer into a confined and oppressive space. 
Hatoum has described how the work concerns “the idea of 
imprisonment, of torture, but it is also a seductive image. Once 
people have adjusted to the dark and watched the bars glow … then 
they begin to see them as beautiful bands of light. I was interested to 
explore this feeling of being attracted and repulsed” (Wright, 1990). 
Here, the experience is problematised to the extent of constituting a 
very real threat of harm, while keeping the beholder distanced by the 
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Figure 8. Ernesto Neto, Navedenga (1998), MoMA, New York 
 
The Brazilian artist Ernesto Neto makes immersive sensorial 
environments, that while highly visually evocative (with their 
anthropomorphic rounded appendages and orifices) foreground the 
tactile and olfactory senses. Indebted to the participatory work of 
Neo-Concrete artists such as Lygia Clark, his biomorphic forms are 
constructed out of stretchable materials such as translucent 
polyamide fabrics, often weighed down by sand (revealing the forces 
of gravity). The resulting organic forms are in stark contrast to the 
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is stretched in each corner at the top by extended, pendulous forms, 
filled with sand, and at the bottom by sand-filled cloven ‘feet’. Neto’s 
characteristic suspended forms often include aromatic materials, 
though in the case of Navedenga it is the fabric that is impregnated 
with the smell of cloves. This experience is much stronger when the 
beholder enters into the tent-like structure through a narrow, slit 
opening in one corner, and is forced to tentatively step onto the 
flexible fabric in order to stumble through the inherently unstable 
space. When two people occupy the space together, this intensifies 
the experience, one person’s movement destabilising the other; one 
is forced to cooperate in order to effectively move, as one negotiates 
the central hanging form and the soft, Styrofoam-filled appendage 
which partially fill the space. As the beholder manipulates the 
enclosing fabric, she also experiences the sound-deadening effect of 
the fabric enclosure, a strangely comforting experience rich with 
childhood associations and evocations of the body, while also 
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Figure 9. Susan Philipsz, War Damaged Musical Instruments (2015), Tate 
Britain, London 
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Duveen Galleries at Tate Britain in London. The work comprised 
fourteen audio recordings of British and German brass and wind 
instruments damaged during conflicts stretching over some 200 
years, and left gathering dust in various museum storage rooms. The 
earliest instrument was a Bugle salvaged from the Battle of Waterloo, 
found beside the body of a 14-tear-old drummer boy; the latest were 
four German instruments (an alto saxophone, a keyed bugle, and two 
transverse flutes) salvaged from the Alte Münz bunker in Berlin, in 
1945. Each recording, where the instrument had to be coaxed back 
into some sort of life (however discordant and tentative) was played 
through a separate speaker, located throughout the entire length of 
the space. In her essay ‘Beyond Borders’, Philipsz notes that “while 
making the recordings we were aware that we were probably the first 
people to hear these instruments since they were damaged” (2019, 
p. 286). The instruments were, literally, reanimated through the 
player’s breath. Philipsz writes:  
 
The notes I recorded were based upon the four tones that make 
up the military bugle call “The Last Post”, a signal to soldiers in 
the theatre of war that fighting was done, and to follow the 
sound of the call to find safety and rest. The tune was 
deconstructed and fragmented to such an extent that it was 
practically unrecognisable. In the space the long tones and 
silences allowed each tone to sustain before the others 
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length within the long physical space. I used sound to define 
distance and used the volume of the space to add volume to 
the work (pp. 286-288).  
 
As Philipsz notes elsewhere in her essay, the acoustics of museum 
spaces are seldom given consideration; but here, in the reverberant 
spaces of the Duveen Galleries, they become a means of navigating 
through both a present reality and the poignant echoes of the past. 
As Adrian Searle wrote in his Guardian review:  
 
For all its mournful aspects, the music is as uplifting as it is 
painful; close then distant, clear then broken, a cry then a 
whisper. The sound is wonderful. The shrapnel damage and 
bullet-holes, mutilated bells and mangled tubing add their own 
flavour. The players have to work around the instruments’ 
injuries. Often they have to substitute one note for another. 
Some instruments are irrevocably out of tune. Brass and 
woodwind, trumpets and saxes are the most bodily of 
instruments; what we hear are damaged, tremulous bodies, 
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